Increasing knowledge-intensity and complexity : nanotechnology and the future of public participation and policy making by Meier, Torsten
  
UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE 
Increasing knowledge-intensity and complexity; 
  Nanotechnology and the future of public participation 
and policy making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted by: 
 
Torsten Meier 
 
Department of Politics 
School of Geography, Politics and Sociology 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of: 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
 
February 2011 
 
 
P a g e  | 2 
Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... 6 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................................... 8 
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................... 9 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ 10 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................ 11 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 12 
1.1 Research question and objectives .................................................................................................... 15 
Research Question ............................................................................................................................. 15 
Proposition ........................................................................................................................................ 15 
Additional objectives ......................................................................................................................... 15 
1.2 Relevance ......................................................................................................................................... 16 
1.3 Methodology ................................................................................................................................... 18 
1.4 Outline of chapters .......................................................................................................................... 23 
Chapter 2: The context of the research .............................................................................................. 23 
Chapter 3: Knowledge ........................................................................................................................ 25 
Chapter 4: Nanotechnology ............................................................................................................... 27 
Chapter 5: Nanologue ........................................................................................................................ 29 
Chapter 6: Analysis ............................................................................................................................ 30 
Chapter 7: Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 31 
2. THE CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH ........................................................................... 32 
2.1 Introducing the socio-economic and technological context ............................................................. 32 
2.1.1 The changing global arena ......................................................................................................... 33 
2.1.2 The change of the technological realm ...................................................................................... 41 
2.1.3 Economic changes ..................................................................................................................... 46 
P a g e  | 3 
2.2. Changing society ............................................................................................................................. 48 
2.2.1 Information Societies ................................................................................................................ 50 
2.2.2 Knowledge Societies.................................................................................................................. 54 
2.2.3 Summarising societal change .................................................................................................... 57 
2.3 Changing politics .............................................................................................................................. 58 
2.4 Summary .......................................................................................................................................... 62 
3. KNOWLEDGE, EXPERTISE AND POLICY MAKING ................................................ 63 
3.1 Defining data, information, knowledge and expertise ..................................................................... 63 
3.1.1 Data .......................................................................................................................................... 63 
3.1.2 Information ............................................................................................................................... 65 
3.1.3 Knowledge ................................................................................................................................ 68 
3.1.4 Practical aspects of knowledge .................................................................................................. 74 
3.1.5 Expertise ................................................................................................................................... 77 
3.2 Knowledge by acquaintance/description ......................................................................................... 79 
3.3 Tacit vs. Explicit ................................................................................................................................ 84 
3.3.1 Tacit knowledge ........................................................................................................................ 84 
3.3.1.1 Defining tacit knowledge ................................................................................................... 84 
3.3.1.2 Dimensions of tacit knowledge .......................................................................................... 87 
3.3.1.3 Forms of tacit knowledge .................................................................................................. 90 
3.3.2 Explicit knowledge .................................................................................................................... 93 
3.3.3 Transforming tacit to explicit knowledge ................................................................................... 93 
3.4 Expert knowledge and knowledge gaps ........................................................................................... 96 
3.4.1 Expert knowledge...................................................................................................................... 96 
3.4.2 Knowledge gaps ...................................................................................................................... 100 
3.5 Information, knowledge and policy making ................................................................................... 101 
3.5.1 Policy making .......................................................................................................................... 101 
3.5.2 Theories of the policy process ................................................................................................. 103 
3.5.3 Policy information and policy knowledge ................................................................................ 113 
3.6 Knowledge Framework .................................................................................................................. 115 
3.7 Summary ........................................................................................................................................ 119 
P a g e  | 4 
4. NANOTECHNOLOGY .................................................................................................... 123 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 124 
4.2 What is nanotechnology? .............................................................................................................. 125 
4.3 Why is nanotechnology important? ............................................................................................... 130 
4.4 Current developments and trends ................................................................................................. 134 
4.5 Public reactions to and understanding of nanotechnology ............................................................ 137 
4.6 The current understanding of the risks of nanotechnology ........................................................... 146 
4.7 Nanoscale silver ............................................................................................................................. 148 
4.8 Summary and outlook .................................................................................................................... 154 
5. NANOLOGUE .................................................................................................................. 159 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 159 
5.2 Nanologue’s study of nanotechnology ........................................................................................... 161 
5.2.1 Risk perceptions ...................................................................................................................... 162 
5.2.2 Areas of concern as highlighted by the members of civil society ............................................. 169 
5.2.3 Recommendations and recommended actions ........................................................................ 173 
5.3 Summary ........................................................................................................................................ 175 
6. ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................................... 177 
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 177 
6.2 Applying the knowledge framework to different knowledge types ............................................... 178 
6.2.1 Knowledge by acquaintance .................................................................................................... 178 
6.2.2 Tacit knowledge ...................................................................................................................... 179 
6.2.3 Knowledge by description ....................................................................................................... 181 
6.2.4 Explicit knowledge .................................................................................................................. 182 
6.2.5 Policy Knowledge and Information .......................................................................................... 183 
6.2.6 Comparing knowledge types ................................................................................................... 184 
6.3 Applying the knowledge framework to policy recommendations ................................................. 187 
P a g e  | 5 
6.3.1 Recommended actions and recommendations - Nanologue .................................................... 188 
6.3.1.1 Recommended actions by researchers............................................................................. 188 
6.3.1.2 Recommended actions by members of civil society ......................................................... 191 
6.3.1.3 Nanologue’s recommendations ....................................................................................... 193 
6.3.2 Assessing the recommended actions and recommendations................................................... 194 
6.3.2.1 Assessing problems.......................................................................................................... 196 
Option 1 – Let the expert be the informer .............................................................................. 197 
Option 2 – Use knowledge elicitation ..................................................................................... 198 
6.3.2.2 Assessing recommendations ............................................................................................ 200 
6.4 Applying the findings to theories of the policy process ................................................................. 209 
6.5 Summary ........................................................................................................................................ 216 
7. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................... 221 
Nanotechnology................................................................................................................................... 221 
Theories of the policy process ............................................................................................................. 225 
Outlook ................................................................................................................................................ 229 
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................. 232 
 
  
P a g e  | 6 
Abstract 
In recent years, both policy-makers and politicians have been confronted with 
increasing obstacles towards the interpretation, usage, prediction and application of 
data, information and of knowledge. This has often resulted in surprises, for instance, 
as predicted outcomes of introduced policy changes, either did not take effect or 
simply took on other forms that were not desired. Added to that, new developments 
and advances in a number of key technological areas have led to the emergence of 
new knowledge-intensive and technologically-complex disciplines, such as 
Nanotechnology, Genetic Engineering or Synthetic Biology. The complexity that is 
inherent in any of these new disciplines poses new challenges to both policy-making 
and public participation.  
This thesis focuses on the question of whether increasing complexity and knowledge-
intensity that follow current and future technological developments will lead to a 
decrease in both the public’s interests and ability to participate in the public debate . In 
addition, this thesis will investigate how policy recommendations are affected when 
the dependency on expertise, which is due to the inherent knowledge-intensity of 
these new disciplines, is on the rise. Nanotechnology has been chosen as an example 
case of one of these new knowledge-intensive and technologically-complex disciplines. 
By developing and employing a knowledge framework that is based on a practical 
approach to distinguishing various types of knowledge; public and expert opinions as 
well as policy recommendations will be analysed in order to determine whether a new 
approach for involving the public and for the future of policy recommendation is 
required. Furthermore, by applying this knowledge framework to three selected 
theories of policy process, special emphasis is placed on the applicability of different 
types of knowledge and information in policy contexts. An additional aim is to assess 
the use of terms, such as information and knowledge, in the policy sciences. Using 
these different types of knowledge, for instance, by making a deliberate distinction 
between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, or between tacit 
knowledge and explicit knowledge, allows identifying what can be known by whom, 
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and thus will shed new light on both policy recommendations and on what can be 
expected from the public’s involvement in the future.  
This thesis will suggest that when dealing with knowledge-intensive and 
technologically-complex disciplines, the importance of acknowledging different types 
of knowledge is a prerequisite for improving the quality of policy-making, policy 
recommendations as well as public engagement. Also, a case will be made against a 
generic use of the terms knowledge and information in policy literature.  As much as 
policy information does not equal any generic type of information, lacking specificity 
with regards to information and knowledge in the theories of policy may invalidate or 
at least challenge some claims made policy scientists, as expected outcomes that apply 
to one particular type of information may not automatically apply to another.  
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1. Introduction 
The extent, intensity and the impact of globalisation (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & 
Perraton, 2000) has triggered global economic, social and technological change that 
will alter established patterns with regard to how people live, how organisations 
interact with each other and how governments work. The sheer speed with which 
data, information and knowledge increases will challenge many in both modern 
(Western) societies and in developing nations alike. Current indicators, such as patent 
filings (WIPO, 2007) seem to confirm these trends. The new knowledge-based 
economy, with its increasing number of distinct products, producers and consumers, is 
said to be far more complex than its industrial predecessor (Stevens, Miller, & 
Michalski, 2000). The rise of the knowledge worker (Cortada, 1998a), in addition to 
manual labourers, will add to the already complex layer of knowledge ‘haves’, and at 
the same time, increase the gap to the knowledge ‘have nots’. New and increasingly 
complex technological change with its creation and distribution of new technologies 
has the potential to challenge not only users and consumers, but also governments 
(Ernst & O'Connor, 1989). These are now confronted with the need to master these 
new technologies, especially when they are strategically decisive and have the 
potential to largely shape a country’s destiny (Castells, 1996). Biotechnology, genetic 
engineering, nanotechnology and synthetic biology are examples of these new, and at 
the same time potentially controversial, technologies.  
This thesis addresses the policy challenge that those in government and society more 
generally face in coping with these technologies and the huge growth in the level of 
knowledge. According to Kaul (2004) and Tsourikov (2001) the world’s knowledge 
allegedly doubles every six months; overall human knowledge every two to three 
years, medical knowledge every seven years, and scientific knowledge roughly every 
decade. Similar statistics exist for information: online information is said to double 
every six months, unstructured information every three months and corporate 
information every 18 months; while corporate data doubles every six months and the 
total sum of printed knowledge and information; that is, everything that has ever been 
published and retained doubles (Kaul, 2004; Tsourikov, 2001). But it is not only the 
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amount of data, information and knowledge that is increasing. The more important 
aspect is that data, information and knowledge have become more and more complex 
and that the types of knowledge required to work with any of these in the future will 
also increase, and therefore, increase the need to know about information (Krohn, 
2001) and knowledge itself. 
The increasing importance of information and knowledge has also been acknowledged 
in the social sciences. Since the mid/late 20th century, knowledge, in itself, has 
received much attention and its value has since then often been compared to that of 
traditional, natural resources (Machlup, 1962). Taking tremendous efforts of theorising 
and philosophising about knowledge as a subject aside, one can still find no single and 
fully accepted definition that describes the now called ‘resource’ knowledge. In the 
areas of business (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) and management sciences (Drucker, 
1995), in philosophy (Fuller, 1991), in sociology (Castells, 1996; Stehr, 2002), and in 
political sciences (Radaelli, 1997; Haas P. M., 2001) the role information and 
knowledge play has received much attention in recent years. In policy literature in 
particular, the importance and the perceptions of information and knowledge has also 
been developed further.   
Radaelli (1997) points out that knowledge shapes and moulds actor’s preferences and 
that “Knowledge – not power – covers the bridge between actors, their interests, and 
action” (Radaelli, 1997, p. 166). Sabatier argues that “policy information is typically 
used …to buttress one's position or to attack an opponent” (Sabatier, 1991b, p. 148). 
However, as this thesis will show, the terms ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’ are all too 
often used very generically, although the terms ‘information’, and even more so, 
‘knowledge’ are far from generic. Policy literature often uses the term policy 
information (Straf, 2001) or policy knowledge (Haas P. M., 2001), yet what type of 
information or knowledge is it? How does it relate to other types of information and 
knowledge ‘out there’? Moreover, terms such as knowledge societies, knowledge 
workers, knowledge gathering, knowledge representation and even knowledge 
management have become common. But what is knowledge? Of what is it composed, 
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how is it acquired, how is it nurtured, and how is it best employed for the use of all – if 
that is desired?  
P.M. Haas argues that “*p+olitical legitimacy rests on a process of knowledge 
development and diffusion that is scrupulously free of political interference (Haas P. M., 
2004, p. 576). Yet in recent years, both policy-makers and politicians have been 
confronted with increasing obstacles towards the interpretation, usage, prediction and 
application of data, of information and of knowledge (Krohn, 2001). This has often 
resulted in surprises, as predicted outcomes of introduced policy changes either did 
not take effect at all or simply took on other forms that were not desired and thus 
required counterbalancing in order to avoid further adverse effects. Notorious 
examples are public budget predictions, introduced reforms that did not deliver the 
expected (and, to the public, promised) results or simply ‘surprises’ that followed the 
ratification of legislations and treaties.   
A number of challenges can be addressed by investigating one particular area of new 
technology such as nanotechnology. It will be argued that increasing complexity and 
knowledge-intensity will lead to an increased dependence on experts as a means to 
accessing as well as interpreting specialist knowledge. From a policy perspective, one 
needs to ask what impact this new complexity has. Similarly, how is this new 
complexity going to impact public participation? Science and technology are complex 
human activities (Ziman, 1984) that change rapidly in form and content. Yet, every so 
often, science and technology can also be harmful. Here, the difficulty is for the policy-
maker to obtain a level of understanding that goes beyond the mere usage of this 
technology in order to assess both risks and benefits. What is required instead is an 
active transfer of expertise - from the technology provider, patent holder, or any other 
directly involved party that has the required expertise - to the actors and bodies 
involved in policy-making. As this appears improbable, an alternative means of 
accessing and/or involving the required subject matter expertise in the policy cycle is 
required. This could include knowledge elicitation or using experts directly. 
Furthermore, the dependence on experts to be used as ‘translators’ of knowledge-
intensive subject matters for either the public or government asks questions as to how 
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non-experts ought to deal with subject matters that are too complex to be understood 
by a mere layperson? What if, going forward, only experts will be knowledgeable 
enough to comprehend certain subject matters? How will they be involved in a policy-
making process, especially when these experts are employed by major corporations 
that quite frankly want to protect their assets, such as patents? And, again, how will 
the public be affected and what happens if the public has no interest in any of these 
new complex technologies, for instance, due to a lack of understanding?  
1.1 Research question and objectives 
Research Question 
Will increasing complexity and knowledge-intensity that follow current technological 
developments and advances challenge policy-making and also hinder the public’s 
ability to participate in the public debate? 
Proposition  
The main argument of this thesis is:  
 
Due to the increasing knowledge-intensity and complexity of new and emerging 
technologies, a distinction between various types of information and knowledge is 
beneficial, if not required, in order to benefit both the public discourse and policy-
making. Furthermore, by distinguishing between various types of information and 
knowledge, theories of the policy process can be assessed towards their applicability 
to complex, knowledge-intensive and expertise dependent subject matters, such as 
nanotechnology. 
Additional objectives 
There are a number of additional objectives that are central to this thesis: 
• To establish a framework that focuses on different knowledge types that can be 
used to make distinctions vital in practical contexts. 
• To assess selected criteria of a number of theories of the policy process with 
regards to the usefulness of identifying different types of knowledge and 
information. The three selected theories are Ostrom’s Institutional Rational 
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Choice framework (1991), Moe’s Structural Choice approach (1995) and 
Sabatier’s Advocacy Collation framework (1988).  
• To investigate one knowledge-intensive area in detail that is relevant for policy-
makers and the public. 
• To identify tools that could help overcome potential stumbling blocks for 
policy-makers and the public. 
1.2 Relevance 
The selected topic is relevant to the political sciences because of two main factors: 
Firstly, it will be shown that even though information and knowledge have received 
increased attention, in some areas, it has not gone far enough. Secondly, it will show 
that the rise of new and increasingly converging sets of technology poses challenges to 
both policy-making and public participation.  
Meehan defines a policy as follows: “A policy provides a solution to a choice problem; 
the problem is always analytically prior to the policy (Meehan, 1993, p. 58). By this, 
Meehan means that a problem, for instance climate change, is always known before 
actions (a solution) can be taken. However, what if this is no longer true? What if a 
policy is required, although not much is known about the problem? What if there is a 
need or a desire to put regulation in place because ‘negative impacts’ of a new 
technology, for instance, are expected, feared or assumed? By now, there are 
numerous fields, such as nanotechnology or genetic engineering, that have become 
rather difficult for the non-expert to comprehend, and yet politicians, bureaucrats and 
policy-makers need to set the direction forward and, at the same time, ensure the 
public that governments can be trusted to deal with knowledge-intensive subject 
matters (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2002). Climate change, to use that example 
again, has been pursued for many years by experts only and at the same time failed to 
gain larger public recognition. The latter part is now slowly changing, partly due to 
media coverage in the wake of Hurricane Katrina that severely affected the United 
States, and partly due to the fact that a number of prominent public figures have 
‘adopted’ the topic (for instance, Al Gore).  
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Nevertheless, gaining public recognition and comprehending a topic as complex as 
climate change are two different things. Worldwide there are only a small number of 
experts researching climate change who can truly claim to more or less fully 
comprehend the topic as a whole. What does this mean for the public? Should they 
simply give up caring about it because they cannot understand it? The inclusion of the 
public in political and social debate is seen, amongst other things, as a sign of political 
stability (O'Flynn, 2007). Furthermore, it is also seen as a sign of political equality, “if it 
means the inclusion in a decision-making process on equal terms of all who are subject 
to its decisions” (O'Flynn, 2007, p. 738). What, however, if this increasingly becomes an 
issue, as the public can neither comprehend the content nor the reasoning behind 
decisions due to a lack of understanding or inability to access the relevant information 
and required knowledge? 
For the past two thousand years, every major government in the world has supported 
centres of knowledge such as libraries, universities, monasteries, and departmental 
libraries and archives (Cortada, 1998a). In recent years, however, much of the 
knowledge-intensive information is being held by corporations, research institutes, in 
patents, or in other inaccessible forms of both storage and ownership. “For a thousand 
years, … guilds certified the ability of craftsmen making everything from jewelry to 
armor” (Cortada, 1998a, p. 9). But now, who certifies the skills and ability of policy-
makers, let alone politicians? Although the technological change led to an enormous 
increase in the quantity of information that is now available, it did not automatically 
increase in the value of information (Keohane & Nye, 1998). On the contrary, finding 
the right information for the right purpose has become more difficult.  
Why is the topic important? Nanotechnology, and its potential impacts, is only one 
example of a knowledge-intensive and expertise-dependent technology. However, 
nanotechnology, as used in the context of this thesis, could easily be substituted by a 
different, and perhaps even more complex technology, for instance, Synthetic Biology. 
What is being suggested here, as part of this research, is that new ways of dealing with 
matters of enormous complexity are required so that society is not challenged per se. 
The main point is not to draw a ‘doom and gloom’ picture about anything that bears 
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risk. Due to the enormous technological advancements of the last few centuries, it is 
only natural that new, and especially converging, sets of technologies bear 
proportionally greater risks than advancements of previous centuries. Methods and 
tools that have been used in the past to deal with vast changes may not apply as 
before. This is where the need to fully understand data, information and knowledge 
comes into play. Only if politicians and policy makers have a sound knowledge and 
understanding of the skills that are required to deal with complex information can the 
public be both prepared and feel informed about complex subject matters.  
1.3 Methodology  
In order to answer the research question and to investigate the additional objectives, 
an approach had to be chosen allowing for the required breadth of the research to be 
taken into account. The research topic sits within political sciences, and to a certain 
extent within policy sciences, but as it is of such a broad spectrum that a multi-
disciplinary approach was required. Thus, areas such as contemporary discussion in 
disciplines such as Politics in general, Policy Science/Studies, Management Studies/ 
Sciences, Information and Communication Sciences and, of course, Nanotechnology 
had to be taken into account.  
The research focuses on a case study and is a detailed illustration of a broader 
phenomenon (Hague, Harrop, & Breslin, 1998). Yin defines a case study as an “enquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” (Yin, 1994, 
p. 13). In the context of this thesis, this can be interpreted as follows: the 
contemporary phenomenon is the rise of knowledge-intensive and increasingly 
complex technologies and the real life context is the impact this has on areas such as 
public participation or policy making. Furthermore, it aims to broaden the 
understanding of currently held views, and where possible, propose options. A 
particular example is the use of information in policy-making. There seems to be 
common agreement amongst researchers that information and knowledge play an 
important, if not even crucial role (Sabatier, 1988, 1991; Haas P. M., 2004; Radaelli, 
1997). Yet, when it comes to the use of the term information in policy literature, one 
often finds this usage to be generic, if not unspecific. Similarly, it is all too common 
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these days to make policy recommendations. Yet, how useful are such policy 
recommendations in a real-world context, when they need to hold up against scrutiny? 
In order to find this out, and to fully take the complexities of this research into 
account, a multi-disciplinary approach that has been chosen. This was supported by a 
literature review encompassing the following areas:   
• Globalisation/global transformation 
• Data, information and knowledge 
• Information/ Knowledge society 
• Policy studies and policy-making 
• Public perception and communication of nanotechnologies 
• Nanotechnology and risks of nanotechnology 
An overview of the multi-disciplinary literature used in this thesis is provided in 
chapter 1.4.  
It is expected that nanotechnology is only the first of a new breed of emerging 
technologies, which potentially will have far-ranging consequences for a variety of 
areas, such as society, economy, and politics. Currently, nanotechnology is neither a 
standard nor a representative type of technology, mostly due to its nature of being ‘a 
set of converging technologies’ rather than a single technology. However, it is 
expected to become a typical technology in the future. Thus, nanotechnology, as used 
in this thesis, is a prototypical case. It is prototypical because of the inherent 
complexity and knowledge-intensity, and as such poses a very difficult information and 
knowledge challenge to policy-making and to political participation.   
Before selecting an example of an emerging complex and knowledge-intensive 
technology that could be used in a prototypical fashion, the following choices were 
reviewed: genetic engineering, nanotechnology, and synthetic biology. For the 
purposes of this research, it was important that the selected choice met a number of 
criteria: available data and research literature, already available practical applications 
and products (ideally unbeknownst to the public), first signs of an existing academic 
and/or public debate, an available timeline for further product launches and the 
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potential to pose difficulties for future policy-making. Synthetic biology did not meet 
these criteria due to the lack of available products, a sufficiently large enough body of 
knowledge and available data and an acceptable timeline for product launches. 
Genetic engineering also did not meet a number of criteria, when excluding GMO, a 
subject that has been sufficiently discussed in recent years. Thus, the decision was 
made to select nanotechnology as it provided just the right amount of acceptable 
criteria. Nanotechnology, although still only emerging can already show a number of 
products on the market, has started a discussion in both public and academia, 
including the social sciences, and there are clear indications of what products/uses to 
expect next. These factors were important in the selection of nanotechnology, as the 
“danger with the prototypical case is that it involves a bet on the future” (Hague, 
Harrop, & Breslin, 1998, p. 277). Thus, it was necessary to ensure that nanotechnology 
did not turn “into a dud” (Hague, Harrop, & Breslin, 1998, p. 277) during the execution 
of the research.  
In order to investigate whether nanotechnology has indeed the characteristics of being 
a forerunner in trends, a characteristic that applies to prototypical cases, international 
funding (ESRC, 2007; Nanotechwire, 2008) and investment activities (Lux Research, 
2007) over the past decade have been studied. This, then, led to the study of recent 
research activities (Bainbridge & Rocco, 2005; Babu, Deepa, Shankar, & Rai, 2008) as 
well as forecasts of nano-technological development (PEN, 2007; Nanowerk, 2007). 
Once it had been established that nanotechnology fits these characteristics, the main 
work for the knowledge framework could be undertaken.    
This included the research of concepts such as knowledge by acquaintance and 
description, tacit and explicit knowledge as well as policy knowledge, as they needed 
to be established in order to form the core of the knowledge framework. The idea 
behind the knowledge framework was to design an analytical tool that enabled not 
only the cross-comparison of various forms and concepts of knowledge, but also allows 
for the application of findings in the areas of public perception of nanotechnology, the 
risks from nanotechnology and to policy recommendations. For such a comparison to 
be successful, it was important to design the framework in a way that allowed the 
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comparison of the varying key components and key characteristics of the different 
knowledge types against a set of variables, such as the scope of each knowledge type 
or the characteristics of the knowledge holder.  
Additionally, the core of the knowledge framework can be applied against select 
parameters of theories of the policy process and policy information. Here, the aim was 
to critically assess three selected theories with regards to the findings of the 
knowledge framework.  
In order to analyse the impacts of nanotechnology on both policy-making and public 
participation, sufficient data for analysis had to be gathered.  However, due to the 
novelty and the complexity of nanotechnology research, it has been decided to use the 
raw data Nanologue (2005, 2006) provided, instead of personally obtaining primary 
research data. Initially, the idea was to obtain such data by means of questionnaires 
and interviews. However, it soon became clear that the quantity and quality of data 
that could have been obtained this way would not hold up to the extensive scope of 
Nanologue’s research, which not only received substantial funding from the EU’s 6th 
Framework Programme but which also involved four research institutes across three 
countries. Data collection on a scale presented by the Nanologue group would have 
been beyond the scope of this thesis, hence the decision to use Nanologue research 
instead. This meant, however, also having to accept limitations. The most important 
one comes with the data Nanologue provided; in particular, Nanologue’s selection of 
the members of civil society. Here, it had to be accepted that although Nanologue 
chose to select members of civil society that had had at least some prior dealing with 
nanotechnology; using random members of the public would have been more useful.  
The analysis was undertaken by applying key findings established in chapters 4 to 5 to 
the knowledge framework.  This has been done firstly, by applying the five knowledge 
types of the knowledge framework – knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge by 
description, tacit knowledge, explicit knowledge and policy knowledge – to 
nanotechnology and to the selected case of nanoscale silver. This was done in order to 
establish a baseline of ‘what can be known by whom’ in the context of nanotechnology 
and nanoscale silver, as this has implications for both public participation, the public’s 
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knowledge of nanotechnology and nanotechnology-related policy-making. Based on 
this, policy recommendations and generally recommended actions were assessed in 
the same manner. Similarly, three selected theories of the policy process were 
examined against the knowledge framework. Both of these exercises aimed at 
establishing as to whether the intentional distinction between different knowledge 
types, as proposed in this thesis, would potentially benefit public participation and 
policy making. The answer to this is provided in the conclusion.     
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, a multi-disciplinary approach was 
chosen in order to research the topic. Thus, a brief overview of the literatures used will 
be given below. 
The globalisation and transformation literature reviewed for this thesis sits mainly 
within political sciences (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 2000) and economic 
geography (Amin & Thrift, 1999), when taking a spatial component into account. 
However, other authors, such as Beck (2000) and Castells (1997, 1998, 1999) have a 
background in sociology. When positioning the research, a certain historical 
perspective was required. Here, perspectives on the historicity of change, and 
particularly of technological and economic changed are provided by Landes (1999a, 
1999b) and Mokyr (1992).  Literature about data, information and knowledge has been 
sourced from various backgrounds. For instance, Lyre (2002) approaches data and 
information from an Information Sciences perspective, whereas MacDonald (1999, 
Davenport and Prusak (2000) and Drucker (1995) approach it from a Business 
Studies/Management Sciences perspective. A similar approach was required when 
discussing knowledge. A review of literature from disciplines such as philososphy 
(Russel, 2001), and particularly epistemology (Sosa & Kim, 2001; Williams, 2001), was 
combined with Business Studies/Management Sciences (Cortada, 1998a; Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995) literature and sociology (Stehr, 2002).  
For the policy section, and in particular, for the sections on theories of the policy 
process and on policy information, a broad spectrum of politics literature has the 
reviewed, ranging from governance (Peters & Pierre, 1998; Pierre, 2000), policy and 
knowledge studies (Radaelli, 1997), organisations and institutions (Lustick, 1980; 
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Peters & Pierre, 1998), general policy literature (Peters & Pierre, 2006), literature 
specific to policy information (Straf, 2001; Haas P. M.,1991, 2004) and theories of the 
policy process (Ostrom, 1991, 1994; Moe, 1995; Sabatier 1988, 1991).  
The nanotechnology literature can roughly be divided into three groups: pure science 
based literature (Babu et al., 2008; Guo et al., 2006), scientific (Ehdaie, 2007; Maynard, 
2006) and popular scientific (Behra & Krug, 2008; Drexler, 1986; Gatti & Montanari, 
2008) accounts reporting about both progress and risks of nanoetchnology, and official 
and public communications from governments (BMBF, 2006), governmental bodies 
(Commission, 2004, 2005) and other organisations (Royal Society, 2004; ESRC, 2003). 
In addition, up-to-date data on funding, products and other recent developments in 
the field has been obtained from various Internet resources (Nanowerk, 2007; 
Nanotechwire, 2008; PEN, 2007, 2008). Science communication literature formed the 
main body of the review of the current public debate (Scheufele et al., 2007) and 
studies into public acceptance of nanotechnoloy (Currall et al., 2006; Kahan et al., 
2007, 2008). 
1.4 Outline of chapters 
Chapter 2: The context of the research 
This chapter aims to position the research, thus focusing on central questions such as: 
Where does the topic fit? Why is the topic important? What are the main challenges? 
By and large, this chapter is a general introduction to the topic and provides the 
starting point and basis for chapters 3 and 4. Drawing on Held et al. (2000), this 
chapter discusses recent changes that have happened on a global scale. Without 
further engaging in the recent globalisation debate (Beck, 2000; Varwick, 1998; 
Bhagwati, 2004), the main emphasis is to find out what role Information and 
Communications Technologies (ICTs) played, and what this means with regards to 
knowledge and increasing knowledge intensity?1 This, then, draws attention to the role 
of corporations in today’s globalised world, especially with regards to holding patents 
(WIPO, 2007).  
                                                     
1 The term knowledge intensity can have two different meanings. In the context of this thesis, it is used 
to illustrate the extent to which industries produce extremely complex high-technology products. 
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Following the above discussion, emphasis is being put on technology and technological 
change. After providing definitions on what constitutes technology (Walker, 1999; 
Ernst & O'Connor, 1989), and what technological change means, the importance of 
technological change in historical context will be discussed. For instance, Castells 
(1996) explains the most recent technological change as a result of the rise of ICTs. 
According to Castells, this will lead to the establishment of the Network Society 
(Castells, 1996). Castells (1996) also describes information technologies as a 
converging set of technologies; it will be shown that these new information 
technologies now include new disciplines, such as biotechnology and nanotechnology. 
These new and converging ICTs are, due to their nature, also being referred to as 
complex and knowledge-intensive technologies.  
The importance of information and/or knowledge as a new resource in the economy 
was first examined by Fritz Machlup (1962). Since then, numerous authors have drawn 
on Machlup’s original work; for instance, Castells (1996, 1998) and (Webster, 2001). 
This new knowledge-based economy is not only more complex than its predecessor 
the industrial-based economy, argue Stevens et al. (2000), but also offers new chances 
for economic development, as knowledge can be transferred more easily and cheaper 
than (some) raw materials, according to the World Bank (1999).  
What knowledge and the new knowledge-based economy means for society is 
discussed next. Societal change based on the new importance of knowledge may have 
far-reaching consequences, but also offers opportunities. However, it appears that 
there is no agreement about where this will lead. Two concepts, therefore, need 
further explanation; that of the information society and the knowledge society. For 
Webster (2001), the defining characteristic that best describes the new information 
society is ‘information’ and the new computational power. Krohn (2001) argues that 
the defining characteristic is the influence of computer-based networks and the 
globalisation of ICTs. This is different to the concept of a knowledge society that is 
based on dealing with complexity, uncertainty, insecurity and ambiguity (Krohn, 2001). 
Another feature of the knowledge society is the dominance of knowledge work 
(Cortada, 1998a), or rather, the increasing number of professions that work with 
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knowledge, as opposed to manual labour (Stehr, 2002). When summarising societal 
change, special emphasis is paid to the dependency of expert knowledge, leading to 
new politics of knowledge (Cozzens and Woodhouse 1994). 
Keohane & Nye (1998) argue that ICTs will determine power in the 21st century. New 
challenges, such as intense growth rates of information and knowledge and the 
development of global networks for information and communication, will alter 
historically grown patterns of power, thus affecting not only states, but also 
organisations and ordinary people. In addition, increasing complexity and knowledge-
intensity will also challenge established societal processes, such as public participation 
and governance.  
Chapter 3: Knowledge 
By looking at practical examples of knowledge, i.e. knowledge by description, 
knowledge by acquaintance, and tacit knowledge, this chapter intends to find out the 
extent to which exactly these approaches can be utilised as alternative access routes 
to expert knowledge and, as such, could be seen as a means to be implemented as 
practical helpers to support both public engagement and decision-makers involved in 
policy change. The chapter also explores the extent to which an understanding of the 
practicalities of various concepts of knowledge may help to understand an active 
knowledge transfer process, or, at least, viable communication processes that enable 
the public to actively participate in establishing sufficient understanding required to 
engage in an open debate or in policy-making efforts.  
This chapter begins with an investigation into the several components that constitute 
the main body of interest - knowledge. A number of definitions are required to 
establish the scope of this study, in particular that of data, information, knowledge, 
and expertise. After defining data, a more detailed introduction of the term 
‘information’ is required, as it forms part of common terminology such as, information 
age, information society, information economy or information technologies. Rowley 
concludes that the term ‘information’ is an ill-defined concept and must therefore 
always be used context-specific (Rowley, 1998). Lyre (2002) approaches information 
differently, by employing information theory, Lyre argues that information is only what 
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is understood and what generates more information. How this plays out in relation to 
nanotechnology is shown in Chapter 5 (Analysis). Other approaches to information are 
based on business studies or management science (Davenport & Prusak, 2000), and on 
power politics (Keohane & Nye, 1998).  
Knowledge cannot be explained as clearly as data or information can. Cortada put it 
fittingly: “the literature on the history of information and knowledge would fill a 
building” (Cortada 1998a, 5). Therefore, a discussion of the ancient Greek roots of 
knowledge and their various meanings provides an overview and also an entry point 
into the subject matter. Davenport & Prusak (2000) provide a working definition of 
knowledge that is seen as being useful and applicable to this thesis. Furthermore, 
authoritarian modes of knowledge and a number of relevant philosophical aspects of 
knowledge are introduced as well. For Lundvall and Johnson (1994), practical aspects 
of knowledge can be classified as know-what, know-why, know-how, and know-who, 
which is somewhat similar to Aristotle’s concept of episteme, techné and phronesis. 
Following this discussion of practical knowledge examples, a review of expertise 
completes this section of definitions and introductions.  
Although generally attributed to Bertrand Russell (2001), knowledge by acquaintance 
was first introduced by Grote in the 19th century. Differentiating knowledge by its form 
of acquisition, a central point of this thesis has, surprisingly, not been tackled in the 
literature since Russell. It offers several advantages with regards to today’s complex 
and knowledge-intensive technologies. Practical examples, be they general or 
technology specific, can be used to illustrate different aspects of direct (knowledge by 
acquaintance) and indirect knowledge (knowledge by description). A different 
approach to distinguishing between direct and indirect knowledge was taken by 
Michael Polanyi (1966, 1969, 2000). By investigating uncommunicated and/or 
uncommunicable knowledge that people have, M. Polanyi described tacit knowledge. 
The concept was quickly taken up by others, most notably in the late 1990s/early 
2000s when tacit knowledge was a key component to Knowledge Management. This 
was largely due to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) when they published ‘The Knowledge-
Creating Company’. Gourlay (2002, 2004) carried out extensive reseach on tacit 
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knowledge, its roots and dimensions, and discovered that there are various forms, 
some pertaining to individuals and some to groups. Subsequently, a question that is 
often being asked with regards to tacit knowledge is whether it can be transformed 
into explicit knwoledge. Here, a number of authors disagree (Tiessen, Andriessen, & 
Deprez, 2000), while others maintain it can be done under certain circumstances 
(Collins, in Gourlay 2002).    
Society’s increasing need for experts, be it as expert witnesses in court cases (Page & 
Lopatka, 2004) or on TV (Boynton, 2007) is subject to a discussion with the aim of 
emphasising on this new dependency. Geißel & Penrose (2003) argue that society itself 
has changed over the last few decades, resulting in a dilemma. On the one hand, there 
is the general fear that results of scientific expertise have been influenced by economic 
or political factors. On the other hand, there is the insecurity of the public about its 
ability to understand and correctly interpret scientific result. Both issues have far-
reaching consequences when applied to knowledge-intensive new technologies 
(Currall, King, Lane, Madera, & Turner, 2006).  
Finally, the role of information and knowledge in policy-making is explored. After a 
brief introduction to policy-making in general, three different approaches to theories 
of the policy process are introduced. These have been chosen because of their 
relevance on the research topic. By using Ostrom’s (1991) Institutional Rational Choice 
(IRC) approach, Moe’s (1995) Structural Choice approach and Sabatier’s (1991) 
'Advocacy Coalitions Framework' the role of information will be investigated, especially 
when actors face uncertainty.      
Chapter 4: Nanotechnology 
Nanotechnology has been chosen to illustrate the complexities that come with it as a 
relatively new area within science and as a new technology that has the potential to 
re-shape the modern industry of the 21st century. The dependence on experts and the 
inherent knowledge-intensity is something that nanotechnology shares with a number 
of other emerging technologies that exist. Some of them, such as synthetic biology, 
have the potential to become even more complex than nanotechnology. This exactly is 
the point that needs to be understood when discussing knowledge intensity; the 
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examples shown throughout this thesis are merely examples of an already known 
discipline, and of areas that are already well-known and discussed within, at least, the 
scientific community, and to a certain, although, limited extent, the public. 
Nanotechnology, like genetics and biotechnology before it, will not be the last and final 
complex technology. Rather the opposite may hold true, it is very likely that it is one of 
the first truly complex technologies that has the potential to re-shape everything that 
is known and taken for granted.  
The chapter starts by introducing a number of different definitions of what 
nanotechnology is, and in the course of doing so, highlights some of its complexities. 
One of the current debates focuses on the direction in which nanotechnology might 
go. On the one hand, there is K. Eric Drexler who insists that the current focus should 
be on atomically precise manufacturing (APM), while having the long-term goal of 
creating self-replicating nanostructures (Drexler, 1986). The Centre for Responsible 
Nanotechnology rebuffs Drexler’s approach and vision, and offers instead a definition 
of what nanotechnology is, and an explanation of what it is not (CRN). Following a 
discussion and illustration of current funding initiatives, current trends and a realistic 
timeline of nanotechnology development are introduced. These current trends offer 
insights into already available products, often unknown to consumers (Nanowerk, 
2007), which in turn asks questions about the public perception of nanotechnology.  
A number of studies into the public perception have been carried out (Kahan et al., 
2007, 2008; Currall et al., 2006; Nanologue 2006). Somewhat unsurprisingly, there is a 
common consensus that the public does not know much about nanotechnology, the 
same applies to public perceptions of risks of nanotechnology. Kahan et al. (2007, 
2008) make the point that when risks are being discussed, risks perceptions follow 
along the lines of cultural predisposition; that is, being shaped by already existing 
values. Risk-based research focussing on nanotechnology is still relatively scarce, and 
the majority of studies have been carried out while focussing on human health, thus 
somewhat neglecting environmental risks (Behra & Krug, 2008). This can be attributed 
to the novelty of nanotechnology itself and to the lack of detection capabilities of 
nanosized particles, as Maynard (2006) points out. In order to illustrate the current 
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dilemma of nanotechnology risk assessment, nanosilver (or nanosized silver particles) 
will be investigated in order to shed some light on nanotechnology risks. Nanoscale 
silver is currently one of the most popular, albeit already highly criticised, materials 
used in already available products, such as toothpaste, washing machines, and wound 
dressings. This is because nanoscale silver is said to have antibacterial and antifungal 
properties (FDA, 2006), yet at the same time, it is already known that it has the 
potential to damage aquatic life (Behra & Krug, 2008). This investigation of the current 
understanding of nanosilver is also critical to the comparison of different knowledge 
types in the analysis part of this thesis (Chapter 6).  
Chapter 5: Nanologue 
Chapter 5 provides the relevant data required for the analysis in chapter 6. The general 
background to Nanologue’s research, and a familiarisation with Nanologue’s research 
design is provided, and the results of Nanologue’s assessment of the knowledge and 
awareness of nanotechnology among the participants of their studies, the researchers 
and other members of civil society, is discussed. Nanologue chose seven particular 
aspects for the research, of which four have been selected as main areas of interest for 
this thesis: environmental performance, human health, access and acceptance. In 
addition, Nanologue’s findings on the varying uses of information channels by both 
researchers and members of civil society are discussed, as these not only impact the 
areas of available knowledge and information, but also provide insight and a means for 
cross-comparison as to how the public informs itself. 
The main aim of this chapter is to establish areas that can be assessed against the 
knowledge framework. Thus, after reviewing the initial findings, an exercise is 
undertaken which focuses on general and policy recommnedations, and on 
recommended actions. In addition, the distinction  between nanotechnology and the 
environmental, legal and social aspects of nanotechnology is being discussed. This is a 
necessary step which impacts on the recommendations given by both the participants 
of the study and by Nanologue’s itself. Throughout the chapter, and where possible, 
Nanologue’s data and results were cross-referenced against other research, for 
instance that of Kahan et al. (2007, 2008) and Currall et al. (2006).  
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Chapter 6: Analysis  
Following the discussions on knowledge (Chapter 3), nanotechnology (Chapter 4), and 
the case study of Nanologue (Chapter 5) this chapter aims to apply findings of these 
chapters in order to identify potential risks with regards to knowledge-intensive and 
expertise dependent technologies and society. In order to do so, this chapter 
introduces a framework that details the types of knowledge discussed in Chapter 3 in 
the context of nanotechnology with the aim of establishing an analytical framework. 
For instance, knowledge by acquaintance in a nanotechnology context refers to 
knowledge that has been directly acquired by a researcher working on nanotechnology 
research. Practical examples, such as Oberdörster et al. (2002), who investigated the 
impacts of the exposure of water fleas (Daphnia magna) to nano-iron particles, are 
used to explain what this means in the context of this thesis. In the same vein, an 
example is provided for explaining tacit knowledge in a practical context (Babu, Deepa, 
Shankar, & Rai, 2008) in order to explain its practical implications.  
As part of this analysis, two other options for dealing with some of the main issues 
identified by Nanologue (2006) and other researchers (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, 
Cohen, & Kysar, 2008) are introduced. A common recommendation with regards to 
public engagement is ‘simplification of content’ (Nanologue, 2006); that is, making 
nanotechnology related research findings understandable to the public. Yet, the 
majority of current research fails to detail exactly how this can be achieved. Thus, two 
options will be introduced, with both their advantages and disadvantages. Option 1 
suggest that the researchers should also be the informers, whereas Option 2 suggest 
that knowledge elicitation can be used to obtain expert knowledge and, then, to 
convert it into descriptive knowledge (or explicit information). Another 
recommendation of Nanologue (2006), the correct use of mass media, is assessed by 
looking into how the public informs itself. Research by Petersen (2006), as well as 
observations made for the purpose of this thesis confirm that nanotechnology is 
simply not in the news enough for the public to form an objective opinion, thus 
corroborating research carried out by (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, Cohen, & Kysar, 
2008).  
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The final part of the analysis is the comparison of three different theories of the policy 
process against the knowledge framework. In particular, the aim of the knowledge 
framework in this context is to use the different knowledge types in an attempt to 
identify which, if at all, could be used to explain the terms information, knowledge and 
expertise used by the aforementioned theorists. 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Chapter 7 summarises the main findings of this thesis and answers the research 
question whether increasing complexity and knowledge-intensity will challenge policy-
making and also hinder the public’s ability to participate in the public debate? It will 
highlight what the findings of this thesis indicate with regards to the different 
knowledge types, policy-making and public participation and also assess the additional 
objectives, as specified in Chapter 1.2. The conclusion will also attempt to place the 
findings of this thesis in the context of future nanotechnology research with regards to 
policy-making and public participation.     
  
P a g e  | 32 
2. The context of the research  
The main aim of this chapter is to position the research with regard to societal, 
political, technological, and economic changes and developments that have occurred 
recently, to show where the topic fits, and why the research is important. The 
intention is to identify what has happened in the past few decades, to explain these 
changes and to establish a number of challenges that are used and analysed in later 
chapters in more detail. After discussing the socio-economic and technological context, 
including the changing global world, the technological and the economic context, this 
chapter explores the impacts on society. Common terminology used in current 
discussions, such as the knowledge society, are explored further with the aim of 
establishing whether societal changes have indeed been ground-breaking and, if that 
assumption is correct, to establish what this may mean, going forward. This chapter 
will draw on a number of different disciplines, such as business and management 
studies, geography, sociology and politics in order to set the context.   
2.1 Introducing the socio-economic and technological context 
In the introduction to the ‘Resources for the knowledge-based economy’ series, 
Laurence Prusak (1998) asks why there is such an increased interest in knowledge, and 
why now:   
Why the focus on a subject that, at some levels, has been around since the pre-
Socratic philosophers? It is yet another one of the multitudinous management 
enthusiasms that seem to come and go like random natural phenomena? We 
don’t think so! (Prusak, 1998, p. vii).  
Four broad trends play a sufficient role for Prusak to believe that the current interest is 
not just mere ‘hype’. First of all, Prusak identifies globalisation as a major trend that 
puts a variety of organisations, be they economic, political or social, as well as entire 
societies, under enormous pressure. The result is an increasing interconnectedness of 
the world (Landman, 2000), which does not come without a number of issues ranging 
from disparities in the distribution of wealth to rising inequalities with regards to 
access to education and knowledge. Secondly, there is a rise in the awareness and 
acknowledgement of specialised knowledge that helps organisations in “coping with 
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the pressures of globalisation” (Prusak, 1998, p. viii). These pressures, such as 
increased global competition, led also to a changed attitude towards science and 
technology, as product life-cycles became shorter and the need to bring new 
innovations more quickly to markets increased. A third point is a rise in awareness of 
knowledge itself being a factor of production. Although this has been known since the 
1960s (Machlup, 1962), it was only acknowledged by many organisations since the late 
1980s that knowledge creation (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) itself can help sustaining a 
competitive advantage. The final point for Prusak is the availability of cheap ICT-based 
networking that allows participants to work with, and to learn from, one another. The 
resulting changes, especially the impact on society are discussed in the following 
sections in more detail.  
2.1.1 The changing global arena 
So far the 21st century has been associated with the so-called information age (Alberts 
& Papp, 1997) and various attempts to find the right terminology indicate that there is 
a common perception that modern societies indeed have arrived at a stage where 
information plays increasingly a key role. Nonetheless, the vagueness of terms used to 
describe the latter have not helped much to determine whether or not current 
societies now moved towards becoming an information society (Webster, 2001), a 
network society (Castells, 1996), a knowledge society (Stehr, 2002), something in 
between or something completely different. Early attempts to describe the upcoming 
changes have mainly been driven and influenced by the advancement of computers 
and the accompanied effect of ever decreasing costs of computational transactions 
and thus the ‘computer age’ was a common term. Soon, however, it became clear that 
computers themselves are not solely responsible for this transformation. Today, there 
is not much doubt that globalisation has fostered this development, be it in a way 
where globalisation functions as a driver of this development or where globalisation is 
merely a result.  
One must acknowledge that globalisation has changed the way in which this world 
functions, which is not to say that globalisation is either a desired or possible end-state 
(Landman, 2000). Yet, globalisation had and still has knock-on effects on various areas 
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that are in the process of being changed. For instance, technological advancement 
functions as a key enabler within the globalisation/ transformation process and 
therefore plays a major role. As a result, the economic realm has changed immensely 
within the past two decades and thus also changed modern societies (Castells, 1996). 
Globalisation has become one of the most fashionable terms over the last decade, but 
defining what exactly globalisation means is an entirely different story (Beck, 2000). 
Held et al. view globalisation as “a process (or set of processes) which embodies a 
transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions – 
assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating 
transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the 
exercise of power” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 2000, p. 55). Practically, this 
describes the new flow and movement of people, goods and information as well as 
their interactions and impact on each other. What has changed is a substantial 
decrease in the time and effort required in order to access both goods and information 
and share it across borders. Varwick, in contrast, describes globalisation as a process of 
increasing relations between societies and problem areas with the effect that actions 
in one part of the world reach (and influence) societies and problem areas in another 
part of the world (Varwick, 1998). This also includes the erosion of a state’s territory, 
nationality and power. Landman suggests that when used as a description, 
“globalisation refers to the increasing interconnectedness of the world across all 
aspects of life” (Landman, 2000, p. 220). Yet, at the same time, the term globalisation 
can be used to describe a cause, i.e. the dominance of capital or the erosion of local 
communities, as well as an effect, i.e. the world-wide spread of Western-based culture 
(Landman, 2000).  
In addition to the political dimension, there is also an economic dimension, which is 
determined by a number of sub-dimensions (i.e. trade, investments, financial markets 
and actors), and there is a technological dimension, which in itself has an increasing 
impact on both the social and political dimension, as this thesis will show. Castells 
(1998) points out that the difference between the world-wide economy and the global 
economy is that the global economy has the capacity “to work as a unit in real time on 
P a g e  | 35 
a planetary scale” (Castells, 1998, p. 92). This includes not only just-in-time production 
and delivery but also information flow without barriers. Until the 1970s, the world-
wide economy was always trying to overcome limits of time and space. The late 20th 
Century brought a change by means of a new infrastructure provided by Information 
and Telecommunication Technologies (ICTs). Traditional boundaries, such as borders, 
have become more permeable and easier to penetrate. 
Since globalisation has stirred this global economic, social and technological 
interdependence, the global market place is, and becomes, even more divided into 
areas of the world that: 
a) now progress towards the so-called knowledge-based economies  
b) now mimic their previous forms of industrial-based economies 
c) and those remaining that are being left out altogether.  
Further progress in areas of ICTs, and also in transportation has already contributed to 
the so-called ‘death of distance’ (Cairncross, 1997). Shrinking costs of global 
transactions and of global transportation have fostered a globalised economy, not just 
for major corporations, but also for individuals. With only a few mouse clicks, a 
European can now order a product in the US or in Asia, as long as language is not a 
barrier. And even here one can witness a major shift as language barriers within the 
areas of e-commerce are shrinking, and as website localisation2 has become a common 
standard requirement for the global players. 
However, there are still limits to globalisation. The first one becomes apparent when 
reiterating the fact that globalisation is not fully global as of yet, at least in economic 
terms. Barriers still exist in forms of limits to capital flows (currencies, banking 
regulations), (im-)mobility of labour due to immigration restrictions, etc.  Also, one still 
witnesses technology export restrictions to a certain set of countries (i.e. Cuba, North 
Korea) that are either the forgotten legacy of the Cold War or simply the vested 
                                                     
2 Localisation is an industry term referring to the ‘translation’ of software, technical documentation, 
websites etc. into different languages. It is called localisation, as opposed to simply calling it translation, 
as localisation goes beyond the translation process and comprises of a full service (including translation 
of graphical user interface strings, code and so on). The focus is on providing a fully-fledged product that 
is ready for new market entry. 
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interest of leading nations. In these areas political actions are based on power, that is, 
states still exercise their historically-rooted hierarchical power in order to achieve 
desired outcomes (King, 1986). Also, and in order to be precise, one has to 
acknowledge that ‘global’ trade is not global yet either. Only 20% of all worldwide 
produced goods are subject to international trade and only 30% of the global 
population participates in it. Eighty five percent of the world-wide trade happens 
between North America, Europe and Asia (The World Bank, 1999), which are at the 
same time the main R&D areas not only for ICTs, but also for other, new key 
technologies such as biotechnology, nanotechnology and synthetic biology.  
The 1998/99 World Development Report highlights three main issues that require 
attention in order to better comprehend the long-term effects of globalisation, 
especially in regard to knowledge and development. The first issue concerns the 
results of the world economy that now becomes more integrated and global, thus 
leaving nation states with little leverage on global trends. Moreover, “*m+ultinational 
corporations today dominate the global economic landscape: a third of world trade is 
now between multinationals and their affiliates” (The World Bank, 1999, pp. 22-23). A 
country with none or only a few of these global players is clearly disadvantaged and 
dependent on both international trade regulations (i.e. WTO) and the good will of the 
other nations. Landman (2000) argues that whether globalisation threatens traditional 
nation states is an empirical question that requires “systematic comparative analysis” 
(Landman, 2000, p. 220) that can be studied in various ways, for instance by looking at 
transnational policy networks, political diffusion or universal global rights. However, 
the implications with regards to knowledge are two-fold: business power differs from 
the power of a nation state (King, 1986), thus giving multi-nationals a greater control 
of their intellectual capital and assets and in doing so leaving less leverage, and 
potential bargaining power, to the traditional nation state, or in the case of the 
European Union, to a still forming multi-national polity (Héretier, 1999). What this 
might mean to key technologies, such as biotechnology or nanotechnology will be 
discussed later (Chapters 4 and 5).  
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The second issue is that the share of high-technology industries in total manufacturing 
has grown in nearly all OECD countries. It is estimated that more than half of GDP in 
these countries is based on the production and distribution of knowledge itself (The 
World Bank, 1999). This, obviously, has implications for the composition and thus 
requirements of the work force. The World Bank estimates that in the US alone the 
percentage of workers engaged in producing and distributing knowledge is higher than 
those of workers that are (still) engaged in making physical goods. Although these 
indicators are mainly valid for OECD countries, they still provide useful insights about 
current developments and the increasing importance of knowledge for both 
organisations and nation states. When measuring the knowledge output - a popular 
indicator is the number of patents issued - one can observe a skyrocketing in the past 
decade. For instance, in the four years between 1989 and 1993 the number of patent 
applications worldwide had increased by 43 percent, or from 1.4 million to 2 million 
according to the World Bank. Somewhat slightly different figures are shown by the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), see figure below: 
Figure 1: Worldwide patent filings by year of filing (WIPO, 2007, p. 10) 
Nonetheless, one can see that patent filing nearly doubled in the years between 1995 
and 2005. Looking at the countries responsible for the majority of worldwide patent 
filings, it becomes very clear that globalisation and knowledge output are not global. 
The table below shows that only five out of the top 20 countries of filing patent 
applications are nations that are regarded developing nations. By looking at the top 
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five countries, responsible for 77% of all patent applications, only China is not regarded 
as a country belonging to the first world3.  
 
Figure 2: Top 20 patent offices by country of origin (WIPO, 2007, p. 12) 
The third and last issue concerns the speed by which ICTs and other new key 
technologies are advancing. A popular example to illustrate this growth rate in regard 
to technical knowledge is the comparison with developments in the aircraft industry. 
“It has been said that if the aircraft industry had evolved as spectacularly as the 
computer industry since the mid-1960s, by the mid-1980s a Boeing 767 would have 
cost $500 and could have circled the globe in 20 minutes on 20 liters of fuel” (The 
World Bank, 1999, pp. 22-23). The crucial component in this development is that the 
ICT revolution and the strides that have been made in other, new, technology areas 
fosters the creation of new knowledge by equally providing inventors and innovators 
with critical input; that is, quick access to knowledge. The most important aspect is the 
fact that knowledge can now be disseminated at an unparalleled scale around the 
globe at ever decreasing costs.  
                                                     
3 Although this might change in the near future, considering the immense economic progress made. 
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One point, above all, is clear: countries that are not able to utilise these current trends 
will fall behind those who encourage it. Failing to promote investments in, and 
utilisation of, both global and local knowledge will no doubt result in increasing 
knowledge gaps between the leading countries and the laggards. Those who cannot 
participate when, for instance, a new set of converging technologies is introduced can 
normally also not participate in the decision-making process that is to set out the rules 
for regulation, industry norms, environmental standards, etc. What this means in the 
context of this research is that, while the most developed nations are already 
struggling with keeping up with technological process and required regulative norms, 
the least developed nations are so far removed from key technology areas that the 
inclusion of these states into a global knowledge framework seems to be impossible. 
Yet, as climate change has shown, and as nanotechnology might prove, these countries 
are not protected from undesired impacts. Bangladesh as a country does not belong to 
the circle of countries that are the main emitters of CO2. Nevertheless, if rising water 
levels are indeed a result of global warming Bangladesh might have to pay for the ‘sins 
of other countries’. The same might potentially be true in the case of nanotechnology. 
According to Hoogvelt, globalisation has “rearranged the architecture of the world 
order” (Hoogvelt, 2000, p. 358) in a sense that economic, social and power relations 
have been altered. Hoogfelt argues that perhaps 20 percent of the world population, 
i.e. those that are ‘bankable’, enjoy the benefits of globalisation. Another 20 – 30 
percent have to face insecure forms of employment and are therefore unlikely to reap 
all the benefits that globalisation offers to their ‘bankable’ counterparts. The 
remaining, larger parts of the world population (circa 50-60 percent) are “already 
effectively excluded from the global system” (Hoogvelt, 2000, p. 358). If this is already 
the case, then questions arise as to what can and what needs to be done in order to 
accompany, steer and possibly mould these developments so that the outcome is a 
preferable one.  
Furthermore, the ever increasing complexity of the technological and economic 
realms, of a globalised world and also of society itself may ask for different, if not new, 
modes to govern a modern political realm that not only wishes to face but also foster 
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and nourish these transformations. This is one of many challenges states face if they 
wish to address the increasing number of internal and external challenges (Pierre, 
2000). However, there are serious issues that need to be associated with faster, and 
ever increasing levels of knowledge and expertise and its resulting dependencies. If 
there is indeed an increase in the complexity of how the globalised world functions, 
should not any forward thinking government also increase its focus on learning, 
knowledge acquisition and distribution? If everything is indeed becoming more 
technologised, complex and more difficult to comprehend, should observers not be 
able to witness the upsides and downsides to this development, i.e. people, 
organisations or economic areas that either can or cannot cope with these 
developments? And if so, will inaction by governing bodies immediately lead to a more 
polarised society or even world?  
An alternative view, according to Stevens et al. (2002), suggests that the above might 
not be true at all. The proponents of this point of view argue that more sophisticated 
technology does not automatically require higher technical skills, as lessons from 
previous technological advancements suggest. For instance, 50 years ago a car 
mechanic’s knowledge had to comprise of how to take apart certain components and 
how to put them back together. Today, all they need to know is which components 
need to be replaced, and by what costs (Stevens, Miller, & Michalski, 2000).  
Translating this view into key technology areas, such as ICTs, biotechnology or 
nanotechnology could potentially reveal whether the aforementioned global and 
technological changes are indeed as pervasive and as complex as suggested. Chapters 
Four and Five will pay special attention to both knowledge-intensive and key 
technology areas and what this means from a (hands on) knowledge perspective. 
Assuming that government and policy makers have an interest in steering the 
aforementioned developments in order to reap the best possible benefits for their 
nations and populations, a closer look is required at the technological, societal and 
political dimension of the global change.  
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2.1.2 The change of the technological realm 
Before speaking of technological change in general as well as of most recent 
technological advances, it is useful to define what is commonly understood as 
technology. A definition from a dictionary suggests that technology is “[t]he practice, 
description and terminology of any or all of the applied sciences which have practical 
value and/or industrial use” (Walker, 1999). Ernst and O’Connor (1989) correctly 
pointed out that: 
technology cannot be reduced to machines. It has to do with certain kinds of 
knowledge, which allow the adaptation of means to ends. Part of this 
knowledge is embodied in machines, but most is not. It is embodied elsewhere 
– in the brains of people, in organisational structures and behavioural patterns, 
which in turn are conditioned by the strategies of different social factors and 
their patterns of conflict and co-operation (Ernst & O'Connor, 1989, p. 20).  
One can therefore assume that technology does not only consist of tangible but also 
intangible elements or parts. These can be found, for instance, in the aforementioned 
patents or in the skills and knowledge a company’s workforce holds. But also 
marketing, product and consumer research play an increasing role. At the same time, it 
needs to be understood that technological change does not automatically mean that 
the best technology or product will lead the transformation and dominate the market. 
A number of cases have shown that there are also other contributing factors that steer 
technological development and change. For instance, an often quoted example is that 
of Betamax vs. VHS in the area of consumer electronics. At the time, it was 
acknowledged that Betamax was the technologically superior product, yet VHS 
dominated in the end (Wielage & Woodcock, 2003)4.  
Technological change is defined as “the generation and diffusion of new technologies” 
(Ernst & O'Connor, 1989, p. 20); that is, the creation of new technology, its 
distribution, and its acceptance by the users. Only the acceptance of new technology 
                                                     
4 A more recent example is that of the new DVD ‘format war’ between Blue Ray and High Definition Disk 
(HDD). In both cases, technology itself was not the deciding factor, others, such as support pledges by 
other companies or entire industries (also called vendor lock-in) may turn out to be of greater 
importance.  
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heralds the substitution of ‘old’ technology with the new one, although this has to be 
seen as a process that often allows the simultaneous existence of both technologies 
for a certain amount of time. Technological change, especially nowadays, is driven by, 
and is a core element of, competition. Yet, it should be pointed out that in certain 
circumstances, as recent examples have shown, the non-commercial sphere of society 
can also contribute to technological change. Most notably seen in the international 
‘Open Source’ movement with its main goal the non-commercial use, development 
and distribution of source codes used for the development of computer applications. 
Their main aim is to provide free, non-commercial software: “The promise of open 
source is better quality, higher reliability, more flexibility, lower cost, and an end to 
predatory vendor lock-in” (Open Source Initiative, 2007).  
Technological change and development itself has been subject to intensive research; 
for instance the historic perspective of technological change and industrial 
development in Western Europe has been explored, amongst others, by Landes 
(1999a; 1999b), Mokyr (1990) and Kondratieff (1926), who approached it by  
researching different economic cycles. Today, both the first and second Industrial 
Revolutions provide insights about the importance of technology and innovation and 
the subsequent spread and use of knowledge. In this regard, Castells holds that “the 
ability or inability of societies to master technology, and in particular technologies that 
are strategically decisive in each historical period” (Castells, 1996, p. 7) largely shape 
their destiny. Since the Industrial Revolution, the pace of technological development 
and innovation has increased heavily and the ability to either lead or keep up with 
technological developments became a major determinant of economic competition. In 
terms of this thesis, the Industrial Revolution is an important concept that situates 
technological change (i.e. within the Kondratieff cycles), as it provides insight into the 
importance of knowledge (i.e. in the context of technological change). Landes (1999b) 
discusses the role that knowledge played as part of the Industrial Revolution in detail. 
In addition to the role of education, the recruitment of expert skills and knowledge, 
sometimes achieved even through means of seduction and bribery, was a vital part. 
The idea of preventing the loss of what is now called ‘intellectual capital’ was not new 
at the time (Landes, 1999b). The importance of knowledge since then has only 
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increased, while   globalisation led to an increase in the pace of technological 
innovation. These developments, including the increased corporate focus on 
knowledge, can nowadays be tracked by a popular indicator that is used to describe 
knowledge output: patents. 
Figure 3: Evolution of worldwide patent filings (WIPO, 2007, p. 11)  
The figure above shows that growth was very modest until the 1960s. The average 
annual growth rate was only 1.99% from 1883 to 1959 and only four countries (USA, 
Germany, UK, and France) were responsible for the majority of the patenting activities 
in that period. This changed in the 1960s with Japan and the Soviet Union entering a 
stage of economic progress, and their subsequently increased filings of patent 
applications. Japan has dominated the league table ever since, whereby the Soviet 
Union’s record of application filing took a sharp decline with the fall of Communism in 
1989/90. Since the 1980s, further countries joined the leading nations, most notably 
Korea and China. Between the 1960s and 2005, the annual growth rate had increased 
to an average 3.35%. In 1977, the European Patent Convention came into force. Since 
the European Patent Office was not intended to substitute for the national offices, it 
offered applicants the choice between filing patent applications nationally (as before) 
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or through a newly available regional route. This explains the decline of filings by 
Germany, France and the UK (WIPO, 2007). 
Over the last two decades, technological changes have also entered the personal 
sphere of every individual (at least in the developed world) at unprecedented speed 
and depths (Beck, 2000). In the grand scheme of things, it does not really matter as to 
whether a cycle or technological development, or a phase of economic development 
lasted a few years longer or less, as Hall and Preston’s (1988) and Haggett’s (2001) 
figures have shown. What is important is that, over time, one can identify patterns and 
key technological drivers that made an era distinctive. Here, the Kondratieff waves are 
an important tool. Today, one can once again witness one of these distinctive eras: 
information technologies converging with chemistry, biology, physics, medicine, 
mechanics and others in order to drive new technological change that translated into 
the rise of new technologies. What these new technologies have in common is that 
they all are knowledge intensive and expertise dependent.  
Today, when speaking about technological change, information technology - or the 
semiconductor industry, as described by Haggett (2001) and Hall & Preston (1988) - is 
the most obvious technological branch that comes to mind; yet there are additional 
technological areas that have gained importance. According to Castells, information 
technologies can be described as “the converging set of technologies in 
microelectronics, computing (machines and software), telecommunications/ 
broadcasting, and optoelectronics” (Castells, 1997, p. 30).  He also includes the area of 
genetic engineering and “its expanding set of developments and applications” (Castells, 
1997, p. 30). Amongst other areas, information technologies can be categorised into 
the following5 sub-categories:  
• Telecommunications/Broadcasting 
• Computing 
• Microelectronics6 
                                                     
5 The above list is by no means exhaustive. 
6 Microelectronics refers to the study and manufacturing of microelectronic components (i.e. digital 
circuits, conductors). 
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• Optoelectronics7 
Taking Castells’ point of converging technologies into account, other new, and at the 
same time, potentially controversial technologies that have emerged in recent years. 
These are, amongst others: 
• Biotechnology 
• Genetic Engineering 
• Nanotechnology 
• Synthetic Biology 
Much has been written about biotechnology (Fukuyama & Wagner, 2000) and genetic 
engineering (Goodman, Heath, & Lindee, 2003), and recent debates about genetically 
modified foods (Bonny, 2003), substances and additives to food have sparked an 
interest amongst consumers, NGOs, and social scientists alike (Marris, 2001). Synthetic 
Biology is the most recent addition to the list of emerging technologies. Its aim is to 
combine biological research with engineering in order to either re-write existing, or 
design new, biological systems or components. Within the Life Sciences, and by 
combining these new emerging technologies with existing and future information 
technology, knowledge and its components (data, information) will play an increasingly 
important role, and will therefore be discussed in the next chapter. What distinguished 
these four technologies from others is that they are converging sets of a multitude of 
technologies. In other words, they are not stand-along technologies; their main 
characteristic is that they are built upon the complex interactions between a numerous 
technologies linked by advances in information technologies. Out of these four 
examples, nanotechnology has been chosen to represent the new key technologies for 
the purposes of this research. As of now, no one knows what this new technology will 
bring, nor what advances and riches, which risks and perils; Mokyr put it as follows: 
“*t+he essence of technological progress is its unpredictability” (Mokyr, 1992, p. 301).  
                                                     
7 Optoelectronics refers to the study and manufacturing of electronic devices that deal with the sourcing 
and use of light (i.e. photo-diodes, integrated optical circuits). 
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2.1.3 Economic changes 
The global and technological changes of the past decade came hand in hand with 
changes to the economic realm. Castells calls the new economy informational and 
global in order to identify its distinctive features and to emphasise its intertwining 
characteristics. He points out that it is informational because productivity and 
competitiveness depend on a firm’s (or even region’s or state’s) “capacity to generate, 
process, and apply efficiently knowledge-based information” (Castells, 1998, p. 66). A 
main feature of the changes of economic landscape triggered by the rise of the 
semiconductor industry (often also called ICT revolution) is that it has vastly increased 
the marketability and value of commercial information by reducing the transmission 
costs of information. The results of this are new patterns of interaction between 
players, be they of economic, political or societal nature. The new economy is also 
global, according to Castells, as its core activities of production, consumption and 
circulation, “as well as their components (capital, labor, raw materials, management, 
information, technology, markets) are organized on a global scale, either directly or 
through a network of linkages between economic agents” (Castells, 1998, p. 67).  
The main features, however, are the information technology industry and its sub-
industries; they provide the necessary basis for the new economy. In taking all three 
points together (informational mode, global focus, new information technologies), one 
reaches a new and distinctive economic system. Although, information and knowledge 
have always been decisive elements for economic growth, only the emergence of 
more flexible information technologies made it possible for information itself to 
become a product of the production process. Popular examples include corporate 
intelligence gathering (i.e. country and market reports) and information processing 
about consumer behaviour (i.e. data mining of available consumer data). Based on 
research undertaken already in the 1980s by Freeman and Monk, Castells gathers that 
“the products of new information technology industries are information processing 
devices or information processing itself” (Castells, 1998, p. 66). 
Information technology, accompanied by the rise of and ever cheaper access to, 
information, is the new and main “raw material” and core focal point of the knowledge 
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economy. This development, in turn, also contributed to the rise of a new social class 
of people who have access to information, as opposed to the information ‘have-nots’. 
Advanced high-tech communication systems, access to open markets and minimal 
trade barriers fostered the gap-building between the information haves and the have-
nots on a global scale. Due to its nature, knowledge as a means of production also 
fostered new developments that have forced businesses to re-think their strategies, as 
knowledge as a commodity is expensive to produce, but relatively easy to reproduce, 
copy or to steal (Stevens et al. 2000). Over the long term, this may pose substantial 
issues to access to knowledge, especially when it is of a corporate nature. What is 
more, knowledge and expertise are inherent in corporate patents, which is also on the 
rise as shown in Figure 3. This, in turn, may also have long-term impacts on both 
policy-making, which is depend on using knowledge when making policy-changes, and 
public participation, as the public’s access to corporate knowledge cannot be 
guaranteed.  
 This knowledge-based economy is, however, also far more complex than its industrial 
predecessor, “as the number of distinct products, producers and consumers increases, 
the knowledge economy introduces more variety” (Stevens, Miller, & Michalski, 2000, 
p. 13). Castells concludes that: “Profitability and competitiveness are the actual 
determinants of technological innovation and productivity growth” (Castells, 1998, p. 
10). Hillner (2000) argues in a similar vein and suggests that there are a number of 
factors to be taken into account; two of them are of particular interest here:  
• The abilities of universities and research facilities to train skilled workers and/or 
to develop new technologies. 
• The presence of established companies and multinationals to provide expertise 
and economic stability (Hillner, 2000, p. 259). 
Today, universities and research facilities have started to go beyond the sole provision 
of education and innovation by also putting the results of their innovation into 
practice. This so-called ‘knowledge transfer process’ is supported by experienced 
professionals ensuring that innovations make it into the market. The role of knowledge 
transfer receives even more attention when linked to the access to domain specific 
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expertise (see also Chapters 3.1.5 and 6.3), as it provides an access route to expertise 
outside the corporate world. The World Bank also provides numerous examples 
showing that knowledge itself has been the decisive factor in regard to economic 
development. For instance, the Soviet Union has accumulated more capital - as a share 
of its GDP - between the 1960s and 1980s than Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore or 
Taiwan by improving the education of its population.  
Yet the Soviets generated far smaller increases in living standards during that 
period than did these four East Asian economies. Perhaps the difference was 
that the East Asian economies did not build, work, and grow harder so much as 
they built, worked, and grew smarter. Could knowledge, then, have been 
behind East Asia’s surge? If so, the implications are enormous, for that would 
mean that knowledge is the key to development—that knowledge is 
development (The World Bank, 1999, p. 19). 
When speaking in an economic context, the word knowledge receives a different 
accentuation than, for instance, in philosophy. The word knowledge, as used in the 
term ‘knowledge economy’ or ‘knowledge-based economy’8, refers to information and 
knowledge as a commodity, such as the already discussed patents, or technological 
know-how and intellectual capital. Philosophical questions, such as ‘Does knowledge 
exist?’ matter less for corporations than the fact that knowledge is seen as an asset 
that can and needs to be translated into capital gains.  
2.2. Changing society 
Speaking in historical terms, a society’s ability to master technology has always been 
strategically decisive (Castells, 1996). Furthermore, the extent to which societies are 
able to use technology exemplifies their capacities to transform themselves. In the 
upcoming information/knowledge society, access to knowledge, the ability to 
comprehend and use it as well as knowledge accumulation will undoubtedly be the 
main feature (Stehr, 2002).  
                                                     
8 For years now, The Economist has been using the terms knowledge-based economy and knowledge 
society (The Economist, 2006), whereby others prefer to use information society, information age or 
knowledge age. For a discussion of information vs. knowledge society, see Chapter 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.  
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For countries in the vanguard of the world economy, the balance between 
knowledge and resources has shifted so far toward the former that knowledge 
has become perhaps the most important factor determining the standard of 
living—more than land, than tools, than labor. Today’s most technologically 
advanced economies are truly knowledge-based. And as they generate new 
wealth from their innovations, they are creating millions of knowledge-related 
jobs in an array of disciplines that have emerged overnight: knowledge 
engineers, knowledge managers, knowledge coordinators (The World Bank, 
1999, p. 16).9  
This, however, also poses challenges with regards to a society’s ability to utilise 
information and knowledge. Stehr (2002) points out that modern knowledge-based 
societies are, to a large extent based on structural changes of their economies and that 
the “source of economic growths and value adding activities increasingly relies on 
knowledge” (Stehr, 2002, p. 3). In order to understand the nature of knowledge that is 
required to keep a society moving forward, be it economically or culturally, it is 
necessary to distinguish various forms of knowledge (for a detailed discussion of 
knowledge, see Chapter 3). There is knowledge that can be acquired by simply buying 
it; various organisations have already specialised in providing knowledge as a service. 
Other forms of knowledge cannot be bought. This includes knowledge that requires a 
long-term process of individual or organisational learning. Organisations are able to 
absorb knowledge in a similar fashion to individuals by constantly repeating and 
refining tasks (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). And, of course, there is knowledge that 
needs to be created first. In addition, and before going into more detail, one needs to 
acknowledge that there are also various forms and types of knowledge gaps. These 
exist across all societal levels, across nations, across the developed world and across 
developing countries. The term knowledge gap has two main usages. The first refers to 
knowledge that an individual does not have, no matter whether the individual is aware 
of ‘not having’ the knowledge or not. The second usage refers to the global knowledge 
                                                     
9 One topical example can be found in the already mentioned area of knowledge transfer, often instated 
to foster the transition of R&D results (for instances, of universities and their institutes) to market. 
P a g e  | 50 
divide. The assumption here is that knowledge gaps increase the more the developed 
world advances and leaves the underdeveloped nations behind (UNESCO, 2005). 
Today, it is commonplace that by acquiring, absorbing, and communicating knowledge 
one can stimulate economic growth and thus foster human well-being in general. 
Reducing knowledge gaps is, however, easier said than done. At a micro-level, for 
instance, one can consider the improvement of educational conditions for a local 
community; this seems feasible and manageable. Bringing developing countries closer 
to their counterparts in the first world is far more complicated (UNESCO, 2005). Even 
by closing gaps with respect to technical knowledge, for instance, there is still the 
matter of various other forms of knowledge (The World Bank, 1999). Furthermore, and 
apart from the fact that often even the computer age has still not yet arrived in many 
of the developing countries, existing societal structures may have seen little change 
over the centuries.  
In order to shed some light on changing societies, in particular, the current level of 
societies’ information and knowledge exposure, two popular concepts shall be briefly 
explored: the concept of information societies and that of knowledge societies. It 
should be noted, however, that although both concepts are different in their 
respective theoretical approach, both terms are often used interchangeably, be it in 
academic terms, or by the press or media.  
2.2.1 Information Societies 
As previously discussed, societies are constantly changing and one current force of this 
change is information. According to Krohn, the term information society “relates to the 
pervasive influence of computer-based networks and thereby the globalisation of 
information, communication, and control technologies. It assumes that collecting, 
copying, storing, transmitting, incorporating, manipulating, simulating, and managing 
information about every aspect of collective and individual life penetrate and shape all 
these aspects” (Krohn, 2001, p. 8139). Webster refers to information as a “defining 
feature of the contemporary world” (Webster, 2001, p. 7464). Terms such as 
information society or global information economy are a logical response to the new 
found importance of information and are easily backed up by facts such as new media, 
P a g e  | 51 
products, economic channels and so forth that have developed since the rise of new 
ICTs. Webster admits though it has become popular to describe Western societies as 
information societies, yet the term information society is not without criticism. This is 
due to its link to information technologies that it may be perceived or suggested that 
an information society is a novel type of society or a novel system altogether. 
Opponents to this view suggest that societies have not changed in their basic patterns, 
only activities themselves have become more informationally saturated (Webster, 
2001). In order to establish quantitative measures of an information society, Webster 
(2001) suggests looking at different categories that are being impacted by recent 
technological developments:  
 Technological 
 Economical 
 Occupational 
 Spatial 
 Cultural 
Advocates of technological conceptions, such as McLuhan (1964), Toffler (1980), and 
Negroponte (1995) suggest that technological innovations since the late 1960s will 
have such a profound impact on society that it will lead to a reconstruction of the 
social world. Proponents of determining the economic value and impact, such as 
Machlup (1962) and Porat (1978), suggest that by calculating the contribution of 
information business to the GNP, one can determine when an informational economy 
has outgrown an economy based on manufacturing and agriculture and thus 
determine when a society has become an information society. 
According to Webster (2001), sociologists mostly favour the occupational approach of 
defining an information society.  This approach suggests that today’s societies can be 
classified as an information society when information based occupations are in the 
majority and “thus the information society is said to have arrived when clerks, lawyers 
and comedians outnumber colliers, steelworkers, dockers and builders” (Webster, 
2001, p. 7465). According to Bell (1973), the decline in manufacturing and rise of the 
service sector heralded the triumph of the white collar – and as such informational – 
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work over manual/manufacturing labour. Other studies also suggest that work is 
becoming more ‘knowledge intensive’ (Lash and Urry 1994), and that activities such as 
design, media and management requiring more intelligence and education than 
hitherto (Reich 1992, Leadbeater 1999).  
The spatial component played a major role in Castells’ (1996-98) work. This approach 
focuses on information networks, locations, time and space. In short, one can argue 
that electronic highways lead to a new emphasis on the flow of information, thus 
altering the time-space relations by eliminating the constraints of time and distance. 
This includes information sharing across continents without the need to physically 
move information or people that hold information, thus giving corporations and other 
organisations the opportunity to conduct their business on a truly global scale. Landes 
(1999b) described how experts were moved from location to location during the 
Industrial Revolution, often at great expense. This, now, has become obsolete due to 
the availability of cheaper information sharing options. Although the above definitions 
illustrate the rising importance of information, none of them say anything about the 
impact information has on them.   
Explaining the concept of an information society by means of the cultural approach 
might appear as the most obvious, but Webster argues that it is “the least amenable to 
measurement” (Webster, 2001, p. 7465). Access to globally available cultural goods, 
such as music, fashion and popular literature has become easy and could also easily be 
measured in terms of sale or market penetration. Yet, using these measures to 
determine the state of a society in order to define whether a society has become an 
information society remains questionable. Indeed, such an approach might be better 
suited to quantitatively measure the (economic) progression of globalisation by 
analysing market penetration of globally available products. Webster (2001) argues 
that there is a tendency to use quantitative measures in order to describe and explain 
qualitative change. “The central criticism is that quantitative indexes of the spread of 
information and information technologies cannot be interpreted as evidence of deep-
seated social change. On the contrary, they can be regarded as the consolidation of 
established patterns of interest and control” (Webster, 2001, p. 7466).  
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There is another concept attempting to explain information societies: theoretical 
knowledge. According to this concept, “an information society is one in which 
theoretical knowledge takes precedence over the practical. Humans throughout history 
responded to conditions as they found them, while today things are organized, 
harnessed, and controlled by starting from known theoretical principles such as laws of 
motion, chemical reactions, and the stress capacities of metals” (Webster, 2001, p. 
7466). The emphasis on theoretical knowledge equals an emphasis on qualitative 
rather than quantitative change. But similar to the cultural approach, measuring 
theoretical knowledge must also explain its assumed penetration of society. It has 
been shown that knowledge output is often measured by using patent statistics. Yet, 
using this measure would not say much about how a society has been transformed, 
who the participants in this information society are and who the opponents are. 
Although Bell (1973) was the first to point to the primacy of theoretical knowledge, it 
was Stehr (1994) who defined a society in which theoretical knowledge determines 
nearly all activities - the knowledge society (see also 2.2.2).  
To summarise, the majority of criticism revolves around the assumption that there has 
been a systemic social change that can be proved by employing quantitative measures, 
which determine the growth of the role of information on various aspects of the global 
world, the economy, technology itself and on culture and society.  Earlier attempts to 
explain changing societies include Bell’s concept of the post-industrial society (1973) or 
Schiller’s informationalised capitalism (1996). The term post-industrial society refers to 
a society where manufacturing has been replaced as the main economic driver by a 
service-based industry. Schiller’s concept of informationalised capitalism attempts to 
explain advanced capitalism by focusing on the information explosion (Webster, 2001).  
Similar to Bell’s concept, the notion of an information society has received much 
attention. Webster, however, suggests that it has only limited value for the social 
scientist and Castells goes even further and suggests abandoning the notion altogether 
(Webster, 2001; Castells, 1998). Generally, there are no objections to the claim that 
societies are changing. It is, rather, the way of explaining it and the extent of change to 
society that has been criticised. Information itself has not altered, thus far, the way 
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societies are organised, albeit it has changed the way the advanced economies 
function. Webster concludes that “it is ironic that the most persuasive conception of an 
information society, that which centres on the role of theoretical knowledge, is the 
least examined by the information society adherents” (Webster, 2001, p. 7468). 
Therefore, the concept of information societies as it stands today, does not seem 
suitable to explain the potential impact of both the increasing importance of 
information and the increasing scope of available information.  Questions, such as how 
does the public cope with increasing complexity in an information society are not 
answered.  
2.2.2 Knowledge Societies 
Contrary to the above-discussed concept of information societies, the concept of 
knowledge societies “emphasises in a complementary way the problem and strategies 
of making sense of information. The knowledge work of researchers, experts, analysts, 
and users depends much on and contributes to information – but what it makes this 
work important is it use of theories, models, scenarios, evaluation criteria, decision 
strategies, experimental designs, and implicit experience in order to establish bits and 
pieces of orientation and certainty” (Krohn, 2001, p. 8139). This means, as opposed to 
the concept of information societies where computational power and ICT are the 
determining forces, knowledge societies are determined by the ‘process of sense-
making’ of information (see also Chapters 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). By referring to Earl (1996), 
Krohn highlights a new risk that decision-makers face: the complexity and opaqueness 
that comes with infinite amounts of information available and the increasing need to 
know about information itself. 
Thus, one of the core points of the concept of a knowledge society is dealing with 
uncertainty, insecurity and ambiguity. The assumption is that the more information is 
available, the more difficult it becomes to condense this information into reliable and 
usable knowledge. “Rather, actors are left alone with the choice between doing 
anything or nothing – except where there is an agency promising to be specialised in 
knowing how to read and use information” (Krohn, 2001, p. 8140). In recent years, 
knowledge operation has, to a certain extent, been standardised and integrated into 
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expert systems. By using filters and algorithms (knowledge operation) relevant data, 
information and knowledge is being made accessible through specialised systems 
(expert systems). This enables the user to focus on only the relevant and pertinent 
parts instead of having to go through large amounts of data and information or 
complex bodies of knowledge. For instance, large corporations use these systems to 
distil information according to the target audience. Thus, executive staff receive 
different information from, for instance, operational staff.  Despite this being a help to 
decision-makers, especially within large corporations, there are still issues that exist 
between modelling and standardising processes and the use of expert systems in their 
appropriate context (Krohn, 2001). Although advances have been made by using 
expert systems, their application is still limited. For instance, expert systems can be 
used within organisational contexts at a level that can support even larger, global 
corporations. However, it cannot be used to support or compute decision-making at a 
societal or nation-state level. It is not that the required computational power is 
limited, but rather that decisions at that level are far too complex to use expert 
systems.  This, in turn, mirrors one of the core arguments of the knowledge society 
concept: complexity. 
There are three areas that need to be discussed when speaking about the concept of 
knowledge societies:  
 Knowledge work 
 Expert knowledge  
 Science and society 
Knowledge work cannot be simply put into categories such as those previously used to 
define work, i.e. manufacturing, agriculture and so forth.  Knowledge work, in general, 
is rather a concept that refers to general activities that are based on using mental 
capabilities, such as analysing, interpreting/evaluating or teaching. Cortada (1998) 
argues that knowledge work has been around for thousands of years, and knowledge 
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workers10 for even longer. “What is very new is the categorization of these people, 
activities and tools into a discrete field – knowledge work …” (Cortada, 1998c, p. 3). 
Often, problem selection, definition, and solution or communication with partners, 
clients and stakeholders is core to knowledge work and to the generation of wealth 
based on knowledge rather than natural resources. To put this into context, an 
example from the area of consumer electronics will be used. For instance, a company 
releases a product that is close to that of its competitors in regard to performance and 
quality. In order to ensure that the successor product becomes superior to that of the 
competitors, ‘knowledge work’ is required. This knowledge work can comprise of a 
number of tasks ranging from integration of lessons learned to using feedback from 
users and their experiences. These tasks rely not only on the identification and 
definition of problems, but also require the conceptualisation and provision of 
solutions and communication with partners and customers.  
Krohn (2001) stresses that there is a “complementary aspect to the economic and 
organizational characteristics of knowledge society. Certainly, knowledge would not 
have become a predominant resource if it could not become transformed in marketable 
goods and services. … The more society relies on knowledge, the more it navigates into 
a dynamic of change. To understand, describe, predict, construct, and control this 
change becomes illusory–simply because of lack of knowledge. This is exactly the 
reason why knowledge experts (Jasanoff 1990) and symbolic analysts (Reich 1991) are 
needed and expected to create islands of certainty to allow orientation and planning” 
(Krohn, 2001, p. 8141). The dependency on expertise appears to be one of the defining 
points of a knowledge society, and also one of the main differences to the concept of 
an information society. In other words, this means that the more knowledge-intensive 
technology becomes dominant, and the more resulting applications penetrate day-to-
day life of society, the more society itself becomes dependent on expertise. This 
expertise dependency is a direct result of the knowledge-intensity and complexity that 
comes with many of the new, key technology areas, such as biotechnology, genetic 
engineering or nanotechnology. This increasing uncertainty and ambiguity of, and 
                                                     
10 Similarly to the concept of information society (vs. knowledge society), some authors prefer the term 
information workers, for instance Porat (1998). 
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about, available information is the central problem that individuals as well as 
organisations and governments face in the future. This is one of the central arguments 
of this thesis. The concept of knowledge societies seems more suitable to answer 
these questions than the concept of information societies.    
2.2.3 Summarising societal change 
As shown in the above discussion about information and knowledge societies, the key 
element that will enable future change is not information alone, be it qualitatively or in 
quantity, but complexity that is inherent in both newly-found theoretical knowledge 
and new areas of technological development and its accompanying uncertainty and 
ambiguity. As demonstrated, knowledge work itself is not that new, but what has 
changed is the vast increase in the numbers of areas that are converging. Commonly 
known knowledge workers, such as teachers, priests, or doctors or shamans have been 
around for a very long time. But until now, knowledge work has often been isolated to 
limited areas, such as teaching or practising medicine.  
With the rise of the ICTs, knowledge work expanded into many new areas, with many 
of them being depended on the new ICTs. Without the recent advances in 
semiconductor development, new fields, such as, biotechnology, genetic engineering 
or nanotechnology could not have emerged as they did. Similarly, without ever 
increasing computing power, global warming, as it is known today, may not be as 
known, or worse, may have never been identified.  
Krohn concludes that the “knowledge society can be interpreted as being exposed to 
hypothetical assumptions and experiments designed by experts and analysts. While 
expertise effectively reduces the complexity of the real world for an observer, it 
inevitably contributes to increase the risks of those who decide to rely on it” (Krohn, 
2001, p. 8142). In other words, new problems arise when society depends on, and is 
directly affected by, expertise. Not only can society not afford errors, but it also raises 
questions about who in society decides which expertise is to be used? Should only 
governments decide on the utilisation of the right expertise? What about opposition 
and what about ordinary citizens? This increasing complexity has left many unable to 
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deal with the amount of information generated today. In order to utilise much of this 
newly generated information, society has turned to experts and their expertise.  
The complexity of modem society, the expansion of governmental functions, 
and the technical nature of most policy problems create enormous pressures 
for specialization. It is exceedingly difficult, except perhaps in small 
communities, to be knowledgeable about more than one or two policy sectors 
(Sabatier, 1988, p. 137). 
The definition of what expertise is (see Chapter3.1.5) agrees with Sabatier’s argument. 
This new and resulting dependency on expert knowledge has received already as much 
attention as it has received criticism and brought about a new ‘politics of knowledge’ 
(Cozzens and Woodhouse 1994). A similar view is shared by Edwards (2010). Here, the 
argument is that the “soft authority of knowledge is ever more important as a force for 
social change. That’s why the politics of knowledge – how ideas are created, used and 
disseminated – represents a key issue…“(Edwards, 2010). How the realm of politics has 
changes due to the increasing importance of information and knowledge is the subject 
of the next chapter. 
2.3 Changing politics 
 By the mid-20th century, science and particularly nuclear physics, contributed 
 crucial power resources to the US and the SU. In the next century, information 
 technology broadly defined is likely to be the most crucial power resource
 (Keohane & Nye, 1998). 
The aforementioned changes to the global arena and its technological, economic and 
societal spheres pose a multitude of new internal and external challenges to 
governments. This is why the role of the political environment cannot be stressed 
enough (Pierre, 2000). The result of what happens when the state is not only an 
organising factor but a dominating or even a coercive source of power one could 
witness before the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe. The economic 
and technological legacy of those countries now suggests, and also corroborates, the 
assumption that, thus far only a liberal market democracy can provide the necessary 
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ground for a (relatively) interference free, resourceful and competitive research and 
innovation environment. Apart from domestic aspects, there is also an international 
dimension. The history of the Cold War and its opposed blocs has vividly illustrated the 
impacts of (international power-) politics on the area of technology and its subsequent 
impact on the economy. By exercising agreed high-technology transfer restrictions 
towards the Eastern bloc, the West gained decisive advantages in technological 
development, and therewith a competitive advantage in their economic development 
and, again, in the area of (power-) politics.      
There is no doubt; the changes introduced by the so-called Information Revolution will 
change the way people live, are educated, work or govern. The increasing use of 
information technology in the sphere of business or even in the private sphere will 
profoundly alter relationships that have followed historically grown patterns. Most 
importantly, governments, organisations and ordinary people have to adapt to the 
upcoming changes, especially since the number of active players increases. Hence, the 
political realm is changing. The increase in the number of communication channels, be 
it at the stage of world politics, domestic, regional or local, and the increase of 
available information itself will challenge the area politics. As has been shown, there is 
an increase in knowledge-intensity and in technological complexity and the result is an 
increasing dependency on expertise. But before investigating this further, a step back 
needs to be taken in order to shed some light on the starting point of all this, the so-
called ICT revolution, as this can be viewed as one of the major turning points in the 
last century.  
The theoretical debate and the literature can broadly be divided into two groups: the 
so-called ‘prophets’ of the ICT-revolution and their opponents or critics. According to 
Keohane and Nye (1998), people such as Peter Drucker, the Toefflers, Ray Kurzweil and 
Esther Dyson belong to the group of prophets. Many of them predict an end to the 
hierarchical bureaucratic organisation and that the ongoing ICT revolution “is creating 
the ‘disintermediation of government’, leading to a new electronic feudalism with 
overlapping communities and jurisdictions laying claim to multiple layers of citizens’ 
identities and loyalties” (Keohane & Nye, 1998). Both Keohane and Nye have a point in 
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arguing that “[p]rophets of a new cyberworld, however, like modernists before them, 
often overlook the extent to which the new world overlaps and depends upon the 
traditional world in which power depends upon geographically based institutions” 
(Keohane & Nye, 1998). In other words, there still will be rules necessary to govern 
society, no matter its level of use of technology. Rules require authority, either in the 
form of public government or private or community governance. This argument can be 
further developed, leading to the assumption that classic issues of politics – who 
governs? on what terms? who benefits? – are now as relevant as they were before the 
start of the ICT revolution. In one aspect, however, both prophets and critics of the ICT 
revolution are of the same opinion. The next century carries the potential of a new era 
for NGOs as opportunities will arise for new ‘virtual communities’ and networks that 
will provide a common platform for all non-governmental activities. The main reason is 
that by increasingly cheaper transmission of information, the number of players, 
mostly organised in loosely structured networks, will increase as well. Thus, the ICT 
revolution removed previously existing barriers to participation. These are effective in 
using local or regional constituencies in order to set the agenda of national leaders. 
Hereby, actors can penetrate states without regard to borders. The political effect of 
increased flows of free information through multiple channels seems to be clear: 
“states have lost much of their control over information about their own societies. 
States that seek to develop (with the exception of some energy suppliers) need foreign 
capital and the technology and organisation that go with it” (Keohane & Nye, 1998). 
Regional, local or even religious communities will still matter, but if a particular 
government wants to see rapid development it will find that many things have to be 
given up, mostly those which are perceived to be barriers to information flows. But 
what impact this will that have with regards to new and knowledge intensive and 
expertise dependent technologies? Do better communication technologies 
automatically mean better communication?   
In regard to power, the history of human development has shown that knowledge has 
always been seen as power, or at least as a source of, and as means to gain, power. It 
provided the opportunity to be “used for the good of many or the wealth of the few. So 
knowledge has always been sought, and if not found it is invented, or existing 
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knowledge is altered and then called faith. Throughout history the proprietors of 
knowledge and the protectors of faith have fought to control and ration the dispersal 
of knowledge” (MacDonald, 1999, p. 6). Both the political and the economic sphere 
have shown the same behaviour towards knowledge, and still do.  
It needs to be reiterated that the state remains, either by blocking or encouraging 
technological innovation, the decisive factor in the overall process of change, as the 
state expresses and organises the social and cultural forces that dominate a given 
space and time. Furthermore, the level of a society’s development itself is an 
important factor. This level can be measured by means of various indicators, for 
example the level of openness of a society, its ability to adapt to changes and the 
speed and comprehensiveness of which transformations take place. In addition, 
culture plays an important role, be it as a product of historical development and of 
tradition; as result of general political and societal conditions (internal environment of 
an cultural entity) or as a response to the external environment (impacts of 
neighbouring cultural entities). Since globalisation will even affect societies that do not 
want to take part in it, especially the latter point seems to be of increasing importance. 
The changing realm of politics will face many new challenges; two shall be mentioned 
here, as they are of major importance:   
• intense growth rates of information and knowledge 
• development of global networks for information and communication 
The quantitative shift of content, the ratio and the density of information that will be 
sent around the globe might potentially lead to a shift within societies towards 
sectoral separation and social structure. Cultural predisposition, for instance, has the 
potential to lead to polarisation; Kahan et al. (2007, 2008) have investigated this 
phenomenon as part of a study of risk perceptions of nanotechnology (see Chapter 
4.5). The typical slogan ‘welfare for all’ might soon be replaced by ‘knowledge for all’, 
or better still, the right knowledge for the right people (with the right interpretation).   
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2.4 Summary 
This chapter has highlighted that not only the global playing field has changed, but also 
that technological change is transforming the economic, social and political spheres of 
modern societies. The new, so-called ‘knowledge-based economies’ are characterised 
by shrinking costs of global transactions, or, as Castells (1997) put it, by their 
informational mode and global focus. A popular indicator to measure the output of the 
knowledge-based economy is patents; and their number have skyrocketed (WIPO, 
2007) over the past decades. Emerging technologies, such as biotechnology, genetic 
engineering, nanotechnology and Synthetic Biology will soon be the new ICTs.  
What does all this mean for politics, for society and for ordinary citizens?  First of all, as 
Keohane and Nye (1998) confirm, the state remains by either blocking or encouraging 
technological innovation the main player, and thus, the main organiser of change. 
Hence, politics will remain politics, and political power will continue to depend on 
harnessing economic prosperity. However, the current intense growth rates of 
information and knowledge will increasingly challenge those in power. This is also due 
to the rise of both global networks for information and communication and due to the 
rise in the number of players, be it globally or locally. Furthermore, the increasing 
amount of knowledge and information held by corporations will put further strains on 
the areas of politics, but also on societies.  
As for the debate of information society vs. knowledge society, current trends indicate 
that modern Western societies steer towards the latter. Although the influence of 
computer-based networks and the ICTs in general on societies, as defining arguments 
used by Krohn (2001), is important, it pales in comparison to the importance of 
knowledge and its implications for society; dealing with uncertainty, insecurity and 
ambiguity. The key element defining this knowledge society is not that merely the 
amount of knowledge increases, but that large numbers of the citizenry and 
government will be challenged by this. The result is an increased need for expertise 
and one can argue that the new complexity and knowledge-intensity will lead to an 
expertise dependency. 
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3. Knowledge, expertise and policy making 
As noted by Sabatier (1991), there is a need to find out more about the use of 
information in choice situations. Similarly, Oh and Rich (1996) argue that there is a 
need to better understand the role of data and information in policy-making. In 
particular, knowledge utilisation in the policy process still leaves much to be desired. In 
order to better understand the use of information and knowledge in the policy 
context, information, knowledge and its components require further investigation. 
Also, in policy contexts, the terms information and knowledge are often used 
generically, although substantial differences exist. These differences have implications 
for policy-making. For instance, when making policy choices, policy-makers require 
usable knowledge (Haas P. M., 2004). But what is usable knowledge, better still, what 
is knowledge, information, or data?  
Information and knowledge play a very particular role in policy-making, that is, to 
enable participating actors to deal with uncertainty and to cope with complexity. There 
are, however, many different approaches that attempt to explain actors’ behaviours 
towards both uncertainty and the use of information. Nonetheless, there is a lack of 
coherent theories that explain the policy process, thus available approaches or 
theories of the policy process have received much criticism. By looking at three of 
these theories, and in particular, by looking at how these differing approaches deal 
with uncertainty and the use of information and knowledge, this chapter aims to 
identify potential implications when dealing with nanotechnology. For this to work, a 
knowledge framework has been developed that looks at different types of knowledge, 
which will then be applied in the analysis (Chapter 6) section of this thesis. 
3.1 Defining data, information, knowledge and expertise 
3.1.1 Data 
The Latin word data is the plural of datum. The related irregular verb is dare (also dó, 
dedi, datum), which means ‘to give’. Thus, the term datum refers to a statement (a 
given or something given). Often, the terms ‘given’ and ‘data’ are used 
interchangeably, most notably in mathematics, geometry and engineering, paving the 
way for using the concept of data in computer science. In the English language, the 
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word data is used as a singular mass noun. Albeit technically incorrect, data is 
commonly used to describe a set of data whereby it is referred to as if it were the 
singular datum. For instance, when someone says that ‘this data is corrupt’ instead of 
‘these data are corrupt’ it is perfectly understood that the person does not refer to one 
particular datum that is corrupt, although Latin grammar rules allow for this meaning 
only when used in conjunction with a singular article. In computing, data are numbers, 
characters, words or images and as such represent mere statements of ‘things that are 
given’. This data is often processed further by human-/computer- interaction, whereby 
the actual data processing can occur in various forms and stages.  
Metadata is a description used to define data that contains ‘information’ (meaningful 
data) in their properties. In the area of information and library sciences, a library 
catalogue is often regarded as an example for metadata, as it not only lists other data 
but also gives it meaning (i.e. bookshelf number, number of available copies, etc.) 
Based on that description, metadata is to a certain extent not data, but already 
information and it provides the user (or computer programme) with instructions and 
interpretations. 
It has often been highlighted that un-interpreted data has no meaning (MacDonald, 
1999; Davenport & Prusak, 2000). This is not much of a surprise, since even the most 
simplistic observation has no meaning, without interpretation. Nonetheless, data itself 
is a key component of information and the act of adding meaning to data results in the 
production of information. This can be done by both humans and various forms of 
computing devices - be it independently or simultaneously - and requires one or more 
stages of interpretation and pre-processing and transfer of data. With regard to 
information and knowledge, data11 has to be seen as a starting point. Data in their 
form as base units often consist of texts (in alpha- and/or numeric form) and pictures. 
Davenport and Prusak define data as “a set of discrete, objective facts about events. In 
an organisational context, data is most usefully describes as structured records of 
transactions” (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 2). And in reference to Peter Drucker, who 
                                                     
11 Throughout this thesis, data is used in its grammatically correct form, except when used in or as part 
of quotations, which have not been altered for the sake of clarity and originality. Data is the plural of 
datum (lat.), although it is commonly used in a singular case (i.e. data is…). 
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once said that “information is ‘data endowed with relevance and purpose” Davenport 
and Prusak suggest that “data by itself has little relevance or purpose” (Davenport & 
Prusak, 2000, p. 2). Data only become information when they are structured and 
measured systematically. Nonetheless, data are most relevant to organisations as they 
are the “raw material for the creation of information” (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 
3), and henceforth the creation of knowledge. 
3.1.2 Information 
Terms such as information age, information society, information economy and 
information technologies have been over-used in recent years and have led to an 
careless use of the word ‘information’, whereby the narrower meaning of the term has 
often been used without careful consideration and without taking the various 
meanings of the term information into account (for a discussion on information 
society, economy and ICTs in general, see Chapter 2). Often, the word ‘information’ is 
used interchangeably with words such as news, advice, message, data and, of course, 
knowledge. Originally, the word information stems from the Latin word informare, 
which can be translated into ‘to notify’, ‘to advise’, ‘to let someone know’ or ‘to tell’. 
Since the 15th Century, the word to inform slowly replaced local expressions and 
became part of the day-to-day vocabulary - to let someone know or to apprise 
someone of something became to inform (Lyre, 2002). Rowley argues that, at an 
intuitive level and based on life experience, one should know what information is, 
especially when one is aware of the importance of information, “yet information 
remains an elusive and ill-defined concept and despite an ever expanding body of 
investigation on the various aspects of processing of information, there remains much 
to be understood about information processing at individual, organizational and 
societal levels” (Rowley, 1998, p. 244). In order to determine some aspects of the 
various uses of the term information, Rowley starts out investigating basic dictionary 
entries of the term before looking into meaning and perception within various other 
disciplines, such as communication theory, library and information science, 
information systems and computer science, other professional disciplines, marketing, 
cognitive science, organisation science and policy-making. Lyre (2002) investigates the 
topic with regards to physics, biology and philosophy in detail.   
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In the end, Rowley’s conclusion is that, although there is no single definition that could 
sufficiently define the term information fully, information must be regarded as context 
specific and suggests viewing this variety of uses and meanings as richness, rather than 
untidiness (Rowley, 1998). Nonetheless, for clarity and in the context of this research, 
the use of the term information shall be briefly described for one particular discipline, 
information theory, and from a very generic, but useful perspective with regards to 
policy-making, as policy information (see Chapter 3.5.3) is still an area requires much 
more  research (Sabatier, 1991b).  
Information theory, based on semiotics, approaches information from a triangular 
perspective and therefore takes syntax, semantics and pragmatics into account. Here, 
the syntax relates to the appearance of individual information units and their relation 
to each other while semantics relates to the meaning, and pragmatics to the effect of 
information. According to Lyre, all three aspects of information need to be looked at, if 
one wishes to avoid of having an incomplete view of information.  Based on the works 
of Hartley (1928) and Nyquist (1924), Lyre connects the terms information and 
probability in order to come to the conclusion that both are equal terms to quantify 
possibility. As for the semantic and pragmatic aspect, based on Weizaecker (1971, 
1985), Lyre employs two hypotheses: information is only what is understood and 
information is only what also generates information. The first describes the semantic 
and the second the pragmatic aspect. The problem here is that both arguments only 
work in conjunction with each other. Lyre provides an example: a person A asks a 
person B to switch the light off. Quite obviously, the light will only be switched off if 
the ‘message’ is first understood and then also put into practice. Information theory 
further considers additional meanings of the term information, mostly subject and/or 
context-specific (i.e. physics, biology) and always depending on the general framework 
or the setting, intentions and reference (Lyre, 2002).  
From a very generic perspective, information can be described as a message, “usually 
in form of a document or an audible or visible communication. And with any message, 
it has a sender and a receiver. Information is meant to change the way the receiver 
perceives something, …” (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 3). Without saying anything 
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about the attributes that determines the character of a message, information can 
simply be a message communicated from a sender to a receiver, whereby both 
receiver and sender can be either a human or a machine (any type of technology 
capable of sending and/or receiving information). In addition, when speaking about 
information as a message, nothing has been said about the quality of the information, 
about its accuracy or worth. For instance, if the sender and the receiver do not employ 
the same decoding, translation or interpretation mechanisms, information as a 
message can also have negative, even disruptive, effects. In a similar vein, messages 
can deliberately be sent in order to disrupt flows of information or to create 
misunderstanding, no matter whether this relates to a technical field or the realms of 
politics or economics. Thus, information is organised to represent meaning. It consists 
of data that has value added to it. This can be done in various ways, most commonly 
however, when data has been contextualised, categorised, calculated, corrected 
and/or condensed (Davenport & Prusak, 2000). 
In a politics context, Keohane and Nye (1998) highlight three different types of 
information that can be seen as sources of power: 
Free information is information that actors are willing to create and distribute 
without financial compensation. The sender benefits from the receiver 
believing the information and hence has incentives to produce it. Motives may 
vary. Scientific information is a public good, but persuasive messages, such as 
political ones, are more self-serving.  
Commercial information is information that people are willing to create and 
send at a price. Senders neither gain nor lose by others believing the 
information, apart from the compensation they receive.  
Strategic information, as old as espionage, confers great advantage on actors 
only if their competitors do not possess it. One enormous advantage the United 
States had in World War II was that, unbeknown to Tokyo, the United States 
had broken the Japanese codes. The quantity of such information is often not 
particularly important (Keohane & Nye, 1998).  
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Examples of free information, according to Keohane and Nye, are marketing, 
broadcasting, and propaganda. The sheer quantity of available free information “is 
perhaps the most dramatic effect of the information revolution” (Keohane & Nye, 
1998). Yet, at the same time, the quality of free information can range from being 
accurate and exact to being misleading and completely false. This is also a risk that 
comes with free information, and it is up to the receiver to make a judgement. As for 
commercial information, Keohane and Nye argue that, for this information to be 
available (on the Internet, for example), “issues of property rights must be resolved so 
that producers of information can be compensated by users” (Keohane & Nye, 1998). 
Today, strategic information is, however, not limited any longer to the realm of 
espionage and politics, at least not in the classical sense, as increasing industrial 
espionage, copyright and patent infringements put both espionage and the use of 
strategic information on the agenda of the corporate world. 
To conclude, the term information has many meanings and therefore always requires 
being treated as context-specific. The key element, however, is the fact that the sender 
and receiver need to use the same decoding mechanisms so that information is 
understood. The latter is also a main point when it comes to the use of information in 
a policy-context and with regards to political participation. Depending on the context, 
information is closely related to other concepts, such as communication, 
representation, knowledge and so forth.  
3.1.3 Knowledge 
Knowledge itself cannot be explained as clearly as data or information. Any attempt to 
explain knowledge has to start with some introductory remarks on humankind’s search 
for knowledge, as this is probably as old as the human species itself. The majority of 
the literature starts off with historic roots dating back to Plato and/or Aristotle 
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Davenport & Prusak, 2000), yet when looking at knowledge 
in form of either literature or historical accounts (i.e. Aesop's Fables, Herodotus -The 
Histories) or on early scientific achievements (i.e. Thales of Miletus) then one can 
argue that the early accounts on knowledge date back even further. Nonetheless, 
there is common agreement that both Plato and Aristotle were one of the firsts who 
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attempted to both explain and classify knowledge. Since Western understanding of 
knowledge and knowledge-related terminology is deeply rooted in Ancient Greek 
writing and philosophy, some terms regularly used in the literature require further 
clarifications. The Greek word epistèmè means sciences, although it is often translated 
as knowledge. According to the OECD (2001) this knowledge is also regarded as being 
both universal and theoretical and as such equals ‘know- why’. Technè, on the other 
hand, is Greek for craftsmanship or craft, and is often used to explain knowledge that 
is instrumental, context-specific and practice-related and as such equals ‘know-how’. 
Phronesis, another term used by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, refers to 
knowledge that is normative, experience-based, context-specific and related to 
common sense and as such equals ‘practical wisdom’ (OECD, 2001). As opposed to 
both epistèmè and technè, phronesis contains a certain relativistic component that 
stresses on reflection in a person’s life. When measuring between what has been set 
out to be achieved and what had been achieved, phronesis plays the part that has to 
do with setting realistic goals that are achievable. It is the practical wisdom that 
enables a person to act ‘wisely’ and thus be realistic in respect of the goals set in 
his/her life.  
The Greek word λόγος or logos means word, although it is also often translated as 
knowledge. Heraclitus used logos to describe human knowledge, the knowledge that is 
inherent in the universe and the knowledge that helped to explain day-to-day life. 
Later, Socrates, Aristotle, and Plato used logos to describe human reason and the 
knowledge men had of the world and of each other. Deriving from that, Aristotle 
developed the concept of logic, the study of the rules that describe human rationality. 
Knowledge is the translation of the Greek word γνώσις or gnosis, although in practice 
it has several other uses. Gnosis is often described as intuitive knowledge of spiritual 
truths that ancient Gnostics were said to have possessed. Today, gnosis is often 
compared to esoteric or secret knowledge, and is often used in pseudo-science and 
amongst conspiracy theorists (often in conjunction with the alleged existence of 
ancient and secret orders) and receives a rather negative and doubtful connotation. 
The table below summarises the above-mentioned Greek terms according to their 
translation and usage: 
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Greek Translation Usage 
epistèmè Science knowledge, know-why 
technè craftsmanship know-how 
phronesis  Wisdom practical wisdom 
logos Word human knowledge 
gnosis  Knowledge intuitive knowledge, secret 
knowledge 
Table 1: Ancient Greek origins of knowledge 
One has to recognise the literature (Sosa & Kim, 2001; Ziman, 1991) that examines the 
foundations of knowledge and attempts to determine the limits to human 
understanding. This literature is mostly of an epistemological nature, a branch of 
philosophy (Sosa & Kim, 2001; Dancy & Sosa, 2001). Epistemology itself is too large to 
be covered here.  Nonetheless, and before going into more detail, some approaches to 
knowledge need to be introduced.  
Apart from a scientific mode of generating knowledge, one can distinguish between 
the authoritarian mode, the mystical mode and the rationalistic mode. Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias point to the fact that “[m]ajor distinctions among these 
modes lie in the way each vests credibility in the source or producer of knowledge (that 
is, Who says so?), the procedure by which knowledge is produced (How do you know?), 
and the effect of that knowledge (What difference does it make?)” (Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 2002, p. 3). Most interesting here is the authoritarian mode, 
where “people seek knowledge by referring to individuals who are socially or politically 
defined as qualified producers of knowledge” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2002, 
p. 3). For instance, this can refer to general knowledge creation in an authoritarian 
system, i.e. the former Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, where the 
writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin have been regarded as being superior and hence of 
highest importance for the development of these countries. This authoritarian form of 
knowledge is also important to today’s societies. For instance, when it comes to 
assessing risks of technology or products, society relies on authorities to make the 
appropriate decisions that, in turn, protect society as a whole and its individuals from 
harm. This is, to a certain extent, execution of knowledge authority. With regard to the 
former Communist states, the relevance of this observation in both a business and a 
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political context becomes clear by looking at the state of their economies at end of the 
1980s. The authoritarian mode is also in the democratic western world of interest, as it 
places ‘socially qualified producers of knowledge’ in a position that has wide-ranged 
implications. Here, one needs only to look at the distribution of information that 
influences the stock market, or, at institutions that impact day-to-day business 
practices. In addition, it can also refer to the interpretation of scientific data and 
information by a reputable expert (where, at the same time, nothing has been said as 
to how the expert became reputable, or who made him/her reputable, nor about who 
determined that this person is an expert at all). Thus, exercising knowledge authority 
can be used for the good of all, or to the advantage of a few, no matter whether these 
are governments, corporations or individuals. Summarising, one can say that while 
undertaking any research that relates to the subject matter, one has to be aware of 
approaches to knowledge creation and its implications. It, however, also illustrates 
that defining knowledge is not a simple task. This is supported by the fact that, for 
instance, a number of scholars, both within the area of epistemology and outside, 
define knowledge differently. Moreover, the sheer historicity (for instance, knowledge 
both a concept and as a subject of study) allows for various approaches to exist 
simultaneously, which, in addition, often use the same terminology and sometimes 
even the same methodology. 
Nonetheless, Davenport and Prusak offer a ‘working definition’, that relates to the 
definitions they have offered for data and information. The authors suggest that 
“*k+nowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and 
expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new 
experiences and information. It originates and is applied in the minds of knowers. In 
organisations, it often becomes embedded not only in documents or repositories but 
also in organisational routines, processes, practices, and norms” (Davenport & Prusak, 
2000, p. 5). Since it has been established that knowledge derives from information and 
information from data, one now has to look into what is required to transform 
information into knowledge. Although this is surely not fully comprehensive, 
Davenport and Prusak suggest that this transformation happens through:  
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 Comparison: how does information about this situation compare to other 
situations we have known?  
 Consequences: what implications does the information have for decisions 
and actions? 
 Connections: how does this bit of knowledge relate to others? 
 Conversation: what do other people think about this information? 
(Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 6). 
Most importantly, however, it has to be noted that the transformation of information 
into knowledge happens through human (inter-) action. Knowledge can only be 
obtained from people, whereby data can be found in records and information can be 
gathered from messages (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 6). In addition to the above, 
there are some other aspects that need to be looked at. For instance, and apart from 
knowledge creation, there are things such as knowledge absorption (i.e. though 
learning), experience (i.e. indirect learning and constant re-evaluation of the learned), 
intuition (the feeling for what is right), judgement (i.e. decisions based on previous 
experience and on what has been learned), beliefs and values (i.e. ethical decisions of 
what is right). These aspects of knowledge are especially relevant in politics and policy 
context. For instance, Sabatier (1988) stresses the importance of both beliefs and 
learning as part of his advocacy coalition framework (see Chapter. 3.5.2).  Moreover, in 
a practical context, two forms of knowledge can be mostly differentiated: tacit and 
explicit knowledge. In general, one can argue that explicit knowledge is precise, clear 
and expressed in such manner. Tacit knowledge on the other hand, is usually not 
always clear, as it is very often personal knowledge, based on individual experience 
and influenced by personal beliefs, perspectives and values (MacDonald, 1999; for a 
detailed discussion on tacit knowledge, see 3.3.1).  
Within philosophy, knowledge is also often described as a form of awareness that has 
either been obtained a posteriori by means of observation (i.e. through interaction, 
experience and learning) or a priori (i.e. through introspection, but without 
observation) (Dancy & Sosa, 2001) and is defined as justified true belief, a conditional 
statement that attempts to set out under which circumstances given statements can 
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be accepted as true  (Sosa & Kim, 2001). A posteriori knowledge is also called empirical 
knowledge. Another distinction often made is inferential knowledge vs. factual 
knowledge, whereby the former relies upon reasoning from facts or theory and, as 
such, it can either be verified or not through tests or observations. Factual knowledge, 
however, is based on direct observation (Williams, 2001). In either case, nothing can 
be said upfront as to whether the obtained knowledge can be regarded as certain, 
since errors can always be made throughout the observation, test and interpretation 
phases.  
On a very practical level, knowledge also needs to be verified. This, depending of the 
type of knowledge and the subject matter that needs to be verified, can be executed 
by various means. A person who buys a product can most likely verify its quality, 
depending, of course, on the type of product and the buyer’s knowledge about it. 
Verifying the quality of a service on the other hand is already more difficult, as this 
might require a certain familiarity with the service and/or a given level of similarity to 
other known services (The World Bank, 1999). Verifying more complicated forms of 
knowledge requires knowledge in itself; an employer who wants to hire a specialist, a 
prospective student who wishes to choose the right subject and right institution for 
him/herself, or legislation brought in to the parliament about regulating new 
technology are only a few examples.  For instance: 
In medieval Europe and in the Arab world until the late 19th century, guilds 
provided quality control, inspecting inputs and production processes and 
punishing dishonesty. Amins, the heads of local craft guilds in major cities 
throughout the Middle East and North Africa, were knowledgeable, respected 
individuals to whom consumers could turn to test sellers’ claims about the 
authenticity and quality of their goods (The World Bank, 1999, p. 73).12 
Today, who verifies that a policy-maker has adequate knowledge? And who verifies 
that Members of Parliament are skilled and knowledgeable enough to make complex 
                                                     
12 These rather individually held positions have now often been replaced by publicly acknowledged 
institutions, especially in the West.   
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decisions? What is more, even if these people are knowledgeable, who can guarantee 
that they possess the ‘right’ knowledge?  
Before finishing this section about knowledge, it needs to be pointed out that the 
approach and concepts of knowledge, as used in this thesis, excludes discussions about 
scepticism and its core questions, such as: Is knowledge possible? The unique identifier 
pertaining to knowledge, as discussed here, is the application of it in practice or in 
practical contexts, independently of philosophical justifications. Hence, all of the 
concepts described in this thesis assume that knowledge is possible. However, it 
should also be made explicit that there are many more possibilities to both 
approaching concepts of knowledge and to providing taxonomies/classifications for 
knowledge. Over time, knowledge as a subject matter and area of research and 
interest has evolved and the overall body of knowledge surrounding the topic has 
grown immensely. Philosophy and Sociology are the obvious areas that study 
knowledge, but even within these disciplines, the numbers of sub-disciplines dedicated 
to the subject in question have sky-rocketed over time. The larger implications of this 
trend are not known yet. However, in order to shed some light onto a number of the 
aforementioned questions, a look at different knowledge types with relevance to a 
practical context is required. 
3.1.4 Practical aspects of knowledge 
As an approach to knowledge in practice, the classification of Lundvall and Johnson 
(1994, quoted in OECD, 2001, p. 14) can be employed. The authors argue that 
knowledge can also be classified as:  
 Know- what  
 Know- why 
 Know- how  
 Know- who  
In comparison, this concept seems to be close to aforementioned knowledge 
taxonomy of Aristotle, who distinguished between: 
 Epistèmè: knowledge that is universal and theoretical: "know- why."  
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 Technè: knowledge that is instrumental, context- specific and practice- related: 
"know- how."  
 Phronesis: Knowledge that is normative, experience- based, context- specific 
and related to common sense: "practical wisdom." (OECD, 2001, p. 15). 
The first point in Lundvall and Johnson’s classification - 'know-what' - refers to factual 
knowledge, which can be expressed by answering simple questions that have fact-
based answers: “How many people live in New York, what the ingredients in pancakes 
are, and when the battle of Waterloo took place are examples of this kind of 
knowledge” (OECD, 2001, p. 14). It is argued that knowledge that pertains to this group 
is due to its simplicity “close to what is normally called information” (OECD, 2001, p. 
15). The decisive element is that this type of knowledge can be separated or broken 
down into its parts and then communicated as data.   
The second point, 'know-why' “refers to knowledge about principles and laws of 
motion in nature, in the human mind and in society” (OECD, 2001, p. 15). This 
knowledge is required to understand and further develop technological progress; thus 
it is the fundamental knowledge behind science that explains, for instance, processes 
in chemistry, physics, material sciences and so on. But it is also the knowledge that 
explains social scientific or historic phenomena, such as the Industrial Revolution, or it 
is used to answer questions such as why the First World War broke out. From both an 
economic and technological perspective (and, of course, from the perspective of 
power politics) access to this knowledge enables the user to make advances in his/her 
research area more rapidly and reduces also “the frequency of errors in procedures 
involving trial and error” (OECD, 2001, p. 15). 
The third point, 'know-how' can be related to skills and the ability to do something, 
which includes the skills of a manual worker to do his/her job or that of an analyst to 
observe the stock market in order to give advice to investors. In general, one can argue 
that this knowledge plays a key role in all societal and also economic activities. 'Know-
how' is, however, more than just practical knowledge, and it would also be wrong to 
characterise it as “practical rather than theoretical. One of the most interesting and 
profound analyses of the role and formation of know-how is actually about scientists’ 
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need for skill formation and personal knowledge (Polanyi, 1958/1978)” (OECD, 2001, p. 
15). This has profound impacts on the use of expertise, for instance, when expertise is 
used in court cases as expert witness statements (Page & Lopatka, 2004) or in a policy 
context. Another example is that given by Ziman (1997) who suggests that “finding the 
solution to complex mathematical problems is based on intuition and on skills related 
to pattern recognition which are rooted in experience- based learning rather than on 
the mechanical carrying out of a series of distinct logical operations” (OECD, 2001, p. 
15). Due to these characteristics, 'know-how' is usually kept within individual 
organisations or research teams and, only when the complexity of the subject matter 
increases, is it shared between organisations and teams. A result of this sharing is 
networking, which, in turn, points to the importance of the last of Lundvall and 
Johnson’s classification points: 'know-who'. In the context of policy-making, for 
instance, the importance of know-who is illustrated during coalition building 
processes, where participating actors of coalitions form around core beliefs. 'Know-
who' impacts the composition of such coalitions (Sabatier, 1988).   
The fourth and last point, 'know-who' refers to knowledge (and information) about 
“who knows what and who knows what to do. But it also involves the social ability to 
co- operate and communicate with different kinds of people and experts” (OECD, 2001, 
p. 15). As knowledge in general becomes more and more complex, it often requires 
more than one person to perform a particular challenging task or to solve a difficult 
technical issue. Or as Pavitt (1998) puts is: “The general trend towards a more 
composite knowledge base, with new products typically combining many technologies, 
each of which is rooted in several different scientific disciplines, makes access to many 
different sources of knowledge more essential” (OECD, 2001, p. 15). But 'know-who' 
also applies to personal knowledge (Who knows where to buy the cheapest airline 
tickets?), and is therefore not exclusive to the technical or academic world. To 
summarise, practical aspects of knowledge must be understood in order to deal with 
complexity that either impacts society or the individual.  
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3.1.5 Expertise 
Expertise can broadly be defined as a process of illustrating outstanding performance 
by a person. In general, expertise is most likely, although not necessarily, limited to a 
certain domain or subject matter. Depending on the holders of that expertise, it can, 
however, also span over more than one domain, especially if they are closely related. 
Gruber describes experts, as follows: 
Experts thus are persons who, by objective standard and over time, 
consistently show superior performance in typical activities of a domain. Expert 
performance in often illuminated by comparison with individuals with limited 
performance. Such individuals are called ‘novices’. In contrast to giftedness, 
expertise is usually considered as acquired special skill in or knowledge of a 
particular subject through practical experience (Gruber, 2001, p. 5146).  
Experts in virtually any complex domain have intensively practiced for 10 years or 
more (also regarded as the 10-year rule of necessary preparation), and thus have 
extensive knowledge at their disposal (Gruber, 2001, p. 5146). Although this 10-year 
rule is a ‘rule of thumb’ measure, it has to be acknowledged that even very gifted and 
talented individuals require such a period of time, or a period of time that comes close 
to this, which is mostly spent with preparation, learning, and practical acquisition of 
knowledge through repetition. Gruber argued that most experts require much longer 
periods of time. Therefore, expertise depends not only on the holder’s ability to 
memorise and to accumulate knowledge; it also depends on more abstract skills such 
as perception and problem-solving skills. In addition, the acquisition of expertise is 
contingent upon the subject matter or context to which expert knowledge relates and 
is thus not easily comparable in a like-for-like fashion. For instance, acquired expertise 
in nanotechnology cannot be easily compared with or related to acquired expertise in 
political or corporate decision-making, as expertise is always domain-specific and thus 
the acquired skill sets of the expertise holders may vary considerably. As a result of this 
domain specificity, expert knowledge cannot be simply transferred, although as 
mentioned before, expertise may span over more than one domain. With time, an 
expert may be able to expand his expert knowledge beyond his original domain. For 
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instance, a business analysis expert may over time also develop expert knowledge of 
systems analysis, if that is his/her (additional) domain of work.  
Although the domain specificity suggests that working with, and the analysis of, 
domain-specific knowledge plays a key role; expert knowledge must not be equated 
with domain knowledge. Declarative domain knowledge is also often associated with 
know-what and as such to be distinguished from proceduralised knowledge, also called 
know-how. The latter one is a key component of the process of acquiring expertise. 
Gruber (2001) argues that with growing expertise, proceduralisation moves into the 
forefront. According to Anderson (1982), skill acquisition can be categorised into three 
phases:  
 the declarative phase,  
 the compilation phase and  
 the tuning phase, 
which can be summarised as follows: declarative knowledge is acquired, which is 
compiled (or better said, becomes proceduralised) through action sequences and is 
then finally tuned by means of repetition.  
Other distinctions of expertise can be found in Hatano and Inagaki (1986) and in Patel 
and Groen (1991). Based on research into child development, Hatano and Inagaki 
make the distinction between adaptive and routine expertise, with the first relating to 
the fact that a repeated application of a “procedure with variations is very likely to lead 
to adaptive expertise” (Hatano & Inagaki, 1986, p. 33) whereby the latter, routine 
expertise, “may in fact produce more or less “generalized consequences”, not through 
understanding but through well established patterns and/or modes of processing” 
(Hatano & Inagaki, 1986, p. 32). The latter points to the complexity that is inherent in 
acquired expertise. Often, the owner of this type of expertise is not aware of 
possessing it. This has implications for accessing this type of expertise, especially when 
this expertise is to be accessed outside the expertise holders’ environment. Patel and 
Groen, on the other hand, have carried out research into the medical professions and 
distinguish between generic and specific expertise. According to Patel and Groen, 
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specific expertise is based on sufficiently available generic expertise and the 
development process from generic to specific expertise can be summarised as follows: 
 beginners have declarative knowledge available;  
 intermediates have already compiled their knowledge into simple 
procedures;  
 generic experts dispose of domain-specific schemata and scripts;  
 specific experts have enriched these with case experience.   
The latter is a point of interest, as increasing knowledge-intensity calls for specific 
expertise. Nonetheless, and no matter as to whether aspired expertise is to be either 
generic or specific, practicing within one or more domains is considered to be a 
necessary component, if not condition, in the process of acquiring expertise. According 
to Ericsson et al. (1993) and Ericsson (2000), training activities need to aim to 
purposefully improve performance, a process called deliberate practice. This, however, 
needs to be distinguished from ‘normal’ practice and training activities as its aim is not 
to acquire more declarative knowledge but to improve the quality of expertise. This is 
often done by experts designing their own training curricula and by monitoring their 
own performance. Finally, it needs to be noted that there is no all-encompassing 
expertise. Expertise it is always problem-specific and comes with infinite variations, 
depending solely on the issue at hand. This has implications to those who wish to 
employ expertise. Political arguments are often centred on varying points of view and 
the number of disagreements potentially increases with the number of players 
involved. Furthermore, the domain-specificity of expertise limits its use even when it 
comes to closely related domains. An example, which will be discussed later in this 
thesis, is that of expertise in nanotechnology vs. expertise in the impacts (health, 
environment) of nanotechnology (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
3.2 Knowledge by acquaintance/description 
The concept of differentiating knowledge by its form of acquisition is mostly linked to 
Bertrand Russell, though John Grote first introduced this distinction. By referring to the 
natural language, Grote argued that there is a distinction between “two applications of 
the notion of knowledge, the one being γνώναι, noscere, kennen, connaître, the other 
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being είδζναι, scire, wissen, savoir” (Grote 1865, p. 60, quoted in Martens 2001, p. 
237). Whereby the English language does not distinguish between different forms of 
‘to know’, Greek, Latin, German, French and other languages do so. The Ancient Greek 
γνώναι or the French connaître can be translated into English as ‘know; be aware of; 
understand; and experience’ (Langenscheidt, 2000), and the translation of the German 
kennen is ‘know and/or be acquainted with’ (Langenscheidt, 2000). Grote’s second 
notion of knowledge, είδζναι or savoir can be translated as ‘know; be aware of; know 
how to; be able to and learn’ (Langenscheidt, 2000). Although none of the translations 
are 100 % clear, by comparing one or more translations for the two different words, 
one can identify similarities in other languages leading to the following. 
The first notion γνώναι (noscere, kennen, connaître) refers to knowledge by 
description13, and the latter notion είδζναι (scire, wissen, savoir) refers to knowledge 
by acquaintance14. Helmholtz compared knowledge by description to the “mere 
familiarity with phenomena” (Helmholtz 1962, 269-75, quoted in Martens 2001, p. 
237), in other words it refers to knowledge about things. Knowledge by acquaintance, 
on the other hand, refers to things one is acquainted with, or one has learned.  There 
are two forms of distinctions between the two notions that seem worthwhile 
exploring. The first refers to the value of knowledge, both in theoretical and practical 
terms. The other distinction refers to its application in practice. Martens points out 
that Russell, Grote and James agreed that: 
First, knowing things involves experiencing them. Second, knowledge of things 
by acquaintance is epistemically basic and provides an infallible epistemic 
foundation for knowledge about things. … Third, knowledge about things is 
more articulate and explicit than knowledge by acquaintance with things. 
Fourth, knowledge about things is casually removed from knowledge of things 
by acquaintance, by processes of reflection, analysis and inference (1911, 1913, 
1959) (Martens 2001, p. 239).  
                                                     
13 See also the translation of the French as ‘be aware of’, of the German ‘be acquainted with’ (as 
opposed to knowledge by acquaintance). 
14 See also the translation of the French as ‘know how to’ and ‘be able to’ 
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This means first and foremost, that knowing (things) refers to a practical encounter 
with something and that it is direct. In the narrower sense of the word, it is henceforth 
knowledge by acquaintance. Therefore, knowing (things) include forms of ‘knowing 
about (things)’15, whereby ‘knowing about’ does not automatically include knowing. 
Deriving from that, one can argue that knowledge by acquaintance receives a higher 
value; it is regarded as epistemically prior to knowledge by description. This is further 
supported by the above argument of Russell, Grote and James that knowledge about 
things is regarded as being more articulate and explicit.16 A practical example might 
shed a bit more light on this: 
A person that learns (1) how to operate and to use (2) a computer application, such as 
a word processor or a spreadsheet programme, has acquired (result of 1) knowledge 
(result of 2) by acquaintance. A person that simply knows about the same computer 
applications is not automatically able to use them. Hence, this knowledge about can 
also be described as ‘having heard of, or having heard about’, whereby nothing is said 
or for sure about a person’s ability.  
Further in respect to the value of knowledge, James argued that “these mere matters-
of-acquaintance, are the only realities we ever directly know” (James 2002, p. 35), 
which leads to the conclusion that knowledge by description is both indirect and far 
less valuable regarding its relation to direct practical application. The importance of 
this shall be illustrated in another practical example. In an interview situation, the 
following dialogue develops: 
Q: What do you know about spreadsheet applications, such as Microsoft Excel? 
A: Quite a lot, MS Excel is a very powerful tool. 
Q: How much do you know about the use of logical functions? 
A: We (the current employer) use them to establish whether certain conditions 
are met, for instance, whether all fields in our database have been populated. 
                                                     
15 Or ‘knowledge by description’, as Russell preferred to speak of (Martens 2001, p. 240). 
16  See also the discussion about tacit and explicit knowledge. 
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The above example is not too far away from reality. Supposedly, the interviewee has 
been hired without further testing or verifying of his/her abilities, the company might 
now face the risk by de facto not knowing about the person’s ability to use 
spreadsheet applications. At first sight, especially the second answer looks very 
impressive, but it does not contain any information as to whether the interviewee is 
able to use this or any other type of logical functions. He/she might simply be aware 
that those types of functions are used in his/her current environment. Furthermore, 
the interviewee even might have been very honest by stating the above, the reference 
as to whether he/she is able to perform might have been simply omitted, as this 
question has not been asked specifically. The same type of interview could potentially 
be carried out with a politician or an industry representative, but this time focussing 
on nanotechnology: 
Q: What do you know about nanotechnology and its applications, such as the 
use of nanosilver? 
A: Quite a few things actually. Nanoscale silver is used by leading 
manufacturers, such as Samsung, in their washing machines.  
Q: How much do you know about the properties of nanosilver? 
A: It has been proven in various studies that nanoscale silver has antibacterial 
properties; it can limit, if not prevent, bacterial infections. It is being used in 
bandages, antiseptic wound dressing and considerable success has been made 
especially when treating burn wounds.  
These intentionally oversimplified examples, however, illustrate at a very simple level 
the complexity that pertains to the practical aspect of knowledge by 
description/acquaintance and the danger that comes with it, when one is not aware of 
its different forms and their implications. Here, the value of direct knowledge receives 
importance from a very practical point of view when, as shown in the examples above, 
an employer needs a person that is able to perform a certain set of tasks or a 
layperson may want to learn about nanotechnology.  
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However, there is also an importance to indirect knowledge; that is, the knowledge 
about things or simply put, knowledge by description. Following Skorupski’s example17  
used in his foreword to Russell’s ‘The Problems of Philosophy’, one can say: I know 
Berlin, which the capital of Germany. I also know that Moscow is the capital of Russia. 
The reason why I can say that ‘I know Berlin’ is because I have been there, “not asleep, 
but conscious of my environment” (Skorupski 1998, p. xii, in Russell 1998). My knowing 
of Berlin is, so to say, knowledge by acquaintance. Although I have never been to 
Moscow, I still know that it is the capital of Russia, that is, I know that Moscow, and no 
other city, satisfies the conditions being ‘capital of Russia’. The importance of indirect 
knowledge is self-explanatory, most notably, however, in relation to one’s ability to 
learn things without experiencing them. Again in practical terms, the danger is when 
one fails to update this knowledge by description when it becomes outdated. For 
instance, by saying that Moscow is the capital of the Soviet Union one satisfies the 
criteria that determine which city is the capital of the Soviet Union. In practice, this 
knowledge became obsolete, as the Soviet Union ceased to exist and Moscow now 
satisfies the conditions for being the capital of a different state. A further danger is 
when knowledge by description is used as a substitute for knowledge by acquaintance, 
as, for instance, in the aforementioned example of nanotechnology. If, for instance, a 
layperson does not consciously make a distinction between those two forms of 
knowledge, then actual knowledge by description may be confused with factual, 
expert knowledge. This is the more the case, as the originator of this knowledge is 
seen as an authoritative figure. As a layperson normally does not make a conscious 
distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance as well 
as authoritative forms of knowledge, assumptions held by the public about what is 
expert knowledge are often wrong. 
In summary, one can say that both forms of knowledge have significant practical 
implication, albeit very different ones. The direct form, that is knowledge by 
acquaintance, plays an important role when it comes to the use of abilities that draw 
upon experience and personal familiarity with things. Indirect knowledge, that is 
                                                     
17 Skorupski used the examples of Paris, where he has been, and Brasilia. 
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knowledge about things, comes into play when personal familiarity is not required, be 
it to either establish facts as truth (i.e. verification as to whether certain conditions are 
met) or to use this knowledge about things as commonplace in day-to-day life. The 
danger is that both forms are used interchangeably, or worse, that, when linked to 
authoritarian modes of knowledge, knowledge by description is confused with expert 
knowledge The concept of knowledge by description/by acquaintance, for instance, 
can be utilised by philosophers/epistemologists – who have a particular stance on it, 
but it can also be utilised by social scientists/practitioners who, in turn, approach the 
concept from a very different, one might say ‘hands-on’ perspective.  Furthermore, the 
distinction of knowledge by their forms of acquisition has implications to the analysis 
of knowledge in regard to its practical use, and especially in regard to policy-making.    
3.3 Tacit vs. Explicit 
As already established, it seems quite impossible to find a commonly agreed and 
accepted definition of knowledge; surprisingly the same has to be said about tacit 
knowledge. It is surprising because, unlike the concept of knowledge, tacit knowledge 
has one generally accepted point of origin: the accounts of M. Polanyi.  
3.3.1 Tacit knowledge 
3.3.1.1 Defining tacit knowledge 
Generally speaking, tacit knowledge is the knowledge that resides in people’s heads; it 
is hidden, not easily accessible and its value becomes apparent when transferred into 
explicit, and thus easily accessible, knowledge (MacDonald, 1999). It also consists of 
directly unrecognisable habits, values, beliefs and cultural and behavioural attitudes in 
individuals and is, in addition to that, also inherent in group and organisational 
relationships. The fact that tacit knowledge is not directly recognisable makes it very 
difficult first to locate and to identify, and then to properly document (MacDonald, 
1999). One of the main reasons for these difficulties is that the holder of the tacit 
knowledge in question may not even be aware of its existence and, in addition, may 
not have the necessary skills to articulate, map or describe this knowledge consciously. 
Often, the only way of both passing this knowledge on and to acquire it is within a 
master-apprentice-like training environment by means of observation and direct 
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hands-on repetition and personal experience. As such, it can be viewed as the ‘not 
articulable skill’ or the ability to perform, analyse, infer, conclude and so forth.  
M. Polanyi’s examples include the ability or skill to swim or to ride a bicycle (more on 
these examples later), neither of which can be learned by reading a book about it or 
through listening to a lecture, but only by direct and personal experience based on 
observation and instruction by someone who is experienced. To give another example, 
M. Polanyi pointed out that although, “[b]oth quantum mechanics and relativity are 
very difficult to understand; it takes only a few minutes to memorize the facts 
accounted for by relativity, but years of study may not suffice to master the theory and 
see these facts in its context” (Polanyi M. , 2000, p. 16). In other words, anyone can 
memorise the simple formula put out by Einstein and yet most people actually have no 
comprehension of what e=mc2 means. Another example of common tacit knowledge is 
provided by Sveiby. By referring to the Polanyian concept of tacit knowledge, he 
suggests that “[w]hen we are tacitly involved in a process-of-knowing we act without 
distance. This describes how and why we take things “for granted”” (Sveiby 1997).  
For MacDonald, “[t]he most valuable asset of every organisation is the hidden or tacit 
knowledge buried in the memories of employees and other people in regular contact 
with the organisation” (MacDonald, 1999, p. 12). This tacit knowledge is the 
experience, which includes everything that has been learned from doing, studying and 
from observation. MacDonald even considers knowledge sources or means of 
distribution, such as gossip, as a relevant part of tacit knowledge. The definition above 
hints already that tacit knowledge is “difficult to both recognise and collect let alone 
codify, store and distribute” (MacDonald, 1999, p. 12). For Tiessen, Andiessen and 
Deprez, tacit knowledge is mainly characterised by its strategic focus and importance 
for an organisation, by its occurrence in a highly dynamic environment and by its 
complexity and highly unstructured nature. Without giving an actual definition, they 
argue that “[t]acit knowledge usually focuses on strategic issues, helping companies to 
stay ahead of the game” (Tiessen, Andiessen & Deprez, 2000, p. 187). Albeit this being 
a snippet of typical management jargon, it hints to the hidden character of tacit 
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knowledge; the knowledge that some have and others do not, as it cannot be simply 
accessed and distributed.  
Although it is generally accepted that the concept and notion of tacit knowledge has 
been introduced by M. Polanyi (2000), Barbiero (2004), by referring to Reber, points 
out “that the idea that certain cognitive processes and/or behaviors are undergirded by 
operations inaccessible to consciousness … goes back at least as far as Helmholtz's 
work in the 19th century” (Reber, 1995, p. 15 quoted in Barbiero, 2004). This reference 
to Helmholtz points to the concept of knowledge by acquaintance.  
Undoubtedly, there seem to be a variety of forms of tacit knowledge that easily 
intermingle and merge with, or are at least very similar to, other concepts and forms of 
knowledge. It is therefore no surprise that tacit knowledge is often compared to know-
how and explicit knowledge to know-that. Barbiero (2004) adds another comparison: 
that of embodied knowledge and theoretical knowledge. On this account, knowing-
how or embodied knowledge is characteristic of the expert, who acts, makes 
judgements, and so forth without explicitly reflecting on the principles or rules 
involved. It is therefore also characteristic of knowledge by acquaintance. The expert 
works without having a theory of his or her work; he or she just performs skilfully 
without deliberation or focused attention. Knowing-that, by contrast, involves 
consciously accessible knowledge that can be articulated and is characteristic of the 
person learning a skill through explicit instruction, recitation of rules, attention to his 
or her movements, etc. (Barbiero 2004). Knowing-that, at least up to the point of 
consciously accessing knowledge, can be both knowledge by acquaintance or 
knowledge by description, as nothing has been said about the method of obtaining this 
knowledge. By developing his argument further, Barbiero (2004) suggests that know-
that is a requirement at least throughout the skills acquisition phase, but as soon as 
the apprentice practices the acquired skills and therewith slowly develops his/her own 
know-how, know-that is no longer a necessity for the practice of these acquired skills. 
The ‘not-articulable’ know-how that has been acquired through observation, training 
and practice now resides in the former apprentice, but remains ‘not-articulable’, albeit 
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being regularly used and applied. At this point, it has also become knowledge by 
acquaintance. 
Nonetheless, the equation of tacit knowledge being know-how and explicit knowledge 
being know-that fails strict scrutiny once it is put to the test outside the field of simple 
craftsmanship. This becomes apparent when venturing into more complex areas that 
require skills far beyond that of simple technical or practised and applied know-how. 
The point here is that the ability to perform a certain task cannot always be attributed 
to tacit knowledge, especially not if that task is merely one step or part in a group of 
numerous and subsequent tasks and, despite being similar to the acquisition of know-
how in craftsmanship, is based on motor skills combined with sufficient theoretical 
knowledge that, in turn, may require personal reflection or inference. Thus, in complex 
environments, tacit knowledge cannot be limited to know-how alone but also includes 
know-that. This is especially true when expert performance comes into play that 
indeed requires a minimum of sound theoretical understanding combined with 
intensive hands-on learning experience. In policy-making, for instance, where expertise 
dependency exists, tacit knowledge cannot be used by participating actors that come 
from the areas such as politics, bureaucracy and other public bodies whose primary 
task is governance. Moe (1995 provides an example about what happens when a 
dominant political group leaves technical expertise solely to externally sourced experts 
(see Chapters 3.5.2 and 6.4). Another significance that is attributed to tacit knowledge 
is that the person to whom one credits the possession of certain tacit knowledge has 
often no awareness of that knowledge, at least not consciously. Often, this tacit 
knowledge is only acknowledged by the person who possesses it after it has at least 
been attempted to make that tacit knowledge accessible in one form or the other.  
3.3.1.2 Dimensions of tacit knowledge 
Gourlay (2002, 2004) has undertaken an intensive study to track and to investigate the 
various meanings that are attributed to tacit knowledge. Depending on the discipline 
or area/field of study, perceptions and definitions of tacit knowledge differ. The phrase 
‘tacit knowledge’ is nowadays not only used within the realm of philosophy, sociology 
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and social sciences, but increasingly expands into business and management studies, 
psychology and cognitive sciences, artificial intelligence (AI) and ICT.   
Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) introduced the concept of tacit knowledge into the area of 
management studies in general, and into the field of knowledge management in 
particular. Gourlay argues that Nonaka & Takeuchi depart from M. Polanyi’s 
perception of tacit knowledge as “they distinguished between technical tacit 
knowledge meaning skills or concrete ‘know-how’, and cognitive tacit knowledge which 
refers to ingrained schema, beliefs and mental models that are taken for granted” 
(Gourlay, 2002, p. 2). Similar to the know-how and know-that model, Nonaka & 
Takeuchi hold that tacit knowledge has two dimensions: a technical dimension based 
on craftsmanship and personal (technical) skills that develop and expand with 
experience; and the cognitive dimension based on mental models, beliefs and 
perceptions (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, p. 8). In addition, Nonaka & Takeuchi believe 
that tacit knowledge can be acquired through a process which they call 
‘internalization’. It suggests that tacit knowledge can be gained by experiencing the 
“experiences of others” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 69). This is done by using 
documents, manuals, oral stories and other knowledge that has been verbalised or 
diagrammed (see also explicit knowledge).  
Further, according to Gourlay (2002), various studies suggest that there are two 
dimensions of tacit knowledge: the personal dimension as introduced by M. Polanyi 
and a group or organisational dimension. As for the latter one, Aadne et al. (1996) 
suggest that tacit knowledge can also be found in organisational settings, such as a 
company as a whole, a department, a team or a collective. Similarly, von Krogh (1996) 
holds that tacit knowledge can be found in relationships. In the same vein, Baumard 
(1999) also identifies tacit knowledge as something that can reside in both individuals 
and in groups. Within organisational settings, however, Baumard distinguishes 
between implicit knowledge and tacit knowledge. Implicit knowledge is the knowledge 
that the person who holds it does not wish to share, whereby tacit knowledge is the 
knowledge that cannot be expressed as it is personal and often non-communicable 
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(Baumard 1999).18 Choo (1998) also acknowledges the existence of the two types of 
tacit knowledge. On the one hand, there is the Polanyian type that is limited to 
individuals, and on the other hand there is tacit knowledge that can be attributed to 
groups. The latter one relates to shared practices and understanding amongst group 
members that work together. This can also be described as the so-called team dynamic 
that suggests that individual members often ‘understand each other blindly’. Another 
group of studies has been carried in the area of psychology. Wagner & Sternberg 
(1985), for instance, define “tacit knowledge as knowledge that is tacit in the 
dictionary sense of ‘tacit’" (Gourlay 2002, p. 7), which in plain English means ‘silent’ or 
‘not spoken’.  
In his second study on the use of the concept of tacit knowledge, Gourlay (2004) has 
again identified two major groups that either accredits tacit knowledge to only the 
personal dimension or to both the personal and/or organisational dimension. Studies 
by Colis (1996), Johannessen et al. (2001), Nelson & Winter (1982), Leonard & Sensiper 
(1998), and Stenmark (2000-01) seem to support Gourley’s argument. The 
organisational dimension is commonly expressed by organisational capabilities, 
routines, and procedures (or procedural abilities and knowledge). 
Tacit knowledge acquisition always depends on the direct experience of an individual 
and builds on the personal contact of the learner and on his/her ability to learn 
through observation. Applying this to Choo’s team model means that the direct 
experience of an individual becomes a direct experience of an entire group that builds 
on the personal interaction of each group member.  At the same time, however, this 
could also mean that when a group or team performs a task together, that an 
individual team member possesses tacit knowledge only of parts of this common task; 
that is, for the task for which they have responsibility. This may particularly hold true 
when the task is of either enormous complexity or size and thus consists of numerous 
steps or sub-tasks. In addition, this may also be intentional. For instance, if work is 
carried out that is of a sensitive or secretive nature, then by means of design it can be 
                                                     
18 In this respect, implicit knowledge may play an important role when it comes to scientific discoveries 
leading to patents and copyrights. It can be argued, that an organisation does not want to share its 
implicit understanding of things in order to deter both industrial espionage and competitors.  
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achieved that the overall ‘whole picture’ remains elusive to some or all team 
members. This included ‘classic’ notions, such as ‘need to know’ in intelligence or 
military operations as well as purposefully designed compartmentalisations in 
competitive corporate environments, especially when assumed to be the target of 
industrial espionage.  
As for interpreting M. Polanyi, various accounts that have been published claim that 
M. Polanyi might have been misinterpreted. For instance, Tsoukas (2003) argues that 
M. Polanyi’s tacit knowledge should be viewed as ‘ineffable knowledge’, whereby 
Gourlay (2002, 2004; also Sveiby 1997) points out that M. Polanyi was mainly 
concerned with the process of tacit knowing and not with a thing by the name of tacit 
knowledge: “Knowledge is an activity which would better be described as a process of 
knowing” (Polanyi M., 1969, 132 quoted in Gourlay 2002, p. 8). In addition, Gourlay 
suggests that when looking especially at tacit knowledge in organisations, M. Polanyi’s 
concept may not be “particularly relevant for understanding tacit knowledge in 
organizations” (Gourlay 2004, p. 47). This also becomes apparent when looking at M. 
Polanyi’s understanding of knowing, which is that of “an active comprehension of the 
things known, an action that requires skill. Skilful knowing and doing is performed by 
subordinating a set of particulars, as clues or tools, to the shaping of a skilful 
achievement, whether practical or theoretical” (Polanyi M. , 2000, p. vii). Furthermore, 
M. Polanyi’s intention with his account on ‘Personal Knowledge’ was not to describe 
tacit and/or personal knowledge (or knowing) per se, but also to illustrate that 
complete objectivity is not just a delusion but actually a false ideal: 
But I shall not try to repudiate strict objectivity as an ideal without offering a 
substitute, which I believe to be more worthy of intelligent allegiance: this I 
have called ‘personal knowledge (Polanyi M. , 2000, p. 16). 
3.3.1.3 Forms of tacit knowledge  
By referring to empirical research carried out by Collins (1974) and Wagner & 
Sternberg (1985), Gourlay (2004) suggest that these authors did not base their studies 
on M. Polanyi, and Collins even attested Wittgenstein greater significance. The table 
below provides an overview of current perception of tacit knowledge: 
P a g e  | 91 
Example Source 
legal expertise - determining critical case factors; identifying 
precedents; developing analogies; building an argument 
Marchant & Robinson 
1999 
knowing how to handle face to face selling; how to maximise 
high probability sales situations; salesman’s rules of thumb Wagner et al. 1999 
setting up a scientific experiment - e.g. the care taken in 
clamping the apparatus; in preparing experimental materials 
(polishing a metal suspension thread; greasing a silk 
suspension thread) Collins 2001a 
riding a bicycle; dancing 
Collins 2001b; Cook & 
Brown 1999 
applying social rules; following conventions 
Collins 2001b; Janik 
1988 
speaking acceptable phrases Collins 2001a 
"knowledge … manifested in traditions" Collins 2001b; 1974 
nurses intuitions about patients' conditions 
Herbig et al. 2001; 
Josefson 1988; Leonard 
& Sensiper 1998 
managing oneself (knowledge about the importance of tasks), 
and managing others (how to assign tasks) 
Wagner & Sternberg 
1986 
deciding which journal to submit an article to 
Wagner & Sternberg 
1986 
drawing inferences from various news stories Baumard 1999 
doctors' rules of thumb for psychosocial problems André et al. 2002 
making, and playing, musical instruments Cook & Brown 1999 
baker's ability to make tasty bread 
Nonaka & Takeuchi 
1995 
Table 2: Knowledge that is tacit to knowers (Gourlay, 2004, p. 5) 
When comparing the various uses of tacit knowledge, as summarised in the table 
above, it becomes clear that Gourlay’s statement that the “current tacit knowledge 
theory is weak or ambiguous” (Gourlay, 2004, p. 4) is neither too bold nor farfetched. 
Gourlay identifies four main categories: 
 knowledge where knowers are unaware; 
 knowledge that was previously explicitly known; 
 innate knowledge; 
 knowledge that some actors can tell, but others cannot because they are 
unaware of it (Gourlay, 2004, p. 4). 
Two of these categories require further explanation: innate knowledge and knowledge 
that was previously explicitly known. Innate knowledge is ‘knowledge’ that everyone is 
born with, such as motor skills (M. Polanyi attributed the ability to ride a bike to tacit 
knowledge). Previously explicit knowledge (documented knowledge) refers to 
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knowledge that, according to Nonaka & Takeuchi, can be internalised or absorbed by 
experiencing the experience of others if, and only if, this experience has been specially 
‘prepared’ for easy ‘absorption’. With regard to tacit knowledge as a phenomenon that 
solely can be attributed to individuals19, Gourlay has identified six distinguishing 
categories: 
a) someone can do something, but apparently cannot give an account 
b) someone claims they feel something of which they cannot give an account, 
but it is not clear if subsequent events validate the claim 
c) someone can do something, but not give an account at that moment, but 
can, if pressed, recall the explicit knowledge that was used tacitly when 
acting 
d) knowledge existing prior to the situation in which it is effective, and due to 
innate (biological) characteristics 
e) knowledge existing prior to the situation in which it is effective, and due to 
cultural factors 
f) situations where A knows something that B does not, but where it could be 
argued A and B share the same practice (Gourlay 2004, p. 9).  
Gourlay suggests that “not to use the phrase [tacit knowledge, sic!] where there is no 
question of the knower not being able to say, either because they are explicitly aware 
of something (it’s just that someone else is not), or where they can readily bring the 
explicit knowledge that underpins their behaviour to mind (experts).” (Gourlay, 2004, p. 
11). Although Gourlay refers in this example to experts, his notion of experts should 
not be confused with expert knowledge and the underlying tacit component as 
described throughout this thesis. In other words, Gourlay suggests that the notion of 
tacit knowledge should not be used where experts can recall the explicit knowledge 
that is required to carry out a task. This is different to expert knowledge that is based 
on the synthesis of explicit (theoretical) knowledge and tacit practical (expert) 
knowledge acquired over a lengthy period of time.  See also Chapter 3.4 on expert 
knowledge.   
                                                     
19 This excludes forms or categories of collective or organisational tacit knowledge. 
P a g e  | 93 
After having discussed tacit knowledge in its various forms and interpretations, it 
should also be mentioned what tacit knowledge is not. The often quoted examples of 
tacit knowledge that M. Polanyi provided, knowing how to ride a bicycle or knowing 
how to swim, are by definition not forms of tacit knowledge. Here, M. Polanyi has 
simply been wrong, as these are motor skills and fall into the area of innate 
knowledge; the knowledge people are born with. The other rather obvious example 
that cannot be attributed to tacit knowledge is the ability to master language. 
Language is a cognitive capacity and as such also inherent to us since birth.  
3.3.2 Explicit knowledge  
Explicit knowledge is de facto the opposite of tacit knowledge. For M. Polanyi, explicit 
knowledge is defined as knowledge that can be 'clearly stated' (Polanyi M. , 2000). In 
an organisational context, explicit knowledge is basically all documented, archived and 
codified knowledge that can be held in databases, technical specifications, patents, 
policies and procedures, etc. In other words, and, as Bock put it, explicit knowledge is 
“the knowledge that is out there for all to find, see and use” (Bock 2000). In terms of 
knowledge generation, it is the knowledge that can be easily documented, be it by 
adding meaning to data and then value to information or by simply writing down some 
meeting minutes and placing it on a black board, an Intranet or the Internet. However, 
explicit knowledge must not be confused with either free information or commercial 
information, as defined by Keohane and Nye (1998) for instance. Just because 
something is ‘out there and for everyone to find’, does not mean that it is explicit 
knowledge.  
3.3.3 Transforming tacit to explicit knowledge 
As discussed previously, tacit knowledge is the knowledge that someone has in his/her 
head. This tacit knowledge has not yet been documented and is linked to knowledge 
by acquaintance and expertise. This limits the transferability and thus hinders public 
access to that type of knowledge. Most importantly, tacit knowledge is always 
controlled by the person or the organisation that has it. A few researchers also argue 
that tacit knowledge is simply impossible to convert into explicit, and therefore, 
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documented knowledge (Tiessen, Andriessen, & Deprez, 2000). Cowan et al. (1998) are 
more specific in this regard and make the distinction between tacit knowledge that is:  
• tacit for lack of incentives 
• tacit by nature. 
According to this, tacit knowledge that has not been documented due to a lack of 
incentives can actually be transferred into explicit knowledge. An example is work-
routine or process mapping, no matter the complexity. Until a certain work routine 
(especially when it is a new, or a very old, but undocumented one) has been 
documented, the knowledge of how to perform this particular task might reside only in 
few people’s minds. With sufficient expertise on how to properly transfer this 
particular knowledge, this existing tacit knowledge can be made explicit. The outcome, 
however, and especially the quality and usefulness always depends on the expertise of 
the person that was tasked to perform this transfer. But there are also examples for 
‘undocumentable’ knowledge, which is tacit by nature. For instance, one cannot 
convert one’s tacit knowledge and understanding (and certainty) of colours into 
explicit knowledge. For instance, when one sees a green object, it is ‘known’ that this 
object is green. One cannot, however, document into the finest details as to why one 
knows that this particular object is green. All that is known is that one has ‘come to 
known this colour as being called green’ and ever since this colour was associated the 
adjective green.    
In the academic discussion concerning as to whether tacit knowledge can be 
transferred into explicit knowledge, the opinions vary starkly. Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995) advocate that, by absorbing the experience of others, tacit knowledge can be 
converted into explicit knowledge, although this process has its difficulties. Von Krogh 
(1996) doubts that this is possible, as tacit knowledge is knowledge that cannot be 
communicated. Tiessen, Andiessen and Deprez (2000) seem to agree. Baumard (1999) 
on the other hand, provides a rather mixed account. Although Baumard agrees that 
tacit knowledge is not communicable, by using patents as examples, he ultimately also 
implies that there must be a conversion process from tacit knowledge (say the 
‘invention’) to the patented description. Gourlay (2002), albeit not convinced of 
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Nonaka and Takeuchi’s approach, refers to Collins (2001) who has researched the role 
of tacit knowledge amongst scientists and other skilled professionals. Collins argues 
that tacit knowledge can be passed on between scientists (or other professionals for 
that matter) by means of direct contact, but not in any documented (written 
instructions, diagrams, etc.) form. The below lists types of such knowledge as 
identified by Collins (2001 in Gourlay, 2002): 
• concealed knowledge: tricks of the trade; concealment may be intentional or 
unintentional (the concealer is unaware) 
• mismatched salience: different parties focus on different variables or aspects of 
a complex piece of research, resulting in mismatched perspectives 
• ostensive knowledge: words may not be available to convey knowledge that 
pointing can 
• unrecognized knowledge: the successful experimenter may be unaware of 
critical actions that an observer successfully but unconsciously imitates 
• uncognized/uncognizable knowledge: our ability to utter meaningful sentences 
without being able to say how; learning requires apprenticeship (Gourlay, 2002, 
p. 6). 
As Gourlay (2002) concludes, all but the last example, which also resembles the 
aforementioned inability to describe exactly why one calls colours by their designated 
names, can be converted into explicit knowledge. Nevertheless, by going back to 
Cowan’s reasons for tacitness, that are tacit for lack of incentives and tacit by nature, 
further reasons as to why tacit knowledge may be difficult or even impossible to 
transfer shall be explored. Three additional motives are: 
 concern with secrecy and power,  
 because no one has bothered to recognize the knowledge or tried to explicate 
it, and,  
 because it concerns presuppositions we all generally hold (Gourlay, 2002, p. 5). 
The latter two can be compared to the group of tacit knowledge that remains tacit for 
the lack of the proper incentives. To a certain extent, however, the same could also be 
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said about tacit knowledge that is not shared for reasons of power and secrecy. Here, a 
lack of incentives could be explained by the fact that holders of this particular 
knowledge might either not have a reason to give this knowledge away (i.e. for reason 
of his/her own personal status) or that he/she may not be allowed to do so, for 
instance by having to sign non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). 
3.4 Expert knowledge and knowledge gaps 
3.4.1 Expert knowledge 
Expert knowledge has received much attention in recent years. Apart from the fact 
that experts are often recognised for their reliability to interpret special issues, experts 
are also regarded as authorities (also see the aforementioned authoritative mode of 
knowledge). Barely a single day goes by without an ‘expert’ being questioned on TV, on 
radio shows or in the print/online media on a broad variety of issues, most of them 
highly topical. Nowadays, there are ‘immigration experts’, ‘climate change experts’ and 
even ‘fashion experts’ who are often presented to the public in order to explain to the 
layperson - which by definition is the opposite of an expert – complex issues or that 
simply debate with other authorities in their respective fields. One underlying 
assumption, that the public accepts experts for their knowledge, is often understood 
to be a given. Popular TV news coverage in the majority of industrialised countries has 
grown accustomed to having a pool of experts on stand-by, should the need arise.20 
Whether the content of what is presented by the popular media can be regarded as 
expertise is questionable. It is more likely that, although a number of experts are 
indeed representing an expert opinion, the majority of issues debated scratch mostly 
only the surface of an underlying expertise. Nonetheless, the target audience of these 
media events is the layperson, who is often challenged enough by what is presented or 
who simply does not have the time and interest to care.  
What transforms a scientific statement into an expert opinion is its use in the 
decision-making process. From then on the scientist cannot avoid bringing 
something of himself or herself into the process: his or her personal and 
                                                     
20 Although no current data could be found, it is probably not too bold to assume that are not many UK 
universities that do not have one of those ‘stand-by’ experts.   
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professional background, his or her sympathies, and so on. The objectivity 
expected of him or her has to be maintained not only despite pressures from 
the public or from government, but also, no matter how honest he or she is, 
despite his or her prejudices and commitment. In short, a clear distinction must 
be made between three separate functions: producing knowledge, offering an 
expert opinion and making decisions (Salomon, 2001, pp. 220-221). 
In addition to the use of expert knowledge in the decision-making process, expert 
knowledge is also used as proof, or as it is called, expert testimony, in courts. The idea 
behind this is to make knowledge usable and accessible to a jury, for instance, that 
normally would be outside their ability to comprehend. As a result, expert testimony 
“must be stated in the language of general coherence, …, but that language must rely 
on formalized models, in addition to common sense and other intuitive preconceptions” 
(Page & Lopatka, 2004, p. 12). However, there are some fears that expert testimony 
may be too complex for juries to either fully understand, or when case-specific, to put 
it correctly in context. Thus, and without debating any legal framework (i.e. what 
expert testimony must adhere to, or whether and under which circumstances expert 
testimony is admissible or should be rejected), one fact needs to be acknowledged: 
expert testimony follows the authoritative mode of knowledge, based on experts’ 
qualifications, reliability, fit and/or reputation (Page & Lopatka, 2004). As a result, 
relying on expert testimony always assumes that the expert in question acts in court 
and exercises the same intellectual capacities that they would employ in their 
respective field of expertise (Page & Lopatka, 2004). A US court case shall be used as 
an example to illustrate the discussion above: Kumo Tire Co. Ltd. vs. Carmichael. 
Following an accident, where a car tyre failed with the result of overturning the van, 
the Carmichael family sued the manufacturer Kumo Tire Co. Ltd.  
The Carmichaels hired George Edwards, an expert on tire failure, to examine 
the tire. Edwards concluded that a defect in the tire’s design or manufacture 
caused the blowout. Before he could testify for the Carmichaels, Edwards 
became ill. He passed the case on to his employee, Dennis Carlson, who was 
also a credentialed expert on tire failure. Carlson reviewed Edwards file on the 
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tire and discussed the case with Edwards. He then confirmed Edwards’ 
conclusion that the tire was defective. Carlson did not examine the tire until 
after he had rendered his opinion on the cause of the blowout, but he claimed 
that the examination confirmed his earlier conclusion (Bernstein, 1998, pp. 7-
8).  
As a result of this, Kumo Tire Co. Ltd. asked the court not to allow Carlson to testify at 
the trial. Although neither Carlson’s qualifications nor his fit was questioned, but the 
fact that he came to a conclusion before examining the evidence and thus, the expert 
testimony failed the acceptable standards21 (Bernstein, 1998). In other words, 
although the expert exercised an authoritative mode of knowledge, he did not apply 
the same intellectual capacities that he normally would employ in his respective field 
of expertise on a day-to-day basis. The result was that the ‘authoritative stance’, which 
is normally purposefully employed in order to exercise the expert testimony, was 
rejected. In other words, the expert – as an authority – lost exactly that: authority.   
This example could easily be translated into the area of politics, for instance instead of 
expertise on car tyres, this could be expertise on nanoscale silver particles, and instead 
of a court it could be a hearing during a policy formation process. Both scenarios rely 
on sufficiency and reliability of the expert and therefore on its authority (Page & 
Lopatka, 2004).  
To clarify what can and cannot be expected of experts, Boynton (2007) delivers a very 
practical (and in this instance, perhaps coincidentally, non-academic) hands-on ‘can’ 
and ‘can’t’ do list with regards to when to use expert advice. According to Boynton, 
experts:  
Can…  
 Provide information about their research, area of teaching, or clinical practice.   
 Discuss issues within their area of expertise (for example their branch of 
science, …).  
                                                     
21 In the US, these standards were established following three main court cases: Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., General Electric Co. v. Joiner, and Kumo Tire Co. v. Carmichael (Gross & Mnookin, 
2003). 
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 Reflect on other research projects or ideas expressed by others in their field.  
 Provide journalists and the public with information (e.g. results of their 
research, …).  
 Use evidence or experience to suggest areas where academia, science, … can 
be improved. 
Can’t…  
 Talk about the results or outcomes of any research they have conducted until it 
has been published, or is presented at a conference.  
 Discuss the results of other people’s work before they have presented or 
published it.  
 Make claims that go beyond their data. 
 Talk outside their area of research, practice, and expertise (Boynton, 2007). 
The above list of items experts can do seems obvious and self-explanatory. The same, 
however, cannot be said about the list of things experts cannot do. The first point, not 
to talk about unpublished and peer-reviewed finding may be well understood in 
academia, yet as to whether every expert takes this seriously is questionable. A good 
example is the use of experts by the media on newsworthy day-to-day events, for 
instance the latest military coup or the failures of a company that has just published its 
annual fiscal report. In these instances, when an expert comments on these events, 
the experts have not actually carried out research on either of these subject, but 
instead, drew conclusions and gave advice based on previous experience in similar 
circumstances. Although, this is not to say that an expert cannot be correct by inferring 
from his/her previous experience, the problem here is that, in fact, it is mere 
assumptions that are presented by following an authoritarian mode of knowledge 
dissemination. A layperson, in these instances, may not be able to distinguish between 
what is scientific evidence and what is conjecture, yet is presented an ‘expert opinion’. 
When summarising her list, Boynton argues that experts are “bound by particular 
ethical and professional guidelines, so the ‘can’t do’ section of this list isn’t something 
that should be seen as optional” (Boynton, 2007). 
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A different take on the subject is presented by Geißel and Penrose (2003). Since the 
mid-1990s, according to Geißel and Penrose, there has been increasing criticism over 
the lack of participation possibilities of the general public in political decision-making 
processes as well as in the processes of knowledge production. This could be observed 
as follows: society modernised itself by also increasing its general levels of education, 
yet at the same time, society has less and less accepted statements of political and 
scientific experts. This is mostly expressed by a general doubt and distrust towards the 
neutrality and objectivity of political and scientific expertise. One the one hand, Geißel 
and Penrose point out, there is the general fear that results of scientific expertise has 
been influenced by economic or political factors. On the other hand, there is the 
insecurity of the public about their own ability to understand and correctly interpret 
scientific results. Both of these arguments cumulate in a general assumption prevalent 
in the public mind that scientific expertise can always be countered by means of 
employing counter-expertise. Geißel and Penrose conclude that this results in science 
looking incomplete, contradictory and elitist.   
3.4.2 Knowledge gaps 
At the moment, there are no definitions available that describe what knowledge gaps 
are or that somehow define the parameters that constitute knowledge gaps. Does the 
lack of the public’s understanding of nanotechnology, for instance, constitute a 
knowledge gap? Similarly, is the lacking knowledge by a politician with regards to the 
genotoxicity of nanosilver particles to be understood as a knowledge gap? In general, 
one can argue that knowledge gaps occur when parts of a process or sequence are 
unknown to the performer. These knowledge gaps can refer to both, theoretical 
knowledge and practical knowledge. Also, the term ‘knowledge gap’ makes most sense 
when used to describe ‘lacking knowledge’ by acquaintance, as there is potentially no 
limit to the lacking knowledge of description. At the same time, lacking knowledge of 
description is not really an issue, as it has been established; knowledge by 
acquaintance is epistemically prior22. Thus, the questions posed above have to be 
                                                     
22 That is, in the context the research topic. However, a pupil in school who lacks knowledge by 
description during a multiple choice test, can, for obvious reasons, be perceived as an issue. 
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answered with a no, as it cannot be expected that either the public or politicians 
possess such knowledge.  
However, the issue of knowledge gaps is not limited to cases where sufficient 
knowledge and expertise cannot be used or is available. It also encompasses the areas 
where the required expertise cannot simply be transferred to the public so that they 
can form an informed opinion. Examples of the limits to transferring tacit to explicit 
knowledge have been shown above (see Chapter 3.3.). The latter case bears a larger 
weight when taking current issues of the ‘politics-tiredness’ of the general public into 
account, as well as current doubts on the general ability of democracy to tackle 
contemporary issues. 
3.5 Information, knowledge and policy making 
3.5.1 Policy making 
Due to the vast changes that have occurred in the last century (see also Chapter 2) 
Mehan (1993) suggests that “*a+radical change in both the kind of knowledge sought 
by policy-analysts and the way in which such knowledge is used in policy-making is 
essential” (Meehan, 1993, p. 54). By this, Mehan refers to both a better conception of 
the kind or type knowledge relevant for policy-making and criteria that can be used to 
validate knowledge claims. Policy-making itself has received much attention in the last 
two to three decades. What initially began with Lerner and Lasswell (1951) soon begun 
to split into several subfields within the political sciences. According to Sabatier (2001), 
policy research by political scientists mainly followed four routes:  
 Substantive area research 
 Evaluation and impact studies 
 The study of the policy process 
 The study of policy design 
Substantive area research focuses on policy of specific areas, such as social policy, 
education or environmental policy. As such, case studies often aim to help both 
practitioners and policy activists (Sabatier, 1991b). Evaluation and impact studies, on 
the other hand, not only rely on contributions from other disciplines (often economics) 
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but also go beyond standard cost-benefit analyses. Sabatier (1991) points out that 
evaluation and impact studies have become integrated into research on the policy 
process by examining the advantages and disadvantages of the use of policy analysis in 
the real world. Somewhat differently, the study of the policy process emphasises 
“factors affecting policy formulation and implementation, as well as the subsequent 
effects of policy” (Sabatier, 1991b, p. 144). Sabatier refers to Ranney (1968) and 
Sharkansky (1970), who argue that “substantive policy areas risked falling into the 
relatively fruitless realm of atheoretical case studies, while evaluation research offered 
little promise for a discipline without clear normative standards of good policy. A focus 
on the policy process would provide opportunities for applying and integrating the 
discipline's accumulated knowledge concerning political behavior in various 
institutional settings” (Sabatier, 1991b, p. 144). Finally, policy design focuses on 
different types of policy instruments, such as regulations, standards, incentives and 
others. 
Each of the above-mentioned areas of inquiry can be broken down further into a 
number of sub-fields and specialisms. For instance, the study of the policy-process, 
which - in Sabatier’s opinion - has been the “most fruitful” (Sabatier, 1991b, p. 144), 
could be broken down into:  
 agenda setting 
 formulation and adoption 
 implementation and 
 evaluation. 
The same could be done by looking at different types of substantive area research, 
evaluation and impact studies or the study of policy design. What is more, further 
distinctions could be made by looking at different approaches to the policy process, be 
they of heuristic or of normative nature, activist based or purely theoretical. All in all, 
this also has led to some criticism on policy research. The most serious one is that 
“policy scholars have made only modest contributions to developing reasonably clear, 
generalizable and empirically verified theories of the policy process” (Sabatier, 1991b, 
p. 145): 
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Much of what passes as policy research-particularly by substantive area 
specialists-shares all the defects of traditional case studies in public 
administration: descriptive analyses of specific institutions or decisions relying 
upon very subjective methods of data acquisition and analysis, virtually no 
attention to the theoretical assumptions underlying the research or the 
theoretical implications of the findings, and very little concern with the 
potential generalizability of those findings (Sabatier, 1991b, p. 145). 
This criticism requires a deeper look into theories of the policy process. In particular, 
three different approaches shall be examined here. However, there are also other 
approaches to and theories of the policy process. Sabatier (1991) provides an overview 
and refers to Hofferbert’s ‘open-systems framework’, Kingdon’s ‘policy stream 
framework’ and Wildavsky's ‘cultural explanations of policy change’ (Sabatier, 1991b). 
Although the three theories that have been selected are all rationalist approaches, 
they have been chose over others (for instance, Lassall’s (1956) heuristic stages model) 
because they account for criteria that are important to this thesis. Overman states that 
“[t]he role of theory in the policy sciences oscillates between useless and useful, futile 
and fruitful depending on our perspective,…” (Overman, 1988, p. 109), the three 
chosen approaches are not only useful, but will also shed some light on the role 
information and knowledge play when actors are faces with uncertainty. The first of 
the chosen approaches focuses on the role of institutions in shaping information 
processes, the second looks at how actor interests drive their behaviour towards such 
processes and the third emphasises the role of beliefs and secondary 
knowledge/information.  
3.5.2 Theories of the policy process 
The first of the three approaches discussed here is that of Ostrom (1991), who 
advocates an Institutional Rational Choice (IRC) approach.  For IRC theorists, such as 
Ostrom, public policies are institutional arrangements and policy changes are the 
result of individuals trying to improve/alter a given situation by changing institutional 
arrangements. These arrangements include presumptions about how actors behave 
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and a number of key characteristics of decision situations. Therefore, according to 
Ostrom, actors need to specify their: 
 resources 
 ability to process information 
 valuation of outcomes and actions 
 criteria for selecting actions (Ostrom, 1990, 1991) 
In addition, Ostrom defines decision situations that include institutional arrangements, 
for instance, the rules that define what actions are allowed, required and/or 
forbidden. Furthermore, since policy making always happens in the physical, real 
world, these attributes are important, as well as characteristics of the locale within 
which desired action is taking place. “Since in most cases, actors cannot readily change 
the characteristic of the community or the relevant attributes of the world, they direct 
their efforts to realize their preferences and improve their situations at changing 
institutional arrangements” (Schlager & Blomquist, 1996, p. 653). Therefore, ICR define 
policy changes as actions taken at institutional level, whereby the actions themselves 
are grouped into different levels. For instance, actions to change existing institutional 
arrangements are one level of actions; the introduction of new, previously not existing 
rules is another level of actions. All in all, there are three levels of actions: 
 operational, having to do with the direct actions of individuals in relating to 
each other and the physical world; 
 collective-choice, the level at which individuals establish the rules that govern 
their operational-level actions; and 
 constitutional, the level at which individuals establish the rules and procedures 
for taking authoritative collective decisions (Schlager & Blomquist, 1996, p. 
654). 
Within that model, actors can either move between these different levels, or decide to 
influence only one level of actions. From an IRC perspective, policy changes happen at 
the collective choice or the constitutional level in order to change institutional 
arrangements. In the context of this thesis, one could interpret Ostrom’s approach as 
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follows: actors working on nanotechnology could be working on any of the three 
levels, always knowing that the choice outcome of one level affects the next 
(constitutional - collective - operational level). In other words, actions taken at the 
constitutional level, the level where the rules and procedures are set, impact actions 
that follow at the collective choice level, the level where policy change is made.   
The second approach to a theory of the policy process is that of Moe’s Politics of 
Structural Choice. Moe (1995) also perceives policy changes as changes to institutional 
arrangements. However, these changes aim to overcome collective action problems 
and require cooperation for mutual gains. One of the main premises of Moe’s 
argument is that the lack of information/expertise leads to use of interest groups, with 
the result that different political actors have different motivations. On the other hand, 
it is only because of the interaction of interest groups, politicians and bureaucrats that 
leads to the formation of public policy (Schlager & Blomquist, 1996).   
The result is a two-tiered hierarchy: one tier is the internal hierarchy of the 
agency, the other is the political control structure linking it to politicians and 
groups. If we think of business firms as governance structures that include their 
creators, then, the closest analogy in the public sector is not the public agency 
itself, but rather this extended hierarchy of public authority that begins at the 
top with politicians and interest groups and moves down to bureaucratic 
leaders to the lowest reaches of the organisation (Moe, 1995, p. 122).   
Within this model, Moe explores how political actors achieve their goals and how they 
maintain their power and influence. For instance, interest groups may be politically 
successful today, but this may not last. Thus, even though an interest group may be 
powerful enough to establish a new agency, the same interest group may not be in 
existence when it finally comes to the implementation of policy, and new actors may 
arise and change the direction (Moe, 1995). As a result, political change affects 
institutional design. Thus, in order to “to gain even a portion of what it wants, those 
seeking political control must engage in compromise even with adversaries” (Schlager 
& Blomquist, 1996, p. 655). This ‘twin pressure’ of political compromise and 
uncertainty is a key characteristic of Moe approach. In the context of this thesis, one 
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could interpret Moe’s approach as follows: the various actors working on 
nanotechnology have an expectation that other groups and actors will bring in 
counter-arguments and points, thus destroying or compromising technical expertise in 
favour of political compromise.  
The third approach is that of Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalitions. Sabatier views policy 
change as a function of: 
 the interaction of competing advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem 
 changes external to the subsystem 
 the effects of relatively stable system parameters (Sabatier, 1991b). 
An advocacy coalition consists of actors from both public and private organisation that 
share a common set of basic beliefs (policy goals) who “seek to manipulate the rules of 
various governmental institutions to achieve those goals over time” (Sabatier, 1991b, 
pp. 152-3).  
Coalitions are assumed to organize around common core beliefs, such as the 
proper scope of governmental vs. market activity and the proper distribution of 
authority among levels of government. Since these core beliefs are 
hypothesized to be relatively stable over periods of a decade or more, so too is 
coalition composition. Coalitions seek to learn about how the world operates 
and the effects of various governmental interventions in order to realize their 
goals over time. Because of resistance to changing core beliefs, such policy-
oriented learning is usually confined to the secondary aspects of belief systems 
(Sabatier, 1991b, p. 153). 
Socio-economic conditions, for example, are what Sabatier means by ‘subsystems’ and 
his ‘system parameters’ refer to basic social structures and constitutional rules.  
Because advocacy coalitions are based on a shared belief system, they operate by: 
 developing and using information in an advocacy mode to persuade decision-
makers to adopt policy alternatives supported by the coalition 
 manipulating the choice of decision-making forum 
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 supporting public officials in positions of public authority who share their views 
or may even be members of the coalition (Schlager & Blomquist, 1996). 
For the advocacy coalition framework, information and learning are important 
motivating factors. As a result, the process of policy change is a constant "iterative 
process of policy formulation, problematic implementation and struggles over 
reformulation” (Sabatier, 1988, p.130 quoted in Schlager & Blomquist, 1996, p. 657). 
Schlager and Blomquist argue that the advocacy coalition framework is best suited to 
explain policy changes that appear over decades, as it focuses on policy changes 
resulting from changing preference or beliefs participating actors, instead of explaining 
change as a result or consequence of emerging new actors that have  different sets of 
preferences (Schlager & Blomquist, 1996). In the context of this thesis, Sabatier’s 
approach could be interpreted as follows: a range of actors working on 
nanotechnology have not only the same core policy beliefs, but will attempt to make 
policy change happened through coordinated activity, consisting of, amongst many 
other strategies, influencing like-minded decision-makers, the use of mass media to 
change public opinions, and the use of information to change perceptions of polices.  
Following Schlager and Blomquists’ (1996) research, the differences of the three 
approaches can be compared by looking at six criteria: 
 the boundaries of inquiry  
 the model of the individual 
 the roles of information and beliefs in decision making and strategy 
 the nature and role of groups 
 the concept of levels of action  
 the ability to explain action at various stages of the policy process. 
Table 3, below, provides an overview of the differences in the three approaches. Two 
of the above six areas are of particular interest of this thesis and will therefore be 
examined in more detail (see also Chapters 3.6 and 6). 
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Criteria Institutional Rational 
Choice 
Structural Choice Advocacy Coalitions 
Boundaries of 
Inquiry 
The decision situation 
and individuals 
Typically, a public 
organization plus its 
creators, benefactors 
and administrators 
Policy subsystem 
organized around 
policy problems 
Model of the 
Individual 
Intendedly but 
boundedly rational 
problem-solver 
Substantively rational 
maximizer seeking 
power 
Procedurally 
rational acting on 
information and 
beliefs 
Uncertainty, 
Information and 
Belief 
Actors use search and 
trial-and-error 
learning to reduce 
uncertainty. beliefs 
enter in as attributes 
of the community, 
affecting the costs & 
benefits of options 
Actors' behavior 
driven largely by 
political uncertainty. 
Interests emphasized 
over beliefs as 
motivations for 
actors' behavior 
Accumulation and 
use of information a 
key element of 
policy change. 
Actors' beliefs serve 
as perceptual filters 
in their receipt of 
information, but 
information can also 
change beliefs 
Nature and Role of 
Groups 
Groups are not 
central to IRC 
explanations and 
collective action 
barriers to group 
formation 
emphasized 
Groups are central to 
political action, but 
their formation is 
assumed rather than 
explained. Groups 
and politicians 
exchange political 
support for favorable 
policies 
Coalitions, which 
include interest 
groups, are central 
actors and cohere 
around beliefs. 
Process of coalition 
formation is 
assumed rather 
than explained 
Levels of Action Explicitly made part 
of actors' coalitions' 
strategic behavior; 
policy change 
conceived as rule 
change  
Implicitly included in 
explanation; 
however, most of the 
time, rules of the 
political game 
assumed fixed  
Implicitly part of the 
strategic behavior in 
attempt to influence 
choice of decision 
making forum 
Stages of the Policy 
Process 
Emphasis on problem 
definition, policy 
formulation, 
evaluation 
Emphasis on 
adoption stage 
Emphasis on 
problem definition, 
policy formulation, 
adoption, evaluation 
Table 3: Comparing approaches to three emerging theories of the policy process (Schlager & Blomquist, 1996, p. 
659) 
Ultimately, “*t+he goal of a political theory of the policy process is to explain how 
interested political actors interact within political institutions to produce, implement, 
evaluate, and revise public policies” (Schlager & Blomquist, 1996, p. 653). Therefore, 
one area of the three previously introduced approaches to policy theory shall be used 
and applied against the findings of this chapter. In particular, Ostrom’s Institutional 
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Rational Choice (1991), Moe’s (1995) and Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalitions Framework 
(1991) will be analysed with respect towards: 
 the roles of uncertainty, information and beliefs in decision making and 
strategy 
The table below summarises the assumptions these three theories make with regards 
to uncertainty, information and beliefs: 
Criteria Institutional Rational 
Choice 
Structural Choice Advocacy Coalitions 
Framework 
Uncertainty, 
information and 
beliefs 
Actors use search and 
trial-and error learning 
to reduce uncertainty. 
Beliefs enter in a s 
attributes of the 
community, affecting 
the cost and benefits 
of options 
Actors’ behaviour 
largely driven by 
political uncertainty. 
Interests emphasised 
over beliefs as 
motivations for 
actors’ behaviour. 
Accumulation and use 
of information is a key 
element of policy 
change. Actors’ beliefs 
serve as perceptual 
filters in their receipt 
of information, but 
information can also 
change beliefs.  
Table 4: Summary of the information aspect of theories of the policy process according to Schlager & Blomquist 
(1996). 
Although beliefs and belief systems are not the central focus of this thesis, beliefs can 
be influenced by both information and knowledge. For instance, although particular 
beliefs can have an impact on policy preferences, an additional supply of information 
either does not change a person’s belief or it only reinforces this belief. In the example 
provided by Kahan et al., a person that was particularly Green/eco-friendly or 
conservative did not change their opinion about nanotechnology when supplied with 
more information (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, & Cohen, 2007). Keohane supports 
this view:  
Facts don’t necessarily have the power to change our minds. In fact, quite the 
opposite. In a series of studies in 2005 and 2006, researchers at the University 
of Michigan found that when misinformed people, particularly political 
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partisans, were exposed to corrected facts in news stories, they rarely changed 
their minds. In fact, they often became even more strongly set in their beliefs 
(Keohane J. , 2010). 
In both Ostrom’s IRC and Moe’s Structural Choice framework, information has a 
relatively narrow role; the use of information in decision-making processes is selective 
due to the limited information processing capabilities of individuals. Although Ostrom 
stresses the role of information, it is mainly used in the context of individual 
information-processing capacities (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). In order to 
identify how actors make decisions, the term information is used as measure to 
determine the level of information actors can possess and process. For instance, by 
making the assumption that actors have complete and all-encompassing information, 
an ideal scenario outcome would be that actors “know the full decision or game tree in 
extensive form. Perfect information requires all aspects of complete information, and in 
addition, that all actions taken by participants are known to all others” (Ostrom, 
Gardner, & Walker, 1994, p. 34). By making the assumption that actors have complete 
information and infallible information processing capabilities, various models can then 
be assessed. By doing this, and by applying ‘bounded rationality’, that is to say, a much 
weaker assumption about actors’ information processing capabilities, the result is that 
actors make mistakes, for instance, by processing only some, or even none of the 
information that is available. A similar effect can be achieved by manipulating the 
number of actors involved is such a scenario. Ultimately, what is important in the 
context of this thesis is the use of the term information. Making any of the above 
assumptions is perfectly fine – within the context of Ostrom’s model. What is open to 
debate is the lacking specificity of the term information. How this can be interpreted 
with regards to nanotechnology will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.4 of the 
analysis section of this thesis. 
Moe stresses that in situations of uncertainty there is an expertise problem since 
science and social science still doesn’t know enough: “These knowledge problems are 
compounded by uncertainty about the future” (Moe, 1995, p. 132). Moe argues that 
political uncertainty differs from economic uncertainty due to the fact that political 
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property rights – for instance the right to exercise public authority – cannot be claimed 
by individual actors or groups of actors in perpetuity: “whatever policies and structures 
... put in place today may be subject to authoritative direction of other actors 
tomorrow, actors with very different interests who could undermine or destroy their 
hard-won achievements” (Moe, 1995, p. 124). The result of this is political 
compromise, as most of the struggle will be about who has the rights “to make 
authoritative decisions for society” (Moe, 1995, p. 125). Thus, political uncertainty 
leads to questions about how to protect political governance structures from 
opponents, and not how to design the most efficient way of governance.  
The information and knowledge problem becomes apparent by what Moe calls the 
‘technical problem of structural choice’ (Moe, 1995). That is, for instance, if a 
dominant political group wants to exercise its power, it is usually quite successful in 
simple decision-making circumstances. In complex ones, however, it lacks the 
knowledge to do so. As Moe put it, the dominant group “typically knows much less 
than society does, even when it hires its own experts” (Moe, 1995, p. 132). Here, a 
solution could be for the dominant group to work on legalisation, for instance, in very 
general terms and leave to specifics to experts. This would allow for the group to focus 
on its core skills and would compensate “nicely for the group’s formidable knowledge 
problems” (Moe, 1995, p. 133). This, however, has major issues for the dominant 
group. On the one hand, it would create an expertise dependency that might even 
challenge the dominance of the dominant group. On the other hand, it creates a 
legitimacy problem, as the dominant group could not explain to the public, for 
instance, why exactly they made the decisions the way they did. What this means to 
the specific nanotechnology case of this thesis will be discussed in Chapter 6.4. 
In Sabatier’s AC framework, the role information plays is much more sophisticated. 
Sabatier stresses “the crucial role of information and (policy) analysis … *that aims+ to 
alert people to the extent to which a given situation affects their interests/values” 
(Sabatier, 1988, p. 152). In their analysis of various theories of the policy process, 
Schlager and Blomquist attest that information can be used as part of the socialisation 
process by advocacy coalitions “for recruiting and adding members, for reinforcing the 
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views of existing members, and for increasing the congruence of members' perceptions 
of their goals and policy preferences” (Schlager & Blomquist, 1996, p. 662). Therefore, 
information is not only being used as a means to overcome uncertainty when faced 
with policy-choices, but instead, it is used much earlier in the process. When looking at 
the findings of Oh and Rich (1996), who argue that familiarity with a policy problem 
often reinforces a policy-makers’ stance on a problem while unfamiliarity does not, the 
use of information in the instance of an advocacy coalitions seems to somewhat 
suggest that, at least, part of this unfamiliarity can or should be overcome by 
reinforcing existing group views. In other words, people with common understandings 
or beliefs are more likely to agree on collective action than those with opposing or 
differing opinions. This may also explain why in advocacy coalitions, the interaction of 
information and beliefs is central. Depending on the viewpoint of an advocacy 
coalition, information can either be integrated or rejected, thus the term ‘perceptual 
filter’.  
The AC framework incorporates the deliberate cultivation and accumulation of 
information within the array of coalition actions. Indeed, the "advocacy" part of 
the AC explanation for policy change represents the conviction that coalitions 
in the policy process devote considerable resources to the development and 
deployment of policy information that supports their views, and that such 
activities matter (Schlager & Blomquist, 1996, p. 663). 
The perhaps most important point of the AC framework is that of policy-oriented 
learning. As Sabatier puts it “'knowledge does not suddenly appear, become universally 
accepted, and suggest unequivocal changes in governmental action programs. Instead, 
findings challenging the accepted wisdom concerning the seriousness of a given 
problem and its principal causes tend to emerge gradually over time, be challenged by 
those who perceive their interests to be adversely affected, and thus give rise to the 
sort of analytical debate…” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 154). This policy-oriented learning 
appears mostly when there is an intermediate-level conflict across varying actors, that 
is, a conflict that is not about core values, but more likely about technical aspects, data 
interpretations and information usage. Finally, as part of developing the AC 
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framework, Sabatier proposes a number of hypotheses. One is of particular interest 
here: “Problems for which accepted quantitative performance indicators exist are more 
conducive to policy-oriented learning than those in which performance indicators are 
generally qualitative and quite subjective” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 156). The term 
qualitative performance indication can be translated as qualitative data and 
information. How Sabatier’s use of the term information and data can be interpreted 
with regards to nanotechnology will be discussed in Chapter 6.4. 
In general, the role of policy information, or to be more precise, policy information and 
policy knowledge requires further examination. Similarly, the nature and the role of 
groups involved in policy making, that is, experts in the context of this thesis requires a 
further look.  
The inadequacy of the present knowledge supply tends to be masked by the 
common practice of confusing knowledge with information.  … The present 
inability of academia to provide the knowledge that policy-making requires is 
too often ignored. … The implication is clear: the policy-maker should rely 
primarily on the resources available internally, using them to direct inquiries 
that will produce precisely what is needed (Meehan, 1993, p. 70).  
What Meehan refers to is the laymen-like substitution of the term knowledge with 
information, and vice versa.  
3.5.3 Policy information and policy knowledge 
Both information and knowledge are used by governments and policy makers for a 
variety of reasons and purposes.  Policy information “can be used in the formulation of 
public policies, by helping to identify the need for a public policy, or to select one 
amongst alternatives” (Straf, 2001, p. 11560). In addition, it can be used to evaluate 
and implement policies and to measure their impacts. Straf argues that “[p]olicy 
information differs from political information, such as polls of public opinions, or 
support for a policy among legislators. Policy information is objective. It may be 
quantitative or qualitative, but it is based on evidence…” (Straf, 2001, p. 11560). Straf’s 
understanding is that policy information is both data and analysis, or better said, that 
P a g e  | 114 
policy information is often the result of policy analysis, which, in turn, can be 
understood as the evaluation of the social and economic implications of changes in 
public policy (Straf, 2001). P.M. Haas calls knowledge that can be used in policy-making 
usable knowledge: “In short, usable knowledge encompasses a substantive core that 
makes it usable for policy-makers, and a procedural dimension that provides a 
mechanism for transmitting knowledge from the scientific community to the policy 
world and provides for agency when theorizing about broader patterns of social 
learning, policy-making, and international relations” (Haas P. M., 2004, p. 573). P.M. 
Haas continues by arguing that “usable knowledge is accurate information that is of 
use to politicians and policy-makers. It must be accurate and politically tractable for its 
users” (Haas P. M., 2004, p. 574). 
Sabatier also stresses the importance of policy information, as “*t]he amount and 
quality of information used in choice situations has been a neglected topic - except in 
voting studies, …” (Sabatier, 1991b, p. 148). The influence of information on policy 
decisions has been well documented. By referring to Patton (1978), Oh and Rich (1996) 
point out that decision makers use information to reduce uncertainty, especially when 
facing unfamiliar policy problems. The familiarity aspect, however, requires for 
distinctions to be made between where information comes from and what information 
is used when: 
 a policy problem is old or familiar and 
 a policy problem is an unknown.  
According to Oh and Rich, if a policy problem is old or familiar, then it is very likely that 
information that is used comes from the decision makers own agency. This is because, 
when decision makers deal with problems with which they are familiar, they do not 
need to search for information, they know how to handle the problem and know 
where to find the information they require. In addition, “since information from 
internal resources can be easily obtained and are believed to reinforce decision makers’ 
positions on problems, it is more likely to be used” (Oh & Rich, 1996, p. 12). This 
example is also called a closed cycle of information utilisation.  
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However, if decision makers face a policy problem with which they are unfamiliar with, 
their behaviour is quite different. When facing unfamiliar policy problems, decision 
makers tend to use more policy information in order to reduce uncertainty. What is 
more, the research by Oh and Rich points to a direct relation between the nature of 
the policy issue and the type of information used. “This indicates that, when facing 
unfamiliar problems, decision makers tend to conduct a wide search of information 
beyond their own agencies” (Oh & Rich, 1996, p. 12).    
These observations, however, pose problems when looking at policy issues which are 
not only just emerging but are also of an incredibly complex nature. In the case of 
nanotechnology, for instance, a distinction needs to be made between available 
knowledge and usable knowledge, to use P.M. Haas’ terminology.  
…the long time often necessary for developing credible knowledge may 
interfere with the short-term needs for applying the knowledge to making 
policy. In practice, then, existing knowledge is more likely to play a role in 
usable knowledge than is knowledge being developed concurrently with the 
policy process. (Haas P. M., 2004, p. 574). 
This means that available knowledge, for instance research output or published 
material, is not ultimately useful for policy-making. Also, the distinction between 
information and knowledge needs to be kept in mind (see Chapters 3.1.2 and 3.1.3). 
Whereas information is a component of knowledge, knowledge – in order to be useful 
to the non-expert – needs to be translated back into useable information. P.M. Haas 
puts it as follows: “This articulation of usable knowledge builds from prior efforts to 
formulate a sense of what kind of technical information is likely to be useful for 
policymaking relating to matters of complexity, which is also likely to be used by 
decision-makers” (Haas P. M., 2004, p. 574). 
3.6 Knowledge Framework 
When it comes to making choices, and in particular, when it comes to policy choices, a 
framework for comparison is required. Meehan suggest that “[s]ystematic comparison 
of the set of outcomes from which a choice is made, which lies at the heart of the 
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justification process, requires a fairly sophisticated knowledge system. The available 
outcomes must be projected on the future…” (Meehan, 1993, p. 56) . In the context of 
this thesis, this means the following. In order to assess the implications of the 
aforementioned knowledge types on nanotechnology, the chosen example of a 
knowledge-intensive and expertise dependent area of technology, a knowledge 
framework (see table below) has been devised. It is based on the findings highlighted 
in Chapter 3 (Knowledge, expertise and policy making) and is aimed to be applied 
against findings from Chapter 4 (Nanotechnology) and Chapter 5 (Nanologue), which 
provides relevant technical and empirical data. In particular, the knowledge framework 
enables the investigation of five different types of knowledge (knowledge by 
acquaintance, knowledge by description, tacit knowledge, explicit knowledge, and 
policy knowledge) that then will also be cross-referenced with qualitative and 
quantitative findings. In addition, the knowledge framework also supports further 
investigations of policy knowledge and policy information.   
The empirical data provided by the Nanologue case (Chapter 5) will be applied against 
findings of the public’s knowledge and involvement as well as against general 
recommendations, policy recommendations and recommended actions. Here, the aim 
is to identify ‘knowable content’ by groups of ‘knowers’ in order to derive at 
implications for both the public and the experts alike. Thus, the knowledge framework 
has been designed with the following proposition in mind: 
If the involvement of the public in the discussion of future high technology 
areas is desired, then increasing knowledge-intensity and technological 
complexity and the resulting dependence on expert knowledge and advice 
will jeopardise this endeavour. The assumption is that the public has no first 
hand and thus direct knowledge, and even second-hand knowledge is only 
partially understood. The same also applies to policy making and the majority 
of policy-makers, who are not experts in the fields of nanotechnology. 
This proposition is used to investigate whether current recommendations made in the 
literature (Nanologue, 2006; Currall et al.,2006; RSA, 2004)  are adequate in the light of 
the findings of this thesis.  
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    knowledge by 
acquaintance 
tacit knowledge knowledge by 
description 
explicit 
knowledge 
policy 
information 
and 
knowledge 
Reitera-
tion, what 
is what? 
knowing things knowing how 
(process of 
knowing) 
knowing about 
things 
easily 
accessible 
knowledge  
usable 
knowledge/ 
information 
Examples Knowing how to 
perform a 
laboratory 
experiment. 
Knowing how to 
perform a 
laboratory 
experiment. 
Moscow is the 
capital of 
Russia. 
handbooks, 
guidebooks, 
manuals 
data + 
information 
required to 
make policy 
choices 
Who? skilled 
professional 
skilled 
professional 
skilled 
professional 
and layperson 
skilled 
professional 
and layperson 
decision-
makers, 
agency staff 
Nanotech 
case – 
what can 
be known? 
detailed 
knowledge of 
properties of 
nanoscale silver 
particles, their 
behaviour and 
reactions to and 
with other 
elements 
detailed 
knowledge of 
properties of 
nanoscale silver 
particles, their 
behaviour and 
reactions to and 
with other 
elements 
existence of 
nanoscale 
silver particles 
and their 
alleged 
benefits as 
indicated by 
marketing 
material, press 
or other non-
scientific 
releases 
existence of 
nanoscale 
silver particles 
and their 
alleged 
benefits as 
indicated by 
marketing 
material, press 
or other non-
scientific 
releases 
existence of 
nanoscale 
silver 
particles and 
their alleged 
benefits as 
indicated by 
marketing 
material, 
press or 
other non-
scientific 
releases 
What 
cannot be 
known? 
un-researched 
or undiscovered 
areas, 
behaviours and 
results, 
knowledge that 
is outside the 
domain of the 
knower 
un-researched or 
undiscovered 
areas, 
behaviours and 
results, 
knowledge that 
is outside the 
domain of the 
knower 
detailed 
knowledge of 
properties of 
nanoscale 
silver particles, 
their 
behaviour and 
reactions of 
other 
elements  
detailed 
knowledge of 
properties of 
nanoscale 
silver particles, 
their 
behaviour and 
reactions of 
other 
elements  
detailed 
knowledge 
of properties 
of nanoscale 
silver 
particles, 
their 
behaviour 
and 
reactions of 
other 
elements  
Who? chemists, 
physicists, 
material 
scientists with 
in-depths 
knowledge of 
nanotechnology 
chemists, 
physicists, 
material 
scientists with 
in-depths 
knowledge of 
nanotechnology 
laypersons and 
scientists alike 
laypersons and 
scientists alike 
laypersons, 
scientists, 
policy and 
decision-
makers, 
lobby groups 
Table 5: Knowledge framework 
The above table starts off with a reiteration of what the different knowledge types are 
and gives an example according to their meaning and reach as well as showing to 
whom the respective types of knowledge apply. For instance, knowledge by 
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description can be described as knowing about things, it applies to laypersons and 
professionals alike and an example is to ‘know’ that the capital of Russia is Moscow. It 
needs to be noted that the examples provided for what can be known and by whom 
are examples only and are by no means exhaustive.  
With regards to the nanotechnology case, and in particular with regards to nanosilver, 
the knowledge framework can be interpreted as follows: A person that possesses 
knowledge by acquaintance has detailed knowledge of the properties of nanoscale 
silver particles and is familiar with their behaviour and reactions to and with other 
elements. This assumes that the knower is fully skilled and has personally acquired 
hands-on knowledge by simply dealing with nanosilver particles. The knowledge 
framework, however, makes no assumptions about the knower’s ability to go beyond 
what it known to him/her. That is, for instance, knowledge that is outside of the 
domain of the knower, such as the environmental impacts of nanoscale silver particles. 
In the context of policy knowledge, a person involved in policy-making has usable 
knowledge and information for policy-specific purposes. This should consist of 
knowledge about, in the context of nanoscale silver, the existence of nanoscale silver, 
the current use in products and manufacturing processes and, ideally, the potential 
health and/or environmental risks associated with the use of nanosilver (especially 
when the policy-choice outcome is to be legislation).  At the same time, the knowledge 
framework would not expect the holder of relevant policy knowledge to also have 
detailed knowledge of properties of nanoscale silver particles; their behaviour and 
reactions of other elements. The framework should be read in a similar fashion with 
regards to the other three knowledge types. Table 5 should be used as an illustration 
only, in order to highlight key aspects of each of the different knowledge types. 
Detailed explanations for each of the knowledge types are provided in the sections 
6.2.1 - 5.  
As part of the analysis (chapter 6), the framework will be used to evaluate a number of 
policy recommendation, that are the result of intensive qualitative studies undertaken 
by Nanologue (2006). The aim is to use the knowledge framework and analyse policy 
recommendations and recommended actions with regards to their viability when 
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viewed from the perspective taken up in this thesis that both information and 
knowledge are topics that are too complex to be viewed generally. Therefore, the 
knowledge framework can be used to analyse whether policy recommendations, for 
instance, are as useful and plausible when viewed from a knowledge specific 
perspective. For instance, a recommendation with regards to nanotechnology could be 
information sharing between the producers of nanotechnology-related knowledge and 
information and the public (and policy-makers). However, since information sharing is 
a very generalised statement, the framework will allow identification of what 
knowledge and information could be shared in terms of its usefulness to the intended 
recipient. A research publication on the toxicity of nanosilver particles is, in the 
majority of the cases, of no practical use to either the public or policy makers. Instead, 
such information would need to be tailored to the targeted recipient group. From a 
policy-recommendation perspective, any suggestions in this regard should therefore 
also specify what can be known by whom and how the information transfer has to 
happen. Chapter 6.3 will particularly discuss these issues. 
The final aim of the knowledge framework is also to assess some of the previously 
introduced theories of the policy process with regards to information, knowledge and 
uncertainty. Ostrom (1990, 1991) uses the term information with regards to the 
information processing capabilities of actors. Moe (1995) uses knowledge, uncertainty 
and expertise dependency as key component of his framework. For Sabatier, 
information is a key component of his framework. However, considering the different 
types of information and knowledge that have extensively been discussed in this 
thesis, questions arise whether any of these authors refer to the terms information, 
knowledge and expertise in a rather generic way and whether, when viewed through 
the eyes of the knowledge framework, these theories can still hold their claims or 
whether the use of the terms information, knowledge and expertise in these theories 
needs to limited to very specific types.  
3.7 Summary  
This chapter discussed extensively the definitions of terms and concept such as data, 
information, knowledge, and expertise as well as knowledge by acquaintance and 
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knowledge by description, tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge, and expertise. As 
this exercise has shown, terms such as data, information, knowledge and expertise 
should not be used generally, and most importantly, should not be used as a substitute 
for one another.  Although, according to Rowley (1998), everyone should know what 
information is, the concept is actually ill-defined and, thus, needs to viewed context 
specific. For Lyre (2002) information is only what is understood, and information is 
only what also generates information. Put in a practical context, this can be 
interpreted as providing information (as in, providing content) and informing someone 
is not the same: Information is meant to change the way the receiver perceives 
something …” (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 3). This is not only important within a 
business context, but also when it comes to the societal role which information plays, 
for instance, when it comes to either informing the public or to how the public informs 
itself. Similarly, the use of information in policy-making is generally accepted as vital, 
yet, as this chapter has shown, the term information cannot be used generically when 
it comes to policy making. Knowledge and information in policy contexts need to be 
usable.  
Knowledge, as it has been illustrated, is an historic and complex concept. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that there is no single definition describing what knowledge 
is. Instead, there are vast amounts of differing and, often, competing concepts. 
Nevertheless, most relevant for the following two chapters (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) 
are concepts involving know-what, know-why, know-how and know-who, knowledge 
by acquaintance and knowledge by description as well as the concepts of tacit and 
explicit knowledge. The latter, which is knowledge by acquaintance/description and 
tacit/explicit knowledge allow for making a distinction between what first-hand 
knowledge and what second hand knowledge is. As it has been shown, this is vital in 
order to differentiate between what can be known by whom, thus combining it with 
the concepts of know-what, know-why, know-how and know-who. What is more, 
expert knowledge (which is also domain specific knowledge) can, in a practical context, 
be equated with knowledge by acquaintance and/or tacit knowledge. Due to the 
specificity of expert knowledge, however, it needs to be highlighted that this equation 
does not work the other way around. In other words, not all knowledge by 
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acquaintance and/or tacit knowledge is, at the same time, expert knowledge. This is 
not only due to the 10-year rule of necessary preparation that that is required to 
become an expert (Gruber, 2001), but also determined by the intent of the knower. 
For instance, an individual can purposefully acquire knowledge without having the 
intent of becoming an expert, for instance, learning how to use and operate an 
electron microscope does not make someone an expert in microscopy. Another reason 
why tacit/expert knowledge is important is because of its hidden nature; being unable 
to transfer this knowledge means not having (public) access to it. Again, this has a 
bearing on policy-making, as it invariably complicates the use of experts in decision-
making processes. Although someone can be an expert in nanotechnology, it does not 
automatically make this person a suitable actor in policy-making. As it has been shown, 
the reasons for this are twofold: on the one hand, the expert in question may not have 
the necessary skills to ‘get his/her expertise across’. On the other hand, having 
expertise in nanotechnology may not be of particular use to actors involved in making 
nanotechnology-related policy decisions, as, for instance, what they are looking for is 
an expert of nanotechnology related risk. These two areas may be complementary, but 
they are not the same; and the holder of one of these areas of expertise may not 
automatically also be a holder of the other.  In order to overcome the problem, one 
must first identify which types can, and which types cannot, be transferred. If the 
former is due to the lack of incentives, then it can be transferred into explicit 
knowledge and information, no matter the complexity.  
However, there is also a value to indirect knowledge; that is, knowledge that does not 
need to be acquired directly, such as knowledge by description or explicit knowledge. 
Here, the advantage is that it can be absorbed easily and is often sufficient for the 
receiver of that knowledge. The problem, similar to the concept of free information as 
discussed by Keohane and Nye (1998), is that it is up to receiver, which could be actors 
involved is policy-making, to verify that the knowledge is also reliable. If governments 
launch an information campaign on the dangers of smoking, for instance, then it is 
believed by the public that the information provided is also correct. This mode of 
knowledge or information dissemination is called the authoritarian mode (Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 2002). In these instances, people trust knowledge that has 
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been provided by people, or organisations, that are regarded as ‘qualified producers’ 
of knowledge. This assumption can potentially bear enormous risks when dealing with 
complex subject matters, such as nanotechnology.  
From a hands-on policy perspective, information, knowledge and expertise are of vital 
importance, as Meehan pointed out, “[a] policy provides a solution to a choice 
problem; the problem is always analytically prior to the policy (Meehan, 1993, p. 58). In 
order to come to a solution to such a choice problem, the use of policy information has 
an impact on the outcome. Thus, different uses of policy information also lead to 
different outcomes. As Oh and Rich (1996) have shown, decision makers approach the 
use of policy information depending on their familiarity with the problem, which in 
turn, also impacts the outcome. Furthermore, and especially in regard to complex 
subject matters (with which policy makers are unfamiliar), policy information and 
knowledge needs to be useful (Haas P. M., 2004) to the decision-maker. 
By demanding knowledge that is adequate for their purposes, the policymakers 
have the potential to channel and direct the quest for knowledge, and to 
modify the criteria used to assess and evaluate knowledge claims (Meehan, 
1993, p. 55). 
It has also been shown that, from a theoretical perspective, especially when looking at 
theories of the policy process, information – the term used by most theorists – and 
knowledge play a key role. While Ostrom (1990, 1991) uses the term information to 
describe information-processing capacities of actors, Moe (1994) uses knowledge and 
expertise dependency as a key component in his framework. Information also plays a 
key role in Sabatier’s framework of advocacy coalitions. This leaves questions with 
regards to the usage of the terms information, knowledge and expertise. These will be 
answered in Chapter 6 by means of using the knowledge framework, which has been 
established in this chapter. The knowledge framework is a matrix for comparing 
different types of knowledge and information, which have been established in this 
chapter, with the aim of applying these findings against data, in particular, technical 
data about nanotechnology and results and recommendations of intensive qualitative 
surveys undertaken by Nanologue (2006). 
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4. Nanotechnology 
While nanotechnology holds enormous potential, public understanding of what 
the technology does is actually as miniscule as the atoms it  manipulates 
(Deloitte, 2008, p. 10).  
Nanotechnology has been chosen as an example of a knowledge-intensive and 
expertise-dependent subject matter. This chapter will show that nanotechnology is 
one of the most recent areas of research that promises to be a game-changer with 
regards to current technological development. No other recent technology currently 
receives as much attention as well as funding as nanotechnology currently does. Yet, at 
the same time, little is known about nanotechnology by the general public. The same 
can be said about the social and/or environmental risks. Therefore, nanotechnology is 
an ideal area to be researched for the purposes on this thesis, as it will be shown that 
the knowledge requirements for this particular technology are extremely high, which 
in turn, poses challenges for both the public and policy making.  
Following the general introduction below, various definitions are introduced and 
discussed. Subsequently, the importance of nanotechnology is examined and general 
trends of nanotechnology development are considered. Due to its novelty and its 
complexities, public reactions towards nanotechnology play an important role in the 
future of nanotechnology development, and are therefore highlighted here as well. 
This is followed by the introduction of one already known example of 
nanotechnological development that potentially bears a risk to health and 
environment, nanosilver, before summarising the findings and concluding this chapter.  
This chapter will introduce the subject very generically, before then drilling down into 
technology related risks, which required a more science-based approach. A small 
example case is utilised to illustrate particular risks, or better said, potential risks by all 
accounts of contemporary understanding of nanotechnology risks. Here, nanosilver 
has been selected, as it provides insights that are particularly useful when applying the 
knowledge framework to nanotechnology. However, the discussions about 
nanotechnology have been purposefully kept at a descriptive level in order to ensure 
that any non-expert reader can follow. Thus, pure science-based research has been 
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limited to an extent that on the one hand, the required information for this thesis can 
still be provided, while at the same time, omitting scientific data, such as details about 
test results. This applies especially to the study of Babu et al. (2008), which was 
particularly useful when investigating and comparing various knowledge types as part 
of the knowledge framework analysis. In addition, the nanotechnology discussion has 
been intentionally been kept as broad as possible. This has been done on purpose, as 
there is not enough data available yet to support such an effort.  
4.1 Introduction  
There has been much written about nanotechnology in recent years, albeit the most 
commonly known examples of nanotechnology can still be found in the realm of 
science fiction. The hugely popular franchises of Star Trek™ and Stargate™ dedicate 
entire subplots to nanotechnology. While Star Trek™ mainly explored the use of nano-
bots; Stargate™ focuses on ‘replicators’, self-replicating, nano-technological, sentient 
(machine) beings. Popular science fiction authors covering the topic include Charles 
Stross (2003, Singularity Sky), Neill Stephenson (1995, The Diamond Age) and most 
notably Michael Crichton (2003, Prey).  
In the real world, nanotechnology has become a buzzword, not only for the industry 
but also for policy-makers. An international nanotechnology business directory claims 
that “[n]anotechnology is making its way into products and materials at a breathtaking 
rate, with about $2.6 trillion worth of goods worldwide expected to use 
nanotechnology by 2014, a 5,200 percent increase from just $50 billion in 2006.” 
(Nanovip, 2008), yet nanotechnology remains barely regulated. Considering that 
currently 3-4 new consumer products based on nanotechnology enter the market 
every week, the lack of specific regulation for a technology as unknown as 
nanotechnology seems to be a risk (PEN, 2008). Furthermore, considering how little is 
known about nanotechnology in general and how little is known about 
nanotechnology by the public, this will undoubtedly have consequences. These 
consequences may range from (negative) reactions to bringing products to market if 
the public was not aware of either its contents or production methods to 
consequences that would arise in the case of an environmental or health-related 
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incident with grave negative impacts. Especially the latter would take both politicians 
and the public by surprise when they had not been warned of the risks, dangers and 
consequences of nanotechnology. In many cases, if there were a nanotechnology-
related environmental incident, for instance, in the next few years, the public would 
very likely feel being part of the aforementioned science-fiction novels.  
4.2 What is nanotechnology?  
It is commonly accepted that Richard Feynman introduced the concept of 
nanotechnology in 1959, without, however, using the term nanotechnology.23 
Feynman (1959) discussed a process allowing the manipulation of atoms and 
molecules by means of developing a set of tools that would provide for building 
another, smaller, set of tools until the needed scale has been reached. Outside the 
world of science fiction, K. Eric Drexler (1986) propelled the term nanotechnology into 
(relative) common use, albeit his introduction of the term ‘grey goo’ painted a rather 
negative, if not sensation seeking and disastrous picture. The complexities inherent in 
nanotechnology shall be illustrated by means of the four varying definitions below: 
The prefix nano in the word nanotechnology means a billionth (1x10-9). 
Nanotechnology deals with various structures of matter having dimensions of 
the orders of a billionth of a meter (Poole & Ownes, 2003, p. 1). 
Nanotechnology literally means any technology performed on a nanoscale that 
has applications in the real world. Nanotechnology encompasses the 
production and application of physical, chemical, and biological systems at 
scales ranging from individual atoms or molecules to submicron dimensions, as 
well as the integration of the resulting nanostructures into larger systems 
(Bhushan 2004, p. 1). 
As the name implies, nanotechnology involves the engineering or manipulation 
of matter, and life, at nanometer scale, that is, one-billionth of a meter. (Ten 
hydrogen atoms side by side span 1 nanometer; the DNA molecule is 2.3 
nanometers across) (Hook, 2004, p. 1871). 
                                                     
23 The term nanotechnology was first introduced by Norio Taniguchi in 1974. 
P a g e  | 126 
… the word “nanotechnology” will be associated with human-designed working 
devices in which some essential element or elements, produced in a controlled 
fashion, have sizes of 0.1 nm to thousands of nanometres,  … (Wolf, 2004, p. 1). 
The first definition clearly defines the key to understanding nanotechnology: size24. 
The second and the third definitions, however, stress the element of human 
interaction through engineering, application, and manipulation. What is more, both 
definitions include the physical as well as the biological dimensions, whereby the first 
definition remains vague when it comes to the ‘hows’ and ‘whats’. The fourth 
definition focuses on devices that are being produced, despite the author’s awareness 
that before that can happen, a major (nano-) technological breakthrough is required. 
This shows that nanotechnology has not been fully defined yet, as the focus of a given 
definition often only highlights one or two typical characteristics, depending on the 
authors’ background or point of view. One potential reason for this is provided by Wolf 
(2004):  
The reader may correctly infer that Nanotechnology is presently more concept 
than fact, although it is certainly a media and funding reality. That the concept 
has great potential for technology, is the message to read from the funding and 
media attention to the topic (Wolf, 2004, p. 1). 
In stark contrast to this lies Drexler’s initial understanding of nanotechnology. His focus 
is on nano-assemblers, self-replicating machines that once built, will continue 
developing machines and tools at nano-scales (Drexler, 1986). Nowadays, this branch 
is mostly referred to as molecular nanotechnology. Since it is unlikely that this type of 
technology will be available for quite some time (see overview of generations 
nanotechnology in Figure 1), further clarification is required on the definition and on 
the use of the term nanotechnology in science today. The Centre for Responsible 
Nanotechnology defines it as follows:  
                                                     
24 “The British Standards Institution (BSI) defines the nanoscale as between 1–100 nm. A nano material 
is defined by BSI as having one or more external dimension in the nanoscale (BSI, 2007). A nano object is 
a discrete piece of material with one or more external dimensions in the nanoscale. A nanoparticle is a 
nano object with all three external dimensions in the nanoscale. A manufactured nanoparticle is a solid 
entity with size from approximately 1nm to 100 nm in at least two dimensions that has been produced 
by a manufacturing process” (Luoma, 2008, p. 10) 
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Nanotechnology is the engineering of functional systems at the molecular 
scale. This covers both current work and concepts that are more advanced. In 
its original sense, 'nanotechnology' refers to the projected ability to construct 
items from the bottom up, using techniques and tools being developed today 
to make complete, high performance products (CRN). 
Furthermore, the Centre argues that “*m+uch of the work being done today that carries 
the name 'nanotechnology' is not nanotechnology in the original meaning of the word.” 
(CRN). Their reasoning behind this statement is based on potential risks, therefore a 
distinction is being made between nanotechnology as defined above and what 
nanotechnology is not: “As used today, the term nanotechnology usually refers to a 
broad collection of mostly disconnected fields. Essentially, anything sufficiently small 
and interesting can be called nanotechnology. Much of it is harmless” (CRN). What is 
interesting here is the fact that CRN’s definition of nanotechnology also omits the 
range of self-replication nano-assemblers. This follows Wolf’s (2004) assumption that a 
major breakthrough (the so-called nano-assembler breakthrough) is required first.  
Where Wolf is wrong, or better still, outdated (his book was published in 2004), is in 
his assumption that nanotechnology is more concept than fact. This also shows the 
pace with which nanotechnology progresses and adds to the urgent need of a better 
understanding of nanotechnology. The following table provides an abbreviated 
overview of the system of units and some examples in order to get a better 
understanding of the size with which nanotechnology deals: 
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10n  Prefix  Name Expressed in decimals Example Size 
1012 tera-  Trillion  1 000 000 000 000   
109 giga-  Billion  1 000 000 000 
106 mega-  Million  1 000 000 
103 kilo-  Thousand  1 000 
102 hecto-  Hundred  100 
101 deca-  Ten  10 
100 (none)  One  1 
10−1  deci-  Tenth  0.1 
10−2  centi-  Hundredth  0.01 
10−3  milli-  Thousandth  0.001 ant ca. 5 mm 
10−6  micro-  Millionth  0.000 001 blood cell ca. 2-5 µm 
10−9  nano-  Billionth  0.000 000 001 DNA ca. 2-12 nm 
10−12  pico-  Trillionth  0.000 000 000 001   
Table 6: Overview of unit sizes 
A number of selected nanotechnological applications expected to emerge (see also 
Chapter 4.4) are summarised in the table below.  
Area Expected applications 
Environmental Remediate contaminated soil and water 
Reduce use of raw materials through improvements in manufacturing 
Rebuild the stratospheric ozone layer with the assistance of nanobots 
Medical Improve the delivery of drugs 
Develop techniques in nanosurgery 
Repair defective DNA 
Improve diagnostic procedures 
Electronic Develop molecular circuit boards 
Improve storage of data 
Develop molecular computers 
Materials Increase the strength of industrially valuable fibres 
Replicate valuable products  
Improve the quality and reliability of metals and plastics 
Manufacture “smart” materials 
Table 7: A sample of applications expected to emerge from Advances in Nanoscience (Mehta, 2002, p. 270) 
There is yet another side that needs to be explored in addition to technological 
approaches to the topic. Poole and Owens (2003) argue that in addition to 
nanomaterials that are based on chemical elements, there are also natural building 
blocks, such as proteins, and also viruses that need to be taken into account. They 
argue that since nanomaterials and nanostructures are defined by sizes between 1 and 
100 nanometres, viruses ranging between 10 and 200 nanometre fall into the upper 
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part of the nanoscale range.  Proteins ranging in size between 4 and 50 nanometres fall 
into the lower part of the nanoscale. In comparison, and to clarify, bacteria have sizes 
between 1 and 10 micrometres and therefore do not fall into the group of nano 
materials or structures. The following table will give an overview of typical sizes of 
various biological substances:  
Class Material Size (in nanometre) 
Amino acids Glycine (smallest amino acid) 0.42 
 Tryptophan (largest amino acid) 0.67 
Nucleotides Cytosine monophosphate (smallest DNA 
nucleotide) 
0.82 
 Guanine monophosphate (largest DNA 
nucleotide) 
0.86 
Other 
molecules 
Chlorophyll, in plants 1.11 
Proteins Insulin, polypeptide hormone 2.2 
 Haemoglobin, carries oxygen  7.0 
 Lipoprotein, carrier of cholesterol  20 
 Fibrinogen, for blood clotting 70 
Viruses Influenza 60 
 Tobacco mosaic length 120 
 Bacteriophage T2 140 
Table 8: Typical sizes of various biological substances in the nanometre range (Poole & Ownes, 2003, p. 315)  - 
abbreviated overview 
Finally, the following figure shows a timeline of predicted nano-technological 
developments in the next 10-20 years. What immediately becomes obvious is that the 
timeline goes only as far as to speak of molecular nano-systems and also omits self-
replicating nano-assemblers. Thus, for the purposes of this research, it should be 
assumed that nanotechnology, nanomaterials and nanostructures exclude self-
replicating assembly at a nanoscale for years to come. 
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Figure 4: Timeline for Beginning of Industrial Prototyping and Nanotechnology Commercialisation: Four 
Generations of Products and Production Processes (IRGC 2006, p.23) 
4.3 Why is nanotechnology important?  
First off, this is important from an economic perspective. "Nanotechnology is an area 
which has highly promising prospects for turning fundamental research into successful 
innovations. Not only to boost the competitiveness of our industry but also to create 
new products that will make positive changes in the lives of our citizens, be it in 
medicine, environment, electronics or any other field" (Commission, 2005, p. 1). 
Although the funding itself has increased to staggering amounts of Dollar, Euro, Yen et 
cetera, which in itself creates and secures current jobs, the long term benefits of 
current funding initiatives have to be seen in economic dominance secured by both 
patenting and manufacturing capabilities. Even before globalisation became a 
buzzword, a number of nations had to learn tough lessons about foreign competition. 
As nanotechnology is practically a new technology that is currently regarded as key to 
the future, a future that also always includes a future of economic wellbeing and 
wealth, many of the current funding champions are interested in nanotechnology 
because they want to be part of that economically wealthy future. Then, there is 
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politico-scientific dominance; that is, the dominance of global powers in the areas of 
key technologies. Certainly of major importance are prospective uses of 
nanotechnology in military applications. For instance, this could include new materials 
that make current military hardware more secure and/or longer lasting, applications 
that increase the security of military personnel and soldiers even in combat situations, 
or it could include applications that help to clean up combat zones. On the other hand, 
nanotechnology also holds large potential for uses in new, nano-based offensive 
weaponry (if that is desired) and bears enormous risks of abuse due to its size, 
probable mobile deployment capabilities and, if desired, time-delayed release 
mechanisms. In addition, there are a number of materials that are in their common 
form/composition harmless, yet when in nano-particle state they turn harmful, even 
toxic.  
That is deeply troubling to many scientists, because the same amazing 
properties that make nanotech materials and devices so promising also create 
the potential to do unexpected harm, particularly when they enter the human 
body. For example, nanotech materials are so small that some might be able to 
pass by the body’s defences, including the walls of cells. Since nanotech 
materials have an exponentially greater amount of atoms on their surface areas 
than their full-sized cousins, a substance that is perfectly safe in its regular form 
could turn out to be toxic in its nanotech form (Nanovip, 2008). 
In politics, nanotechnology has only recently gained broader popularity. The result of 
this, however, was an immediate increase in public funding. Between 1997 and 2003, 
worldwide funding has increased by 700 percent, whereby funding in countries other 
than the USA, Japan and Western Europe increased by 1143 percent25 in the same 
time period (Rocco 2003). In comparison, federal funding in Germany pales beside that 
of the US, although no European government spends as much on nanotechnology as 
Germany. The table below provides a comparison of nanotechnology funding between 
the USA, Germany and the EU’s framework programmes: 
                                                     
25 Own calculation based on Rocco (2003). 
P a g e  | 132 
Year USA Germany EU 
2001 $465 € 210   
2002 $697 € 240 
€1.300   
(6th 
Framework 
Programme) 
2003 $774 € 258 
2004 $849 € 273 
2005   € 310 
2006   € 330 
2007    € 330 
€3.475 (7th 
Framework 
Programme) 
2008 +$2.00026   
2009     
2010     
2011     
2012     
2013     
Table 9: Nanotechnology funding (in million) based on Rocco (2003) and BMBF (2006) 
In the US, the political interest in nanotechnology was effectively demonstrated in the 
2006 State of the Union address, where former US President George W. Bush 
mentioned nanotechnology for the first time: “First, I propose to double the federal 
commitment to the most critical basic research programs in the physical sciences over 
the next 10 years. This funding will support the work of America's most creative minds 
as they explore promising areas such as nanotechnology, supercomputing, and 
alternative energy sources” (The White House, 2006). In 2003, the US ‘21st Century 
Nanotechnology Research and Development Act’ was signed, dedicating $849 million 
for nanotechnology R&D across 10 federal agencies. That amounted to a 10% increase 
on nanotechnology spending in comparison to 2003. Between 2001 and 2004, 
nanotechnology spending in the US had risen by 83 %. In 2008, the US budget made 
the following provisions: 
National Nanotechnology Initiative: $1.45 billion, a 4.2 percent increase, to 
continue to support discovery, development and application of nanotechnology 
through investigator-led fundamental and applied research; multidisciplinary 
centers of excellence; education and training of nanotechnology researchers, 
teachers, workers, and the public; and infrastructure development, including 
                                                     
26 Own estimates based on the 2008 budget. 
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user facilities and networks that are broadly available to support research and 
innovation (The White House, 2008, pp. 41-42). 
The Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and 
Technology: $594 million, to enhance nanotechnology manufacturing 
capabilities; expand a neutron facility to help characterize novel materials; 
construct new, high-performance laboratories; and improve our understanding 
of quantum information science that may dramatically improve computer 
processing speeds and enable more secure communications. (The White House, 
2008, pp. 34, 42). 
Additionally, a large proportion of the $6.4 billion budget of the National Science 
Foundation will go towards addressing “specific priorities in … nanotechnology…” (The 
White House, 2008, p. 33).  
In addition to the EU’s funding initiative, and funding by other major European powers, 
other countries followed suit. In August 2007, the Russian government approved the 
following nanotechnology programme: “Development of the Infrastructure of the 
Nanotechnology Industry in the Russian Federation 2008-2010”, worth 27.773 billion 
Roubles (ca. 1.134 billion US Dollar/766 million Euro) (Kommersant, 2007). Israel also 
has launched a National Nanotechnology Initiative, spending US $230 million between 
2007 and 2011 (INNI, 2006). Based on recent developments, other states will follow 
suit and launch similar national nanotechnology initiatives. Slightly different figures are 
shown by Lux Research for the year 2006. What is interesting here is the fact that 
corporate spending nearly matches government spending, thus contributing to an 
overall serious investment. Only one year later, in 2007, corporate spending on 
nanotechnology had already exceeded government funding with US $6.6 billion  
(Nanotechwire, 2008) and total funding increased to US $13.5 billion  (Lux Research, 
2007).  
Another reason for the importance of nanotechnology can be found by looking at its 
potential risks (see also Chapters 4.4 and 4.5). Going forward, serious research will be 
required to determine both health and environmental aspects of nanotechnology. 
P a g e  | 134 
Behra and Krug highlight that the majority of toxicity studies that have been carried 
out have focused on human health. Until now, environmental aspects are mostly 
unexplored and require urgent attention. “Some studies have shown that fullerenes, 
carbon nanotubes and various metal and metal oxide nanoparticles can affect the 
physiology of different aquatic organisms such as fish, algae and water fleas” (Behra & 
Krug, 2008, p. 253). The authors mention that nanotechnology experts in areas of 
exposure, behaviour, analysis, nanoecotoxicology and green nanotechnology agree 
that there is a need for further research “in a range of areas — such as detection and 
characterization, environmental fate and transport, ecotoxicology, and toxicology — is 
needed to solve the issues at hand and to gain a mutual understanding of the concerns 
and requirements” (Behra & Krug, 2008, p. 253). Thus, the political importance of 
nanotechnology stems not only from its potential use in military applications of major 
powers; it must also be regarded as a security concern of the same.  
Finally, in addition to the economic, political, military/security, and environmental/ 
health aspects that nanotechnology will impact in the long term, there is also a 
personal aspect, that of individual citizens and consumers. As the case of GMO, in 
particular, the issue around the need for labelling of GMO products or additives to 
products, has shown, there are instances when the public wishes to know about what 
is in their products. Until now, all products that have either been produced by using 
nanotechnology or contain nano-particles are being sold without labelling that 
indicates nanotechnology. Quite the contrary, nanotechnology has been used as 
marketing vehicle in order to better sell products. This, of course, can only go on for a 
certain period of time. In only one or two generations, nanotechnology will have 
reached a stage where ‘more serious products’ are ready for market. What then? 
4.4 Current developments and trends 
One can expect nanotechnology to become the ‘new biotechnology’, an area that is 
not only perceived by many as the next technological leap, but an ‘idea’ that promises 
to solve the worlds’ illnesses, such as disease, hunger, pollution et cetera. Kahan et al. 
summarise the benefits of nanotechnology as follows: “Its immense range of potential 
applications—scientific, commercial, medical, and more—marks nanotechnology as 
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one of the most promising new forms of applied science” (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, 
Gastil, & Cohen, 2008, p. 1). Also similar to biotechnology, nanotechnology is an 
exceptionally complex subject matter. This alone may account for the ‘myth building’ 
element that both biotechnology and nanotechnology inherit. There are a number of 
benefits that are being attributed to nanotechnology; that is, in addition to the 
predicted US $1.3 trillion worldwide market by 2015. One of the most popular 
assumed benefits of nanotechnology is environmental protection, or, to be precise, 
the use of nanotechnology to clean polluted water and soil. But also medicine is a 
often used example, where, for instance, nanobots could potentially repair damaged 
cells. This example might be quite far off into the future; a more immediate possibility 
is the use of nanotechnology in the development of better drug delivery systems. The 
2003 report of the British Foundation for Science and Technology listed the following:  
Already available products: 
• Hard disks – devices based on giant magnetoresistance in nanostructured 
magnetic multilayers dominate the market 
• Sun-block creams based on nanoparticles that absorb UV light 
• Lasers, modulators and amplifiers for telecommunications 
Products and applications close to market introduction include: 
• Better photovoltaic techniques for renewable energy sources 
• Glasses with scratch resistant coating 
• Harder, lighter and stronger materials 
• ‘Lab-on-a-chip’ diagnostic technologies 
• Quantum structure electronic devices 
• Self-cleaning surfaces 
• Advanced photonics devices in telecommunications (FST, 2003, p. 2) 
In 2007, the list of available products that either contained nanoparticles or were 
based on nano-technological production mechanisms contained (Dabek, 2006; 
Nanowerk, 2007): 
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• Golf balls, tennis racquets and coated fishing lures 
• Stain-resistant khaki trousers and ties 
• Shoe inserts and socks 
• Lip gloss, skin cream and men’s razors 
• Household paint 
• Wrinkle-free fabrics 
• Toothpaste 
This list is to grow in the near future; it very probable that this list might even grow 
dramatically. The striking element here is that nearly all of these products are day-to-
day use household products, with many of their users being not aware of the 
nanotechnology linkage.  
However, when considering the advances corporations have made with regards to 
nanotechnology-related products, then this does not come at a surprise. Figure 5 (see 
figure below) provides an overview of the top 10 institutions in the EU, Japan and the 
US based on nanotechnology patents. Corporations account for twenty of the thirty 
listed institutions; the remaining ten are a mix of universities and other public 
institutes. This was not unexpected when considering the increase in corporate 
nanotechnology funding. Between 2006 and 2007, the number of manufacturer-
identified nanotech goods listed by the online Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies 
had “increased 175 percent--from 220 to 580 products. There are 356 products in the 
health and fitness category--the inventory's largest category--and 66 products in the 
food and beverage category. One of the largest subcategories is cosmetics with 89 
products” (PEN, 2007) A rather large number of products are based on the use of silver 
nanoparticles: “The nanomaterial of choice appears to be silver--which manufacturers 
claim is in 139 products or nearly 25 percent of inventory--far outstripping carbon, 
gold, or silica” (PEN, 2007). 
The future of nanotechnology will not just depend on availability of funding or on 
technological breakthroughs alone. It will also depend on the public perception of 
nanotechnology. 
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Rank Institution No. of patents 
  US Patent and Trademark Office   
1 IBM 209 
2 University of California 184 
3 US Navy 99 
4 Eastman Kodak 90 
5 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 76 
6 Micron technology 75 
7 Hewlett-Packard 67 
8 Xerox Corporation 62 
9 3M Company 59 
10 Rice University 51 
  European Patent Office   
1 Japan Science and Technology Agency (Japan) 78 
2 L'Oreal (France) 60 
3 IBM (US) 50 
4 Rohm &  Haas (US) 47 
5 Samsung (South Korea) 45 
6 Eastman Kodak (US) 40 
7 CEA (France) 39 
8 CNRS (France) 37 
9 Matsushita Electric Industrial (Japan) 32 
10 BASF (Germany) 31 
  Japan Patent Office   
1 Nippon Electric 109 
2 Japan Science and Technology Agency  70 
3 National Institute for Materials Science 52 
4 National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science 48 
5 Matsushita Electric Industrial  45 
6 The Agency of Industrial Science and Technology 43 
7 Tokyo Shibaura Electric 43 
8 Sony 32 
9 Canon 31 
10 Seiko Instruments 27 
Figure 5: Top 10 institutions based on European, US and Japanese patent offices (Chen, Rocco, Li, & Lin, 2008) 
4.5 Public reactions to and understanding of nanotechnology 
There have been a number of studies towards the publics’ perception of 
nanotechnology. Some focussed on available knowledge; that is, what does the public 
know about nanotechnology, some focussed on the perception of risk and others 
focussed on moral questions. Why is public perception important? Currall et al. stress 
that “[u]nderstanding public sentiment towards nanotechnology is pivotal because, 
historically, public perceptions and attitudes have shaped the direction and pace of 
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scientific activity in a number of fields. This has been and continues to be the case with 
nuclear power, genetically modified organisms (GMO), embryonic stem-cell research 
and biotechnology. In the case of GMO, negative public sentiment has had an adverse 
effect on governmental funding of research, especially in Europe” (Currall, King, Lane, 
Madera, & Turner, 2006, p. 153). The following sheds some light on the outcomes of 
these studies and on possible lessons learned and/or future implications. 
A group of researchers around Dan M. Kahan at Yale Law School conducted a number 
of polls to gauge the public’s reaction towards nanotechnology. In general, they argue, 
that “[n]ot much more is known about public perceptions of the risks of 
nanotechnology than is known about nanotechnology risks themselves” (Kahan, Slovic, 
Braman, Gastil, & Cohen, 2007, p. 4). In their first study, the main hypothesis was “that 
individuals’ perceptions of nanotechnology risks and benefits would be affect driven” 
(Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, & Cohen, 2007, p. 9); that is, not driven by information, 
and/or knowledge, or, simply put, facts but by what ‘people feel’, based on existing 
values. A sub-hypothesis of the study was that the affect can be explained by people’s 
disposition towards environmental risks. In addition, the authors also expected that 
people’s affect would reflect their cultural disposition: “We predicted, in particular, 
that hierarchical and individualist subjects would have a relatively positive affective 
response to nanotechnology, and egalitarian and communitarian subjects a relatively 
negative one, in accord with the dispositions of such persons toward environmental 
risks generally” (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, & Cohen, 2007, p. 10). This means that 
already existing values, to which people subscribe, such as being conservative, ‘green’ 
or liberal, pre-determined their responses and reactions towards nanotechnology and 
its risks. When asked if they have they heard about nanotechnology before, 53% of the 
asked sample27 responded with ‘no’, and only 5% responded with ‘a lot’ (see Figure 
below).  
                                                     
27 Sample size (n=1500), thus Kahan et al (2007) argue that the result can be projected towards the 
American public in general.  
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Figure 6: Prior knowledge of nanotechnology (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, & Cohen, 2007, p. 15)  
After being supplied with some information on nanotechnology, one group of 
participants were asked about the risks vs. benefits, and some 53% indicated either 
‘strongly’ or ‘slightly’ that the benefits outweigh the risks (see figure below).  
 
Figure 7: Risks vs. Benefits, No-Information Condition (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, & Cohen, 2007, p. 16)  
In comparison, a group that was asked the same risk-benefits question without, 
however, being supplied with information answered as follows:    
Nothing at all
53%Just a little
28%
Some
14%
A lot
5%
Benefits > Risks
54%
Risks > Benefits
35%
Not sure
11%
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 Figure 8: Views of Subjects Across Conditions (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, & Cohen, 2007, p. 22) 
When comparing the sample groups with (Figure 9) and without (Figure 10) prior 
knowledge of nanotechnology, it turned out that the risks vs. benefit ratios were 
relatively close and that additional information did not matter. Kahan et al. concluded 
that “[t]he main effect of information exposure—that is, the overall effect of 
information exposure across the treatment groups—is essentially nil” (Kahan, Slovic, 
Braman, Gastil, & Cohen, 2007, p. 22). However, the authors highlight that this is due 
to the fact that the majority of people in the group of individuals that had prior 
knowledge of nanotechnology indicated that they had only ‘just a little knowledge’. In 
the same vein, one could argue that a little knowledge equals no knowledge. This is 
somewhat supported by the means analysis and the clearly visible gaps between 
‘information have’s’ and ‘information have not’s’ and their attitude towards risk: 
Benefits > Risks
57%
Risks > Benefits
38%
Not sure
5%
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Figure 9: Impact of Information Across Condition by Prior Knowledge Level (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, & 
Cohen, 2007, p. 30)  
What shapes these opinions? Kahan et al. argue that the majority of opinions are 
formed affectively, that is, people form instantaneous opinions based on their ‘gut 
feelings’; “Indeed, we found that this emotional response to nanotechnology better 
explains differences in individuals’ opinions than does any other factor, including their 
race or gender, their level of education, their income, their political and cultural 
commitments, their trust in government, and their level of knowledge about 
nanotechnology” (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, & Cohen, 2007, pp. 30-31). This raises 
questions as to how people form their opinions and how they get their ‘gut feelings’? 
As mentioned above, an associated aim of this study was to see if environmental 
values play a role in the perception of nanotechnology. The authors come to the 
conclusion that risk assessment is based on values. For instance, individuals whose 
values predispose them to give credit to claims of environmental risks are more 
alarmed than individuals whose values predispose them to dismiss claims of 
environmental risks. In layman’s terms this means that people with an individual track 
record of being conscientious or aware of environmental risks in general are also very 
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likely28 to be more sceptical about environmental risks of nanotechnology and vice 
versa. Concluding, Kahan et al. say that there remains at least one general puzzle:  
There is clearly a positive correlation in general between how much people 
know—or at least report knowing—and the view that nanotechnology’s 
benefits outweigh its risks. At first glance, this appears to imply that people 
become more favorably disposed to nanotechnology the more they know 
about it. But this interpretation is almost certainly incorrect, or at least unduly 
simplistic. As our own results demonstrate, people with different values react 
in divergent ways—some negatively, some positively—to the same 
information. In addition, considering only how much people knew prior to the 
study, exposing ill informed people to information did nothing to narrow the 
gap between their relatively negative view of nanotechnology and the 
relatively positive view of persons who describe themselves as well-informed 
(Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, & Cohen, 2007, p. 33). 
The relationship between prior knowledge and positive view of nanotechnology seems 
to be deceptive, thus, the authors conclude that ‘some other influence’ makes people 
that have a positive disposition towards nanotechnology wanting learn more about it. 
What that ‘other influence’ is, the authors do not say. A second study carried out 
concluded that a “strategy of public education that focuses only on disseminating 
accurate information cannot reliably be expected to generate convergence on accurate 
public beliefs about the risks and benefits of nanotechnology” (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, 
Gastil, Cohen, & Kysar, 2008, p. 2). Using qualified experts to deliver arguments about 
nanotechnology, and the risks and benefits associated with it, may not necessarily 
counteract cultural predispositions toward environmental and technological risks.  
Just as individuals often lack the time and capacity to assess the soundness of 
information on their own, they also often lack the time and capacity to assess 
the training and knowledge of information providers. Moreover, on almost any 
risk issue of significance—from global warming to domestic terrorism, from 
                                                     
28 Kahan et al stress that there is no causality (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, Cohen, & Kysar, 2008). 
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school shootings to vaccination of school-age girls for human papillomavirus—
members of the public will be confronted with duelling advocates whose expert 
credentials (scientific training, university affiliations, and the like) are roughly 
comparable (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, Cohen, & Kysar, 2008, p. 14). 
In their third and final study, Kahan et al. investigated the way forward with regards to 
public risk perceptions and nanotechnology. Is the aim of having a well-informed 
citizenry that can balance pro and counter arguments worth pursuing? Is there 
anything else that needs to be done in addition to ‘simply informing’ the public? The 
researchers conclude that “[i]t would be a mistake, …, to assume that nothing more 
need be done than to supply people with scientifically sound information” (Kahan, 
Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen, 2008, p. 19). This, as the authors stress, is due to 
ordinary citizens lacking both time and expertise to assess information (technical data) 
on risk properly, especially when it can be disputed. Instead, people tend to evaluate 
information based on their cultural disposition and preference. Therefore, risk is being 
evaluated in the same way, or as Kahan et al. put is: “issues of risk tend to polarize on 
cultural lines” (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen, 2008, p. 20); that is, 
information is evaluated by ordinary people in the same polarised fashion that shapes 
their opinion on any other matter.  
Hence, one can argue that general cultural and political predisposition and orientation 
seem to be of greater importance than balanced technical information itself. This 
poses a danger to nanotechnology, and any other potential future technology that is 
highly dependent on expertise: they are faced with the potential of becoming 
culturally and politically dividing. “Nanotechnology, on this view, could go the route of 
nuclear power and other controversial technologies, becoming a focal point of 
culturally infused political conflict” (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen, 2008, p. 
20). Even though this is not an inevitable future, Kahan et al. suggest that more 
research and effort is needed in the areas of risk communication so as to avoid 
polarisation as it has been seen previously, for instance, around nuclear energy or 
GMOs. This is also important if future public deliberations over nanotechnology are 
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seen as desirable. As Kahan et al. have pointed out, for the time being, little 
information makes little difference.  
A different kind of study was carried out by Currall et al. (2006). Here, the aim was to 
compare nanotechnology and its risks and benefits with those of other technologies, 
such as biotechnology, stem-cell research or GMOs (see Figure below). On the right 
hand side, the figures shows technologies that are associated with a high risks. These 
include material and elements, such as asbestos and mercury, and technologies, such 
as biotechnology and nuclear power.  Technologies shown at the top, or close to it, are 
seen as providing the highest benefit. The results show that nanotechnology was seen 
as less risky than, for instance, biotechnology or GMOs. It also shows that the expected 
benefits are currently seen as being lower than that of biotechnology or solar power. 
This is not surprising when considering the fact that the public still does not know 
much about nanotechnology.   
Figure 10: Perceived risks and benefits of nanotechnology
29
 (Currall, King, Lane, Madera, & Turner, 2006, p. 154)  
                                                     
29 The acronyms are: alcoholic beverages (AB), anaesthetics (AN), air travel (AT), automobile travel 
(ATT), bicycles (B), commercial aviation (CA), chemical disinfectants (CD), chemical fertilizers (CF), 
chemical manufacturing plants (CM), computer display screens (CS), dichloro-diphenyltrichloroethane 
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Currall concluded that “current public sentiment towards nanotechnology is relatively 
neutral” (Currall, 2007). Moreover, he suggests that “*b+ased on our findings, we 
question an assumption by many of our science and engineering colleagues that the 
public thinks about nanotechnology applications only in terms of possible risks. To the 
contrary, our results showed that public perceptions of nanotechnology weren't as 
simple as previously assumed—risks and benefits are both enmeshed in a complex 
decision-making calculus” (Currall, 2007). Thus, the public should be educated on the 
risks and benefits of nanotechnology in order to prevent nanotechnology encountering 
the same opposition as GMO. How this can be achieved is suggested as follows: 
With respect to the future, government funding should be provided for 
interdisciplinary research centres that promote collaborative research among 
physical scientists, engineers and social scientists. Additionally, social scientists 
should be encouraged, through research grant opportunities, to develop 
metrics and track the public’s understanding of the risks and benefits of 
nanotechnology. For example, we have presented a research methodology that 
can be used as a scorecard for gauging how the public compares 
nanotechnology with other technologies. (Currall, King, Lane, Madera, & 
Turner, 2006, p. 155).   
This is because the public engages in a trade-off between risks and benefits, as 
perceived levels of risks depend on the extent of the expected benefits and vice-versa  
(Currall, 2007). A survey carried out by Peter D. Hart Research Associates for the 
Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies in 2007 confirms that, at least in the US, 
“simply telling people more about nanotechnology is not enough. Of 1,014 adults asked 
about the risks and benefits of nanotechnology, around half did not answer the 
question, which is not surprising given that almost three quarters had heard little or 
nothing about nanotechnology” (Peter D. Hart Research Associates, 2008). This seems 
                                                                                                                                                         
(DDT), electric power (EL), fire fighting (FF), food preservatives (FP), general aviation (GA), herbicides 
(H), home appliances (HA), human genetic engineering (HE), handguns (HG), hydroelectric power (HP), 
lasers (L), large construction (LC), liquid natural gas (LG), motorcycles (M), microwave ovens (MO), 
motor vehicles (MV), pesticides (P), prescription antibiotics (PA), prescription drugs (PD), police work 
(PW), railroad (R), radiation therapy (RT), surgery (S), stem-cell research (SC), smoking (SM), water 
fluoridation (WF), X-rays (X). (Currall, King, Lane, Madera, & Turner, 2006, p. 154) 
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to corroborate the findings of Kahan et al. (2007, 2008). “However, when asked again, 
after being informed about the risks and benefits, the percentage who thought the 
benefits were greater than the risks increased from 18% to 30%, whereas those who 
felt the risks and benefits were similar rose from 25% to 30%. Disturbingly, however, 
the percentage who believed that the risks outweighed the benefits increased from just 
6% to 22%” (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, Cohen, & Kysar, 2008). This is somewhat 
different to the finding of other studies, because providing information did not 
automatically trigger people to become more concerned about it. And, to complicate 
matters further, differences in opinions have been identified when analysing the 
responses by gender, age, income and along political values (Kahan 2007, 2008). 
4.6 The current understanding of the risks of nanotechnology 
Considering the results of the observed public opinions towards the potential risk of 
nanotechnology, it seems to be crucial to get a better understanding of the risks, as 
seen by the science and technology community today. Therefore, the following 
identifies current trends with regard to known and/or suspected risks of 
nanotechnology.  
The general perception is that there is little known about nanotechnology risks 
(Nanologue, 2005; Kahan et al., 2008). This is not because nanotechnology is itself still 
a fairly recent development, but also because there are not many products available, 
at least when compared to the overall market. Another element that plays a role here 
is the complexity that is inherent in this type of technology/area of research. 
Moreover, nanotechnology research is not limited to publicly-funded and executed 
research, such as in universities and other government laboratories, but stretches also 
into the corporate realm. If the previously mentioned figures from Lux Research (2007) 
are anything to go by, then it seems that corporate funding has already exceeded 
public funding. In the same vein, funding through venture capital is also very likely to 
increase; therefore managing or overseeing current research has already become 
incredibly difficult. For instance, as of 2008, there are approximately 1200 
nanotechnology firms in the US alone, yet more than 80 percent have fewer than 10 
employees (CSP, 2008). This, first of all, makes global oversight of research and the 
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associated risks impossible, and, secondly, national oversight needs to be regarded as 
already challenging. Before one spins this further, for instance, by adding the risks of 
nanotechnology related research being carried out in either less democratic countries 
or by rogue nations or groups, then a picture arises that might suggest an inevitable 
myriad of forthcoming challenges. Whether this is already the case or whether this 
remains a potential future scenario, is answered in the following section. 
What does real-world research on nanotechnology say about the risks? Maynard 
(2006) points out that although it is generally accepted that some nanomaterials 
and/or technologies may come with the potential to cause harm to both people and 
environment, the more fundamental problem remains that there is still not much 
known about these risks: 
Fears over the possible dangers of some nanotechnologies may be 
exaggerated, but they are not necessarily unfounded. Recent studies examining 
the toxicity of engineered nanomaterials in cell cultures and animals have 
shown that size, surface area, surface chemistry, solubility and possibly shape 
all play a role in determining the potential for engineered nanomaterials to 
cause harm (Maynard, 2006, p. 267). 
This is due to the fact, so Maynard continues, that, at least at the moment, science is 
still “ill-equipped to address novel risks associated with emerging technologies. 
Research into understanding and preventing risk often has a low priority in the 
competitive worlds of intellectual property, research funding and technology 
development” (Maynard, 2006, p. 267). In other words, there are currently two main 
problems. The first relates to a lack of detection technologies and the second to the 
fact that the main focus of R&D is on development of new, and predominantly 
applicable, solutions involving nanotechnology, and not on the things that may 
potentially hinder nanotechnology progress. Furthermore, Behra and Krug point out 
that the majority of studies that have been carried out focussed on health and “the 
environmental aspects have largely been unexplored” (Behra & Krug, 2008, p. 253).  
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4.7 Nanoscale silver 
This section will use nanoscale silver as an example to elaborate further on the issue of 
nanotechnology-related risk. As one of the currently best researched nanoscale 
elements, nanoscale silver provides an ideal insight into the current available 
knowledge on nanomaterials, and therefore has also been a chosen to serve as a 
practical measure for the analysis part of this thesis (Chapter 6). By integrating 
nanoscale silver into the knowledge framework, assessments can be made with 
regards to the practical implications of the complexities that are characteristic to 
knowledge intensive and expertise depended technologies, such as nanotechnology. 
Here, nanoscale silver provides insight into the risks of nanotechnology that can be 
assessed by already available data on environmental impacts and by assessing the 
knowledge, or better put, the expertise requirements needed to address technology 
related risks. 
As briefly mentioned above, one of the very few already known, as opposed to 
suspected, materials that can cause a risk is nanoscale silver, or simply put, nanosilver. 
Nanosilver can be defined as a “nanoparticle or a nanocoating comprised of many 
atoms of silver engineered for a specified use. Silver nanoparticles are usually 
engineered to release silver ions, which are the source of antibacterial activity” (Luoma, 
2008, p. 11) and vary in sizes between 1 and 100 nanometres. Silver ions are of 0.1 
nanometre in size. In general, positive effects attributed to nanosilver are mostly of 
medical nature, thus nanosilver products are especially popular in healthcare products, 
sport and clothing. The FDA reports that nanosilver “has been recently recognized as a 
more potent antimicrobial form of silver (Baker et al., 2005; Aymonier et al., 2002; 
Wright et al., 2002; Melaiye et al., 2005; Sondi et al., 2004; Alt et al., 2004). As an 
example, Wright et al. (2002) demonstrated that wound dressing coated with 
sputtered nanoscale silver reduced infections in burns” (FDA, 2006, p. 8) Current 
products containing nanosilver, amongst many others, are: 
 Washing machines, for instance, produced by Samsung 
 Antibacterial make-up instruments  
 Curling irons 
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 Toothpaste 
 Acne treatments 
 Socks and slippers 
 Taekwondo  training suits/uniforms 
 Bandages and wound dressings 
 Beauty soaps, cleansers, make-ups, fabric softeners 
As mentioned above, nanosilver has indeed antibacterial and antifungal qualities.  As a 
result, new products containing nanosilver are promoted in a fashion that over the 
long term might turn out to be counterproductive for the industry. For instance, the 
Honk Kong based Chinese company Nano Care Technology Ltd. reports on their 
website about the above-mentioned antibacterial make-up instruments and the 
benefits of nanosilver in the following way: “The appliance processed by this means 
can effectively protect people from the hairdressing-related infections such as 
trachoma, conjunctivitis, virosis hepatitis, dermatitis and AIDS” (Nano Care Technology, 
2007). In the same vein, JR Nanotech Plc. claim that nanosilver is: 
 highly efficacious, fast acting, non-poisonous, non-stimulating, non-allergic, 
tolerance free and hydrophilic 
Both claims are not only highly deceptive, if not outrageous (for instance the 
advertised protection against AIDS), but also unsubstantiated and thus do not benefit 
public deliberation on the subject, quite the contrary. Considering the public’s current 
lack of understanding of nanotechnology, or general knowledge thereof, it would be 
disastrous if that little knowledge that is available were built on false claims and myths. 
J. Keohane (2010) puts it as follows:  
This effect is only heightened by the information glut, which offers — alongside 
an unprecedented amount of good information — endless rumors, 
misinformation, and questionable variations on the truth. In other words, it’s 
never been easier for people to be wrong, and at the same time feel more 
certain that they’re right (Keohane J. , 2010).  
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Moreover, the statement by JR Nanotech Plc. that their nanosilver is non-poisonous 
begs the question: Non-poisonous for whom? Although nanosilver is not poisonous to 
humans, silver is still regarded as a hazard and argyria, that is the condition describing 
the effects of silver ingestions, is commonly known. The FDA reports that argyria has 
been documented as early as 980 AD (see FDA 2006). 
One of the first researchers looking into potential problems with nanosilver was Troy 
Benn of Arizona State University. He showed that nanosilver, as used in some already 
available and commercially marketed socks (here, the marketing aspect focuses on the 
attributed minimising effects of nanosilver of odour-forming microbial growth) can 
actually leach out as either silver colloids or ions during washing. This effect, which is 
the same as the machines containing nanosilver washing produced by Samsung where 
this effect is actually desired, has the result of nanosilver particles potentially making 
their way into domestic waste water (Behra & Krug, 2008). Other exposure to 
nanosilver may occur through contact with burn and wound dressings containing, or 
surfaces treated with, nanosilver as an antibiotic. The FDA assumes that the increased 
use of nanosilver products will also lead to an increased human exposure. Potential 
products the FDA mentioned are, for instance, masks to reduce transmission of 
infectious agents, home water or food sanitizing kits, kitchen towels, and cutting 
boards to reduce foodborne infections (FDA, 2006). 
The FDA suggests that there should be a research focus on nanoscale silver “because of 
increasing use and the gap in knowledge that cannot be filled by information submitted 
by manufacturers. There are possible toxicity concerns due to the lack of understanding 
of various aspects of the nanoscale materials” (FDA, 2006, p. 9) and these concerns will 
not be addressed adequately unless the following studies are undertaken:  
Nanoscale silver - Conduct (1) absorption, distribution, metabolism and 
elimination studies in rodents using oral and intravenous routes of 
administration (including blood-brain transfer), (2) acute (single and repeat 
dose) toxicity studies (28 days) in rodents, and (3) subchronic, dose-response 
toxicity studies in rodents (only if warranted). The studies should be conducted 
on nanoscale silver of one or two sizes (e.g. 10 - 60 nm). The nanoscale material 
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should be thoroughly characterized before use, and after recovery from tissues 
(FDA, 2006, p. 9). 
What these research requests indicate is that there is large amount of uncertainty 
when it comes to nanosilver. The FDA stresses that there is a “paucity of information 
regarding the environmental disposition (i.e. fate) of nanoscale materials” (FDA, 2006, 
p. 4) in general, and due to its popularity amongst manufacturers, a lack of information 
regarding the environmental fate and impact of nanoscale in particular. In other 
words, the information received about the amounts of released nanosilver particles, if 
at all, from manufactures is regarded as either unreliable or incorrect. Toxicology 
studies have shown that the antibacterial properties of ionic silver occur mainly due to 
cell death or by compromising cell walls (FDA, 2006). Luoma (2008) states that the 
complex behaviour of silver is the main reason for existing contradictory conclusions 
about its risks on both health and environment: 
 Different uses release silver in different forms and different quantities.  
 Quantifying the mass of silver ultimately released to the environment (or to the 
body) from a given use is necessary to evaluate the risk associated with that 
use. Complex geochemical reactions determine how those releases translate to 
silver concentrations in food, water, sediments, soils or topical applications. 
 Silver concentrations in the environment determine impacts. But 
concentrations in the environment are low compared with those of many other 
elements, adding to the challenge of obtaining reliable data on environmental 
trends. Similarly low concentrations of nanosilver might be expected where 
waste products from its uses are released, although nanoparticle-specific 
transport and accumulation mechanisms might also be expected. 
 The environmental chemistry of silver metal influences bioavailability and 
toxicity in complex ways (where bioavailability is defined by the physical, 
geochemical and biological processes that determine metal uptake by living 
organisms). The influence of environmental chemistry on nanosilver 
bioavailability is a crucial question. 
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 Determining potential for toxicity is more complex than usually recognized. The 
type of test can have a strong influence on conclusions about silver’s potential 
as an environmental hazard. Organisms are most sensitive when tested using 
long-term chronic toxicity tests and/or exposure via the diet (…). But such data 
are rare. 
 Once inside an organism, silver may be highly toxic, but not necessarily so. The 
processes that influence internal toxicity (or biological detoxification) might be 
one of the most important considerations in determining risks from nanosilver. 
 Ecological risk is ultimately influenced by toxicity at the cellular and whole-
organism level, but that risk will differ from species to species (Luoma, 2008, p. 
15). 
Luoma argues that although silver is a both a known element and environmental 
hazard, “[o]ur knowledge is not adequate to conduct a full risk assessment for 
nanosilver” (Luoma, 2008, p. 13). The problem mainly associated with nanosilver is 
that ionic silver is one of the most toxic metals known to aquatic organisms. 
Historically, silver releases into the environment have always posed a risk. For 
instance, when compared to the 1980s, a study of the silver discharges of the San 
Francisco Bay Area in 2007 were more than 10 times lower (see table below): 
Facility Kg silver release  
per year 
mg silver release  
per person 
Concentration in Bay 
(ng/L) 
Palo Alto*              1989 92 415  
                                 2007 6 27  
Silicon Valley**    1980 550 275 26-189 (mean = 113) 
                                 2007 40 20 6 
* Data from Homberger et al. (2000) and P.Bobel, Palo Alto Environmental Protection Agency (unpublished) 
** Data from Smith and Flegal (1993) 
Table 10: Discharges of silver into South San Francisco Bay from one Waste Treatment Facility (POTW) and from 
the combined POTW discharges from the surrounding urban area (Silicon Valley) in the 1980s and 2007 (Luoma, 
2008, p. 17)  
Although normally concentrations of trace metals are reported as parts per billion 
(ppb, which equals microgram per litre), silver is reported as parts per trillion (pptr, 
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which equals nanogram per litre). The lowest concentrations of silver (that is dissolved 
silver in water) can be found in the open oceans (see table below).  
Location Silver concentration (ng/L) 
Pristine Pacific Ocean 0.1 surface waters 
2.2 deep waters 
Oceans off Asia (2005)* Changed from 0.03 to 1.3 in 20 years 
South San Francisco Bay (2003)* 6 
South San Francisco Bay 
1980 
1990** 
 
113 
27-36 
California Bight (nearest human inputs)*** 4.5 
Rivers in urbanized Colorado (2000)**** 5-22 
Effluents of Colorado POTWs (2000)**** 64-327 
"Protective" Ambient Water Quality Criteria 1,900-3,200 
* Ranville and Flegal, 2005; ** Smith and Flegal, 1993 
*** Sanudo-Wilhelmy and Flegal, 1992; **** Wen et al., 2002. 
 Table 11: Typical silver concentration of the water bodies of the world (Luoma, 2008, p. 18) 
However, recent research shows that silver concentrations “changed from 0.03 ng/L in 
1983 to 1.3 ng/L in 2002 in surface waters from the open ocean off Asia (Ranville and 
Flegal, 2005). The distribution of the contamination followed a pattern that suggested 
wind-blown pollution aerosols were being carried to sea from the Asian mainland by 
the prevailing westerly winds” (Luoma, 2008, p. 18). Although the exact sources for 
that are unknown, it is assumed that they can be linked to recent economic 
developments; that is, increased economic productivity and output in Asia. The result 
of this was that offshore silver concentrations rose 50-fold and show the sensitivities 
of water bodies towards human input (Luoma, 2008). The problems with nanosilver in 
water is, and this may be one of the reason why nanoscale silver particle may 
potentially be even more dangerous than the known silver concentrations of the 
1980s, that ionic silver is positively charged, thus always seeking to bond quickly with 
negatively charged ions. Silver uptake or bioavailability, that is the uptake of silver 
from all sources, is strongly influenced by the form of silver available in the 
environment and ionic silver is favoured. The uptake is being done by ion transporters, 
which are proteins. Once taken up, bioaccumulation occurs. Recent studies have found 
that “oceanic food webs (phytoplankton) bioaccumulate silver from marine waters to 
concentrations 10,000 to 70,000 times higher than those found in the water” (Luoma, 
2008, p. 23), thus high ionic silver concentrations can be found at the beginning of the 
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food chain of many aquatic species. With regards to estuaries and marine 
environments, Luoma concluded that the ‘window of tolerance’ for silver 
concentrations is “relatively narrow because of the strong responses of organisms to 
relatively small changes in exposure concentration” (Luoma, 2008, p. 23). 
What makes this worse is biomagnification, a process that occurs when a predator 
accumulates a chemical in concentrations that are higher than in its prey. In this 
context it means that an organism that takes silver up from its food will accumulate 
higher concentrations than were present in its food itself. Invertebrates, for instance, 
have high assimilation and slow loss rates. If, for instance, the above mentioned 
phytoplankton is the food, then due to biomagnification, the bioaccumulation will also 
be very high. This can be spun further by looking at invertebrate predators, which also 
have a high bioaccumulation of silver and so forth (Luoma, 2008). To summarise, and 
considering what is known at the moment, one can conclude that an increased release 
of nanosilver into the environment may accumulate to become a serious problem. 
Although a few studies have been carried out, it is agreed (Behra & Krug 2008, 
Scheringer 2008, Maynard 2006, Luoma 2008, FDA 2006) that there is still an urgent 
need for more studies on nanosilver and its toxicology in general, and is ecotoxicology 
specifically.  
4.8 Summary and outlook 
One should assume that both governments and corporations have an interest in public 
deliberation on nanotechnology. This is because the benefits potentially outweigh the 
risks of such a debate.  Maynard argues that “[t]he spectre of possible harm — whether 
real or imagined — is threatening to slow the development of nanotechnology unless 
sound, independent and authoritative information is developed on what the risks are, 
and how to avoid them” (Maynard, 2006, p. 267). Considering the long term benefits 
that are being associated with nanotechnology, be it from a technological progress 
perspective or by looking at the economic benefits, it seems to be a 'no-brainer' to 
assume that such deliberations are required. However, although the 
nanotechnological development and the release of market-ready products is only at its 
beginning, one can already observe some questionable impacts of product releases. 
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The examples shown in the previous chapter of the marketing of products containing 
nanosilver are questionable, especially when considering that there is almost 
unanimous agreement that there is insufficient knowledge and expertise on the 
impacts of nanosilver products in particular, and on nanotechnology in general. As 
previously mentioned, one of the reasons why there is little known about the effects of 
nanoparticles is because there is a lack of detection mechanisms. Gatti and Montanari 
point out that “*i+t has already been proven that inhaled 100nm particles can negotiate 
the lung barrier within 60 seconds, then show up in the liver and other internal organs 
within an hour”. (Gatti & Montanari, 2008, p. 33), yet the complexities that are 
inherent in many nanoparticles are still unknown, and thus reaction with the human 
body (or the environment) is also not fully clear. Nanopathology, which is the study of 
effects and diseases caused by nano-sized particles, is still in its infancy and the 
amount of work that needs to be done is enormous. 
In order to maximise benefits and minimise risks at the same time, Maynard (2006) 
suggests that the science community “needs to act now if strategic research is to 
support sustainable nanotechnologies” (Maynard, 2006, p. 267).  He proposes five 
grand challenges spanning over the next 15 years with the sole aim of bringing focus to 
complex multidisciplinary issues:  
 Develop instruments to assess exposure to engineered nanomaterials in air and 
water, within the next 3–10 years. 
 Develop and validate methods to evaluate the toxicity of engineered 
nanomaterials, within the next 5–15 years. 
 Develop models for predicting the potential impact of engineered 
nanomaterials on the environment and human health, within the next 10 years. 
 Develop robust systems for evaluating the health and environmental impact of 
engineered nanomaterials over their entire life, within the next 5 years. 
 Develop strategic programmes that enable relevant risk-focused research, 
within the next 12 months. (Maynard, 2006, pp. 268-269) 
There are two main things that can be learned from the research on the public’s 
perception of both nanotechnology itself and the risks of nanotechnology. First and 
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foremost, the public has very little knowledge about nanotechnology, and if there is 
some knowledge, then it seems to be vague. What is more, there also seems to be a 
distinct lack of interest in nanotechnologies by the public (Krug & Fleischer, 2001). The 
little available knowledge is of descriptive nature; that is, non-tacit and thus not first-
hand acquired knowledge. The second lesson that can be learned is that there is a 
danger when communicating risks; public opinions will be formed along existing 
cultural and political orientations, as shown by Kahan et al. (2007, 2008). Although 
polarisation of opinions along the lines of political and cultural predisposition is 
nothing new (see the political divide over nuclear power for instance), what is new is 
that the number of available products either containing nanoparticles or being 
produced by means of nanotechnology will be a thousand times higher. This increase, 
plus the effects of globalisation and mass communication (including mass mis-
communication) have changed the playing field and cannot be compared to previous 
occurrences with high political polarisation. Kahan et al. propose that “it is imperative 
that those who have a stake in enlightened public assessment of nanotechnology 
attend not just to what is said about its risks and benefits but also to who says it” 
(Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, Cohen, & Kysar, 2008, p. 14). Here, the argument is that 
it is critical to avoid creating the impression in the public that positions on 
nanotechnology can be associated with cultural dispositions, thus contributing to 
polarisations along cultural lines of diversity (see also Chapter 2.2). A study by Peter D. 
Hart Research Associates (2008) suggests that providing little information changed 
perceptions positively when waging benefits versus risks towards the benefits side, 
however, it does not automatically confirm the same when assessing risk alone (as 
opposed to comparing risk to benefits). This is being confirmed by research carried out 
by the University of Michigan:  
In fact studies undertaken in 2005 and 2006 by researchers at the University of 
Michigan found that people rarely change their minds when exposed to 
corrected facts in news stories – and many actually become even more 
attached to their pre-existing views, especially on controversial issues, a 
problem that is heightened by the increasing glut of information that confronts 
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us, which harbours both new insights and new myths, rumours and downright 
fabrications (Edwards, 2010). 
In other words, people who are adverse towards risk will not radically change their 
mind, when provided with additional information and vice versa. What can proactively 
been done to promote a better understanding of the risks and benefits of 
nanotechnology? Maynard (2006) suggests that communication activities should be 
developed that allow for the summarisation of technical information, their critique and 
synthesising for interested parties, including decision- makers and consumers. Currall 
et al. point out that “*a]cademic bodies, such as the Royal Society and Royal Academy 
of Engineering in the United Kingdom and the National Academies in the United States, 
should be asked to summarize and update the current state of knowledge about risks 
and benefits of nanotechnology. Based on these findings, interagency ‘societal impact’ 
subgroups can be formed to coordinate education and public outreach efforts by 
creating a clearing house in each country that synthesizes information about the health 
and environmental impacts of nanotechnology, including performance indicators and 
the latest scientific findings on risks and benefits” (Currall, King, Lane, Madera, & 
Turner, 2006, p. 155). Both ideas rely, however, on input, willingness and suggestions 
that need to come from governments, or at least government bodies. Yet, this is also 
where some of the problems with knowledge-intensive technologies lie:  
America leads the world in science and technology, yet its political leadership 
often seems detached from its scientific expertise. Indeed, the Bush 
administration has acquired a reputation for treating science with disdain. … 
The Bush administration has repeatedly drawn criticism not just for neglecting 
science, but for manipulating and suppressing science for political ends (New 
Scientist Magazine, 2008, pp. 8-10). 
Moreover, Bowman and Hodge suggest that “[g]overnments, regulatory agencies, and 
industry are only now beginning to understand the depth of the scientific information 
deficits that exist in relation to the potential human and EH&S {environmental health 
and safety, sic!] implications” (Bowman & Hodge, 2008, p. 484). The argument is, 
according to the authors, that, in addition to the currently existing information deficits, 
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there is a lack of certainty and “the difficulties and lengthy development of new 
legislative regimes, the complexity of the nanotechnology itself and the possibility of 
large economic rewards all appear to be significant factors associated with why 
governments have not reacted hastily to calls” (Bowman & Hodge, 2008, p. 484) for 
nanotechnology specific regulation.  
A second perspective, which has briefly been mentioned in this chapter, needs to look 
at what could happen if nanotechnologies were used by rogue nations or terrorist 
groups? Gatti and Montanari quickly highlight that “[t]oday’s science has no experience 
with the novel, nano-scale environmental pollution caused by the innovative 
technologies of twenty-first century wars” (Gatti & Montanari, 2008, p. 33). Although 
one needs to stress that these types of technology/weaponry are not yet available, 
considering the progress that nanotechnology has made over the past 10 years, one 
can assume that it only remains a question of time. According to Gatti and Montanari 
(2008), not much research has been done in this regard. Considering how little is 
known about nanotechnology risks, this is not surprising. As with nanotechnology in 
general, weaponisation of nanoscale materials is still largely unknown, but the 
potential nanotechnology offers suggest that will change soon. Combining this 
assumption with what is known already about the public perception of 
nanotechnology, one can further assume that there is an enormous potential for 
public dispute on this subject matter. The complexities, however, that are inherent in 
these knowledge-intensive and expertise-dependent technologies are very likely to 
complicate public deliberation on these subject matters.  
Where to go from here? Nanotechnology is, simply put, extremely complex and when 
it comes to informing the public nanotechnology is expertise dependent. The following 
chapter will provide further insights into the perceptions of risks by both experts and 
non-experts and also provide an overview of recommendations and recommended 
actions to address these issues. These recommendations and recommended actions 
are then used in Chapter 6, where they will be analysed against the knowledge 
framework.    
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5. Nanologue 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to investigate available data, information, knowledge and expertise of 
nanotechnology and the risk of nanotechnology, the following research carried out by 
Nanologue will be used to highlight areas of concern and typical responses from 
laypersons and experts. Nanologue’s study has been chosen over other research 
conducted (Currall, King, Lane, Madera, & Turner, 2006; Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, 
& Cohen, 2008; Peter D. Hart Research Associates, 2008) as it goes beyond standard 
opinion polling. The study was a comprehensive mix of a number of public and expert 
engagement exercises and it has been the most complex and extensive study 
undertaken to date with regards to collated qualitative data on the preceptions and 
risks of nanotechnology. According to Türk, “Nanologue brings together researchers, 
businesses and representatives from civil society from across Europe to support 
dialogue on the impact of NT on society, and is part of the commission’s response to 
the challenges highlighted in the recent Nanotechnologies and Nanoscience (N&N) 
Action Plan for Europe” (Türk, 2005, p. 56). In addition, Nanologue’s study takes 
detailed differentiations of risks associated with nanotechnology into account and 
makes a distinction between laypersons and experts and their respective take on 
nanotechnology related issues, thus delivering a more detailed overview of the  
current understandings of the subject matter.  
For the sake of clarity, it should be mentioned here that the use of Nanologue’s 
studies, and therefore, data, for the purpose of this thesis also means using, or relying, 
on descriptive knowledge and/or explicit information. Nanologue’s studies have been 
approached, and therefore, utilised as a main source of data. As discussed earlier, the 
act of adding meaning to data results in the production of information, and hence, 
knowledge. Using Nanologue’s data, analysing and then recomposing it for the 
purposes of this chapter also means adding to the overall body of knowledge and 
going beyond the findings of Nanologue. Nanologue (2006) published outcomes of 
interviews and a workshop where both researchers and members of civil society were 
asked about the risks and benefits. For instance, the tables below provide an overview 
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of the perceived benefits and risks of nanotechnology, as stated by the participants of 
Nanologue’s study. These finding corroborate that of other researchers (Kahan et al., 
2007, 2008; Currall et al. 2007; Peter D Hart, 2008) who also have investigated the 
current perceptions of benefits and risks of nanotechnology with regards to the scope 
of what is either known or being assumed by the participants of these studies. 
Benefit  Votes 
Better medical diagnosis  11 
Reduction in environmental pollution / impacts 10 
Better drug delivery  5 
Food safety (improved packaging)  3 
Reduced Cost / Material use = Improved efficiency  3 
Greater Access to Resources (reduction in conflict)  3 
Reduced cost of Healthcare  3 
New technologies / New economies  1 
Next generation information technology  0 
Table 12: Benefits prioritised (Nanologue, 2006, p. 115) 
Risk  Votes 
Toxicity of Nanoparticles  12 
The Nanobubble30 9 
Nanodivide 7 
Use of NT for military applications / terrorism 5 
Products we don’t want 4 
Economic Dislocation 2 
Privacy 1 
Table 13: Risks prioritised (Nanologue, 2006, pp. 115-116) 
The following chapter will provide further insight, especially when it comes to the 
composition of such risks or benefits analyses with regards to the differing type of 
participants, such as nanotechnology experts or members of the civil society. 
Moreover, Nanologue’s finding will be critically evaluated and assessed against the 
knowledge framework and against findings of other research in order to address the 
core objectives of this thesis.   
                                                     
30 “The Nanobubble – a concern held by the majority of the delegates that there was not enough focus 
and too much hype surrounding investment in nanotechnologies and this would result in a “bubble” that 
would eventually burst” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 116). 
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5.2 Nanologue’s study of nanotechnology 
Nanologue, funded by the EU’s 6th Framework Programme31 undertook intensive 
studies of researchers and members of the civil society on their opinions of 
environmental, legal and social aspects (ELSA) of nanotechnology. Following their 
initial review of ELSA, their studies and workshops aimed at obtaining a deeper 
understanding of ELSA and the risks of nanotechnology. Using interviews and 
workshops, their intention was to:  
 engage with representatives from R&D, marketing and users of nanotechnology 
in a dialogue on the benefits and potential ELSA on nanotechnologies in order 
to capture their perspective on the issue; 
 speak to societal groups in order to further develop and substantiate the 
benefits and potential impacts of nanotechnologies; 
 facilitate the process of prioritising the benefits and potential impacts 
identified; 
 contribute to the development of the subsequent project work, including the 
development of scenarios exploring how business, civil society and public 
institutions can engage effectively in a dialogue on the ELSA of 
nanotechnologies (Nanologue, 2006). 
Nanologue uses the term “researcher” as a synonym for scientists and technologists 
that are either based in universities or the business and are involved in research and 
development of nanotechnology based applications in the areas of medical diagnosis, 
food packaging and energy conversion and production. For members of the civil 
society, Nanologue widened the definition beyond that of voluntary civic and social 
organisations or institutions and included others “who are involved or interested in 
understanding, marketing, regulating, monitoring, writing about nanotechnologies or 
helping to develop market-relevant products using nanotechnology applications” 
(Nanologue, 2006, p. 8). Nanologue stresses that the involvement of members of the 
civil society was not meant as a representation of the public’s perception of 
nanotechnology, but to ensure a balanced view between researchers and civil society. 
                                                     
31 FP6-2003-NMP-TI-3-main. 
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Considering that Nanologue used this broader definition of civil society, the awareness 
of nanotechnology and related risks was slightly above that of other studies on the 
public perceptions, for instance by Currall et al. (2006). Nanologue explains that this is 
due to how the members of civil society have been selected: “As a result this group 
was expected to have a better understanding of the issues surround NT than a more 
traditional group of representatives from civil society” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 7). To a 
certain extent, this is somewhat unfortunate, as it would have been useful to fully 
compare the result between Nanologue’s civil society and the results of other research 
that interviewed the public in order to identify differences between the interviewed 
groups. In addition, it would have also been useful to have an overview of exactly how 
Nanologue’s members of civil society differ from that of the ‘ordinary’ public. Since 
Nanologue did not provide any details about the members of civil society beyond the 
explanations shown above, it is difficult to assess the size of the assumed knowledge 
gap, or differences in pre-existing knowledge, between Nanologue’s civil society and 
the ‘ordinary’ public.    
5.2.1 Risk perceptions 
A number of researchers that have been contacted and asked to participate did not 
respond. Nanologue suggests that some of the contacted researchers were “either 
overloaded with interview requests and therefore not able to participate or were simply 
not interested” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 8). As a result, the Nanologue team concluded 
that “the group of experts who agreed to participate in the interviews takes an above 
average interest in NT-related ELSA aspects” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 9). This needs to be 
taken into consideration when looking at the results. 
The participating researchers were interviewed either by telephone or in person, and 
also asked to complete a questionnaire. The participating members of civil society 
were invited to a one-day workshop32 where the delegates were asked to: 
• list the main risks and benefits of nanotechnologies; 
• vote for the most important risks and benefits and prioritise them; 
                                                     
32 Held in Edinburgh on 05.09. 2005.  
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• vote on how certain they were that these risks and benefits would be 
relevant by 2015; 
• discuss the barriers to better communication between stakeholders 
concentrating on the role of scientists; 
• make recommendations to overcome these barriers (Nanologue, 2006, pp. 
9-10). 
In their 2004 study, Nanologue concluded that there is neither a common ground 
amongst scientists nor an understanding on what exactly the ELSAs of nanotechnology 
are: “The question remains, however, what exactly are the ELSA of nanotechnology, 
and what to do about them. Indeed, we should expect this question to remain open for 
a long time” (Strand 2004, quoted in Nanologue 2006, p. 10). As a result, Nanologue 
decided to focus on a variety of opportunities, threats and risks of nanotechnology and 
instead of looking at this area generically, Nanologue chose seven particular aspects 
for the research: 
• Environmental performance 
• Human health 
• Privacy 
• Access 
• Acceptance 
• Liability 
• Regulation & Control33 
Four of those areas need to be further looked into: environmental performance, 
human health, access and acceptance. These areas are of particular interest to this 
thesis, the first two, as they reflect the current understanding of risks, and the latter 
two because they deal with information and the group of non-experts. The table below 
provides an overview as to why these selected areas are of interest: their relevance. 
 
                                                     
33 Nanologue investigated all of these areas generally as well as industry specific, namely the areas of: 
medical diagnosis, food packaging and energy conversion and production. For the purpose of this 
research, only the general findings will be used, but not the industry specific findings. 
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Area Relevance 
Environmental 
performance 
The assumption is that nanotechnology has a direct or indirect 
impact on the natural environment.  
Potential issues are: eco-efficiency, eco-toxicity, bioaccumulation. 
Human health 
The assumption is that nanotechnology has a direct or indirect 
impact on the human wellbeing.  
Potential issues are: Toxicity, particle accumulation, disease 
diagnosis and treatment, or drug delivery. 
Access 
Potential issues are: How do individuals or groups get access to 
nanotechnology, including physical access, access within and 
between societies/countries? 
How to deal with issues such as affordability, intellectual property 
rights, concentration of power? 
Acceptance 
The assumption is that level of public acceptance of nanotechnology 
has a direct or indirect impact on the development, production and 
marketing of nanotechnology products.    
Potential issues are: delayed introduction of nanotechnology 
products and/or political divide on nanotechnology issues. 
Table 14: Selected areas and their relevance (Nanologue, 2006; also Kahan et al. 2007, 2008) 
Nanologue states that all researchers interviewed were aware of the ELSA of 
nanotechnology and that it can be assumed that the interviewees had an above 
average awareness and knowledge. However, and to reiterate, more than half of the 
originally asked researchers were not willing to participate. Nanologue assumes that, 
although the interview request “explicitly stated that no expertise on ELSA is required, 
some might have not responded simply because they felt not comfortable with or well 
informed about the topic” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 13).  
When asked how they informed themselves on the ELSA of nanotechnologies, the 
researchers responded as follows: 
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Figure 11: Information channels mentioned by representatives from research by numbers (Nanologue, 2006, p. 
13) 
In comparison, when asked how the members of the civil society informed themselves 
on the ELSA of nanotechnologies, they responded as follows: 
 
Figure 12: Information channels mentioned by representatives from civil society by numbers (Nanologue, 2006, p. 
13) 
When members of the civil society were asked if they felt adequately informed on 
ELSA of nanotechnologies, “*r+oughly a third said yes, but mostly with a caveat. Many 
of the interviewees commented that they follow the nanotechnology debate closely as 
part of their work or interests, but felt that the information had not yet reached the 
wider public domain” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 13). In other words, although circa a third 
said that they felt informed, “they were not necessarily representative of the general 
public, who might not be adequately informed. … It was also posited that whilst there 
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was an adequate amount of information ‘out there’ this did not mean that the ELSA 
were well understood [i.e. information itself is not enough]” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 13). 
In addition, another third was not sure whether they felt adequately informed, arguing 
that there is lot of information ‘out there’, but had difficulty deciding where to even 
start. This confirms the assumption that the members of the civil society represented 
in Nanologue’s study were better informed than the general public. The results of 
studies by Kahan et al. (2007, 2008) and Currall et al. (2006) confirm this. There was a 
general feeling that the current debate on ELSA of nanotechnology “had no structure 
and had not advanced” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 13). The remaining third responded with 
not feeling adequately informed.  
Nanologue interviewed five researchers from various nanotechnology backgrounds in 
order to assess their perspective on nanotechnologies in general. Most of them were 
personally interested in ELSA, felt well-informed, and some of them had already been 
involved in discussing ELSA topics with colleagues. “However, leaving their area of 
expertise and being asked about ELSA of NT in general most participants expressed 
they lacked an overview and would only be able to provide a few examples” 
(Nanologue, 2006, p. 30). As a result, the researchers demanded additional 
information on nanotechnology for non-experts, for instance, if these non-experts 
were involved in creating regulation.  
Human health aspects and environmental performance were the areas that the 
researchers pointed out to be of highest relevance. With regards to public acceptance, 
the researchers were asked to provide a vision of nanotechnology development until 
the year 2015, issues such as fraud, ethical concerns, and clarification of health risks 
were mentioned on several occasions. However, concerns about accessibility were 
considered “to deserve only more or less attention” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 31). 
Nanologue points out, that the researchers did not differ substantially in their opinions 
and that the most common statements referred to:  
• Environmental risks (eco-toxicity) and environmental opportunities 
(resource efficiency gains); 
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• Human health risks (toxicity) and opportunities (disease treatment and 
diagnostics); 
• Parallels to the GM-debate (Nanologue, 2006, p. 35). 
The table below summarises the main findings of the selected areas and the 
researchers’ overall perceptions.  
Area Researcher's perceptions 
Environmental 
performance 
Nanotechnologies would eventually contribute:  
• to improvements in the overall environmental performance due to eco-
efficiency gains,  
• miniaturisation effects or enhanced mechanical properties as well as 
through NT-based environment technology applications, e.g. testing and 
monitoring systems.  
The overall impact of nanotechnologies was seen positive, but the potential 
eco-toxicity was perceived as a risk. 
Human health 
This was perceived as one of the most important ELSAs and benefits were 
expected to appear in the areas of: 
• medical diagnosis and treatment  
• improved food safety and water treatment  
Potential drawbacks were risks of misinterpretation of diagnostic data and 
the possible wrong treatment of diseases (this, however, is not 
nanotechnology specific) . Other risks were mentioned in connection with 
free nanoparticles. Lab-on-the-chip (LOC) developments were considered 
as being one of the most relevant ELSA. 
Access 
Access was only considered to be an issue of medium relevance. 
Sophisticated nanotechnology developments were expected to be limited 
to the most advanced industrial nations. The access and abuse of 
nanotechnologies by either criminals or political regimes was not 
mentioned by any of the interviewees. 
Acceptance 
All researchers felt that public acceptance of nanotechnology to be crucial 
for the development of nanotechnologies and that it is a risk in itself. Some 
even regarded it as being more important than potential risks themselves. 
It is expected that public acceptance will depend on the availability of 
applications and their practical use, i.e. using nanotechnologies in 
consumer goods or as part of medical treatment will have better 
perception than in other areas.  
Table 15: General perception of researchers for four selected areas  
However, one area was left out of the ELSAs altogether: the use of nanotechnologies in 
military applications. The reasoning behind this was that this area employs different 
measures of what is social and ethical. Moreover, it was acknowledged that this area 
has other incentives and priorities.  
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The opinions of the members of civil society differed to that of the researchers, 
althoughnot in areas one would expect. When the members of civil society were asked 
which of the ELSAs or risks debated by the media were most relevant, the participants 
listed risks three times more than potential benefits.34 One explanation for this was 
that discussions about the benefits of nanotechnology happen mostly in business-to-
business (B2B) relationships, yet this often does not reach the public. The media, on 
the other hand, was seen as mostly reporting about the risks.  
Area Perceptions of members of civil society 
Environmental 
performance 
Potential benefits were seen in:  
• improvements in nano-filtration of water,  
• improved energy storage and transfer. 
Eco-toxicity was seen as the most pressing risk, however less agreement 
was found with the following statement “nano-materials present an eco-
toxicological risk, in particular in the disposal phase.” 
Human health 
The participants agreed that nanotechnology applications will 
• enhance human health through earlier disease detection and  
• better-targeted application of treatment. 
A third of the participants were concern over toxicity, nanotechnology as 
an occupational hazard and the use in food. 
Access 
The most prominent risks mentioned here were:  
• nanodivide35,  
• the use of patents,  
• corporate power and economic disruption. 
Acceptance 
It was noted that there is a potential risks associated with media coverage 
of nanotechnology related threats, ‘grey goo’ and the vision of 
nanotechnology destroying the world (admittedly,  
the interviewees pointed out that these assumptions were not based on 
sound science). 
Also, the “majority of interviewees were also more or less sure that there 
would be a public backlash against the use of nanomaterials in areas such 
as food and medicine” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 41).  
Table 16: General perception of members of civil society for four selected areas  
A comparison between the two tables shows that the researchers and the members of 
civil society more or less agreed on the first two areas; environmental performance 
and human health. However, considering that there was less agreement amongst the 
                                                     
34 Nanologue, however, admits that this may have been triggered by the way the unprompted question 
was framed (Nanologue (2006). 
35 In this context, Nanologue uses the term nanodivide as a collective term to cover a number of 
concerns. Nanodivide has scored as highly likely to be an issue by 2015 and includes: 
• Concentration of power and access to nanotechnologies (i.e. cost of medical treatments);  
• Access and equal distribution of the technology globally; 
• Access within society or between societies (Nanologue, 2006, p. 48). 
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members of civil society on the potential of nanomaterials posing an eco-toxicological 
risk, and that only a third were concerned about the human health risk, the 
researchers seemed to be a little more concerned in these two areas. Although 
Nanologue did not provide any reasons for this, as the thesis will show later, both prior 
and acquired knowledge by the researchers are likely to be contributing factors. The 
third area, access, showed the most prominent division between these two groups. 
Whereby the researchers considered this to be of (only) medium relevance, their 
concerns seemed to focus more on abuse or misuse by criminals or regimes. Members 
of civil society had a different take on the subject, and were mostly concerned with the 
nanodivide (that is, a potential gaps between people who have and who do not have 
access to nanotechnology), and restrictions that come with the use of patents and 
corporate power. Although there was agreement in terms of the expected result, 
public acceptance was viewed differently with regards to the 'why' and 'how'. The 
researchers assumed that, with increasing availability of potential useful products, the 
public will come to accept nanotechnology and see it as a benefit. The participants of 
the civil society, however, argued that the media coverage is negative per se (see 
Chapter 6.3.2.2) and hence assumed that there would be a public backlash.  
5.2.2 Areas of concern as highlighted by the members of civil society 
As the members of the civil society were not just mere members of the ‘ordinary’ 
public, but rather a mix of professionals who work in areas related to nanotechnology, 
a number of their viewpoints require further attention. It is important to make a 
distinction here, as the members of civil society are not only giving their own opinions 
on areas of concern, but also provide an opinion about how they perceive the public 
think about them. The following provides an overview of what these areas of concern 
are.  It will not only show which areas are considered to be important in the future, but 
also the areas which are perceived to require the most urgent action, whether 
attention to some of the issues will increase or decrease and which issues the public 
views as important. 
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When asked how much attention any of the ELSAs deserve, the members of civil 
society answered as follows (see figure below):  
 
Figure 13: ELSA priorities of interviewees (Nanologue, 2006, p. 42) 
Human health scored the highest, followed by environmental performance and public 
acceptance. The area of access scored the lowest. This is interesting, because when 
asked which of the ELSAs require the most urgent actions, the members of civil society 
did not mention public acceptance at all.  
 
Figure 14: ELSA of civil society (Nanologue, 2006, p. 42) 
Access was also seen as a concern of only medium importance (see figure above). In 
fact, Nanologue itself argued that there were disagreements as to whether society 
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should be concerned with area of access (and liability and regulation). Human health 
and environmental performance are considered to be the two areas that not only 
require the most urgent action but are also expected to gain the highest levels of 
attention in the future. Public acceptance is also perceived to be an area that deserves 
more attention, but is has not been listed as an area that requires urgent action. 
However, this is also due to how Nanologue has collected the data; the participants 
could only choose between the six options provided (environmental performance, 
human health, privacy, access, liability, regulation). No information was given as to 
why acceptance was not on this particular questionnaire. This is unfortunate, as its 
inclusion would have allowed better insight into whether public acceptance is an area 
requiring urgent action and it would have allowed for better comparisons with the 
answers provided to the other questions. 
When the members of civil society were asked which area is most likely to receive 
more, less or the same amount of attention in the future, the areas of public 
acceptance, however, scored higher than environmental performance, which was on 
par with access (see figure below). In fact, public acceptance was seen as the second 
most important concern after human health; scoring slightly higher than 
environmental performance.  
 
Figure 15: Will attention increase, decrease or remain the same? (Nanologue, 2006, p. 43)  
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Unfortunately, Nanologue does not provide any further insight as to whether the 
members of civil society see public acceptance as an important issue because of their 
prior knowledge of nanotechnology or whether the members of civil society see public 
acceptance as an issue because they assume that, in the future, the public will see this 
as an issue.  
Finally, when the members of civil society were asked how they rated the general 
public’s level of attention, the results were as follows (see figure below): 
 
Figure 16: The general public's level of attention, as rated by the members of civil society (Nanologue, 2006, p. 
43) 
This figure requires some explanation. One can see that the area in which the 
participants scored most with less (meaning it is likely that there will be less attention 
in the general public) is the area of access. This is due to the fact that the participants 
were “not happy to answer this question as they felt that public level of knowledge was 
generally poor. However, there does seem to be some differentiation with most 
interviewees marking the level of knowledge on Access lower” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 
43). Similarly, public acceptance did not score particularly well. This begs the question 
regarding what impact the members of the civil society’s prior knowledge had on these 
results. According to these results, the members of the civil society see environmental 
performance and human health as the two main areas where to which the public will 
pay attention, followed by privacy concerns. 
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To summarise: environmental performance, human health, and public access are the 
three main areas that stand out. Despite the unfortunate omission of public 
acceptance from one of the questionnaires, these three areas are seen at the forefront 
of required actions as well as current and future attention. However, due to the 
composition of this group, these members of the civil society should not be confused 
with the general public. There is no doubt that they cannot be classified or described 
as experts. Nonetheless, their prior knowledge of the subject matter may have played 
a larger role than Nanologue either expected or declared.  
5.2.3 Recommendations and recommended actions 
Nanologue points out that although all participants had a general awareness of certain 
ELSA of nanotechnologies, discussions concentrated more on risks than benefits. 
Amongst both groups, researchers and members of the civil society, there was 
consensus on concerns with regards to potential impacts of nanoparticles on the 
environment and human health, and that there is little known about the life cycle of 
nanoparticles yet and more is to be learnt about the ‘end of life impacts’. On a positive 
note, there was a general expectation that nanotechnologies can potentially positively 
impact efficiency in material and energy use leading to a potentially positive economic 
benefit. However, with regard to public awareness, Nanologue concluded that it 
recognised that the information on ELSA is neither comprehensive nor centralised and 
that public awareness is low. Moreover, although there was agreement of the 
importance of discussing ELSAs, there were doubts about what is needed in the public 
domain, or in other words, what is needed to better inform/involve the public. This, at 
least to a certain extent, explains why there was an assumption that “a public backlash 
is almost inevitable” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 58). This goes hand-in-hand with the fact 
that transparency and the need for the business to share as much information as 
possible were strongly seen as being important. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, there 
was little agreement either within or between the researchers and members of civil 
society about the need for new regulation.  
Following the interviews, workshop and interpretation of results, there are a number 
of recommendations Nanologue makes. First, there seems to be a need to stress that 
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the risks of nanotechnology are often ‘lumped together’ (instead of discussing them 
domain specific) when discussing nanotechnology-related risk in public. This seems to 
be the main cause for the assumption that a public backlash is very likely. Thus, 
Nanologue stresses, “*t]he debate of risk often does not differentiate between 
applications” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 73). However, this does not seem to be limited to 
public discussions: “not only the general public, but also other non-expert decision-
makers in politics, business and society might also mix things up” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 
74). Therefore, the recommendation is that dialogue and communication need to be 
context or application specific. The next area touched upon is transparency:  
Whilst there is a danger that too much information could lead to confusion or 
disengagement from the issue, there is a far greater danger that a lack of 
transparency will result in a lack of empowerment and a backlash from the 
public. The discussion on GM raised serious questions mainly but not 
exclusively about corporate transparency in particular, and this must be 
overcome (Nanologue, 2006, p. 73). 
Especially the reference to GMO echoes concerns of other research undertaken, for 
instance, by Kahan et al. (2007).  As the results have shown, there seems to be a large 
amount of information ‘out there’, but not all is accessible, nor is it available in a 
central place. “Making this information available at the internet is an obvious choice, 
since the interviews showed that both target groups use it as a prime information 
source” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 76). One of the direct results of this is the lack of 
knowledge of both nanotechnology itself and the ELSAs of nanotechnology. Nanologue 
concludes that “*l+ack of knowledge about nanotechnologies as well as ELSA of NT-
applications can not only be attributed to the complexity or novelty of the subject“ 
(Nanologue, 2006, p. 76).  
There are a number of additional raw data items in Nanologue’s study that are of 
special interest to this thesis. In their appendix, Nanologue provides a full list of 
recommendations that go beyond what has been discussed above. Selected 
recommendations that are particularly of interest are listed below: 
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• The education system needs to be updated to integrate the discussions around 
science and society, cost / benefit. Critical thinking introduced into all levels of 
education. (Obviously this is not unique to NT) 
• Trans-disciplinary education of Natural / social scientists 
• In corporate science there needs to be close co-ordination between those 
responsible for ELSA at board level and the technicians. 
• Information about new tech e.g. NT should be available at schools even at early 
levels (Nanologue, 2006, p. 117).  
Furthermore, what became clear is that a distinction between nanotechnology experts 
and experts of ELSA (of nanotechnology) needs to be made. Most researchers in 
Nanologue’s study were not comfortable with ELSAs of nanotechnology and indicated 
that they lacked an overview of the subject matter that is ELSA. Nanologue also 
expressed that there was some concern about the experts who declined to attend, 
although it was stated that prior knowledge of ELSA is not required. Also, a clear 
distinction can be made as to how the experts and the participants of civil society 
informed themselves about the subject matter. The researchers mostly used 
conferences, contact with other researchers, scientific publications and research 
projects; the members of civil society mainly used the Internet, then research projects, 
conferences and contact with governments/authorities. Although this already indicates 
a differentiation between how these two distinct groups inform themselves, again, the 
results from the members of civil society do not seem to represent the public as a 
whole. Their prior exposure to the subject matter clearly played an influential role 
here. Other communication channels were also mentioned, although in lower numbers 
that could be expected from representatives of the public, namely the media, NGOs 
and contact with the industry.  
5.3 Summary 
The main aim of this chapter was to review, filter out and select data that can be used 
for analysis purposes. It has identified the currently perceived risks by both experts 
and non-experts. Furthermore, as Nanologue’s research is the most comprehensive 
carried out to date, it also provides detailed recommendations and recommended 
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actions to address the identified risk. The available data was comprehensive and 
provided more than sufficient insights for the purposes of this research. The data will 
be analysed and compared to the knowledge framework in the next chapter.  
However, Nanologue’s study also revealed a paradox. Nanologue argue that they 
‘widened’ the interpretation of what members of the civil society are for the purposes 
of their research, by including those “who are involved or interested in understanding, 
marketing, regulating, monitoring, writing about nanotechnologies...” (Nanologue, 
2006, p. 8). Here, questions needs to be asked whether this achieved the desired 
outcome. This is, because, one could argue that by including those who are involved or 
interested in marketing, monitoring or writing about nanotechnologies actually do not 
represent the ‘average’ member of the public. When comparing a number of 
responses from studies carried out by other researchers, such as Kahan et al. (2007, 
2008) and Currall et al. (2006) to the findings of Nanologue in areas such as public 
awareness of nanotechnology and related risks, then it does not come as a surprise 
that Nanologue’s findings of what ‘their’ members of civil society knew about 
nanotechnology was above average. Although Nanologue clearly stated they expected 
to see better results than they might have received from a “more traditional group of 
representatives from civil society” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 7), the questions remains 
whether the study would have not yielded more accurate results, if they had decided 
on average members of civil society that did not have an expressed interest or 
involvement in nanotechnology. Nevertheless, Nanologue’s approach to civil society 
has one, perhaps unexpected, benefit; the members of civil society they had chosen 
represent a new group that had not been investigated before: people with some prior 
knowledge, or better said, with descriptive knowledge of nanotechnology. They are 
not experts; that is, they do not belong to the groups of people that have knowledge 
by acquaintance, but also do not belong to the group that have no knowledge (the 
majority of people interviewed in other surveys, such as those of Kahan et al. (2007, 
2008) and Currall et al. (2006)).    
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6. Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
Taking the aforementioned complexities that are inherent in new and emerging, and at 
the same time often converging, technologies and stripping them down to the 
required and available sets of knowledge allows a closer view into the idiosyncrasies 
that come with those forms of domain-specific knowledge intensity. Such a view is 
required in order to understand better the problems and risks that are, or can be, 
associated with new technologies of increasingly complex nature. Therefore, a 
knowledge framework has been established and will be applied to both the 
nanotechnology case (Chapter 4) and the qualitative data provided by Nanologue 
(Chapter5). This framework covers the various types of knowledge that have been 
discussed in Chapter 3, that is, knowledge by acquaintance and tacit knowledge vs. 
knowledge by description and explicit knowledge as well as policy knowledge. Their 
subsequent application to the nanotech case and to the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 
aims to identify issues not only with regards to the policy recommendations made, but 
also with regards to involving the public in an open discourse about nanotechnology. 
The goal is to validate the importance and applicability of these types of knowledge in 
an analytical framework that is able to deal with complex, but more importantly, with 
knowledge-intensive subject matters.  
Following the introduction of their findings, the knowledge framework is used to 
assess a number of Nanologue’s suggestions in regard to policy-making and 
recommendations that focus on dealing with the public. In addition to assessing 
Nanologue’s recommendations, recommendations of other studies are assessed as 
well in order to get a better overall picture of the quality of recommendations 
currently being made with regards to nanotechnology research and its wider 
implications. As part of this critique of current policy recommendations and 
recommendations on how to better involve the public, two alternative options will be 
introduced and discussed. 
P a g e  | 178 
6.2 Applying the knowledge framework to different knowledge types 
First, knowledge by acquaintance is discussed and applied against the nanotechnology 
context followed by tacit knowledge, knowledge by description, explicit knowledge 
and then policy knowledge and information. The reason for this particular order is that 
both knowledge by acquaintance and tacit knowledge are not only very similar, but 
they can also be classified as direct knowledge. The very generic term of expert 
knowledge is an example of direct knowledge. Knowledge by description and explicit 
knowledge can be classified as indirect knowledge, and thus the knowledge that is 
mostly available to non-experts or laypersons. The aim of this analysis is to identify the 
nature of these knowledge types when viewed from a nanotechnology perspective, 
what attributes they have and also what limitations with regards to their user base, 
and when it comes to communicating them, to their potential target bases.  
6.2.1 Knowledge by acquaintance 
In the context of nanotechnology, and, particularly, in the context of the example of 
nanoscale silver particles as shown in Chapter 4.7, knowledge by acquaintance refers 
to knowledge that has been directly acquired through first-hand and thus direct 
exposure to the subject matter (see also Table 5). A researcher working on specific 
nanotechnology problems can be identified as having knowledge by acquaintance. For 
instance, Oberdörster et al. investigated the impacts of the exposure of water fleas 
(Daphnia magna) to nano-iron particles (Oberdörster, Stone, & Donaldson, 2007). This 
direct experience not only led to knowledge by acquaintance but was also based on 
existing tacit knowledge. As a result, while supposing that the general conditions as 
laid out in Chapter 3.4 have been met, Oberdörster et al. gained acquired expertise in 
the area of toxicology of nano-sized particles. Similarly, Babu et al. have investigated 
the effects of nanosilver on cell division and its potential damage to genetic material 
(Babu, Deepa, Shankar, & Rai, 2008). As a result of this study, Babu et al. now possess 
acquired knowledge (and in this case, the evidence) of the potential genotoxicology36 
of nanoscale silver particles on plants. Guo et al. investigated the growths of Boron 
rich nanowires and by doing so acquired first-hand knowledge on the synthesis of 
                                                     
36 The term genotoxic means ‘damaging the DNA’, thus potentially leading to mutations and cancer.  
Genotoxicity describes the toxicity of agents or materials that have the potential to damage DNA.  
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nanomaterials (Guo, Singh, & Kleebe, 2006). Maynard (2006), Scheringer (2007), 
Scheufele et al. (2008), and Gatti and Montanari (2008) investigated the potential 
risks, health and environmental impacts of nanotechnology as a whole and/or of 
nanoscale particles in particular and therefore it can be assumed that these authors 
have directly acquired knowledge in one or more relevant areas as well.   
What are the limits to knowledge by acquaintance? In a practical context, there are no 
limits. The limits, however, will start to show when it comes to retaining and, most 
importantly, updating the acquired knowledge. The most important question remains 
who can acquire what? Can a layperson acquire direct knowledge about 
nanotechnology, or to use one of the above examples, can a layperson acquire direct 
knowledge about the synthesis of nanomaterials, or the toxicological impacts of 
nanoscale materials on plant or animal life? In theory, yes, in practice, it is rather 
unlikely. In order to do so, a layperson would not only have to complete full scientific 
academic training, but then also specialise in the area of nanotechnology. If this were 
to happen, the layperson would not be a layperson any longer and, thus, be 
disqualified from the group of laypersons. In fact, the (former) layperson would very 
likely to become an expert in that chosen area. In this respect, every expert once was a 
layperson. What has changed is the acquisition of domain-specific knowledge and it is 
exactly that which has distinguished him/her from the laypersons. Table 13 shows who 
can possess knowledge by acquaintance and what lies outside this type of knowledge. 
6.2.2 Tacit knowledge 
Similar to knowledge by acquaintance, possessing tacit knowledge supposes direct 
contact to a specific subject matter. In addition, however, tacit knowledge 
accommodates human traits such as intuition and inference based on previous direct 
knowledge and observation. For instance, when Babu et al. suggest that their current 
findings “raise the need for elaborate evaluations to ensure the safety of nano-silver” 
(Babu, Deepa, Shankar, & Rai, 2008), then this can be attributed to the employment of 
tacit knowledge. It was due to their experiments that Babu et al. (2008) confirmed 
(what many others suspected) that nanosilver can be toxic, and in this instance, 
genotoxic to plant cells. Only by combining tacit knowledge with the recently directly 
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acquired knowledge, were Babu et al. (2008) able to formulate additional research 
goals. In this case, it is the need to elaborate on the evaluations of the behaviour of 
nanosilver particles.  
What are the limits to tacit knowledge in this context? First of all, everything that lies 
outside the domain specificity of the knower. Although this may seem obvious, in the 
case of Babu et al. (2008) it is actually fairly complex. In the context of their research 
project, the domain specificity lies within the ability to conduct laboratory experiments 
and to interpret results, and in the ability to understand and evaluate toxicological 
investigations. The researchers conducted an experiment by using the commonly 
known garden onion (Allium cepa), and, after germination, the roots were treated with 
varying concentrations of nanosilver. The subsequent investigation of the varying 
chromosome preparations followed procedures that are commonly accepted in 
science practice, for instance, by using “techniques [that] had been developed for the 
detection of environmental mutagens” (Babu, Deepa, Shankar, & Rai, 2008). Although 
the research conducted by Babu et al. was not nanotechnology research per se, that is, 
research that investigates properties or functions of nanoscale materials, the point of 
the research was to investigate risks that potentially may arise with regards to 
nanosilver particles. It was the tacit knowledge that the researchers possessed that led 
them to formulate statements, such as, current “*s]tudies to justify the safety of nano 
particles in living systems are inadequate” (Babu, Deepa, Shankar, & Rai, 2008), which 
in turn justified the reasons for conducting the research in the first place.  
The tacit element of their study is therefore two-fold: Firstly, the scientist must have 
acquired the techniques to conduct the experiments and then perfected it by means of 
deliberate practice (see Chapter 3.3.1). The second element is that of the 
interpretation of the results. Without having prior and acquired knowledge of both 
laboratory experimentation techniques and domain-specific deduction skills, the 
formulation of the research question or hypothesis – in this case, whether the 
exposure of onions to nanosilver particles will lead to changes at a cellular level – 
would have not been possible. In addition to the evaluation of tens of thousands of 
cells and the subsequent statistical analysis, it was the researcher’s tacit knowledge 
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that allowed for the conclusion to be formed. The commonly known phrase ‘you had 
to be there’ perfectly describes the use of the tacit knowledge in this context and its 
implication when it comes to making recommendations.   
6.2.3 Knowledge by description 
To reiterate, knowledge by description refers to knowledge that can be obtained 
indirectly, without having to directly acquire it. Often this refers to factual information 
that can be obtained by the expert and layperson alike. One of the main problems with 
knowledge by description is that if it is not constantly being updated, it can easily lose 
its value and even become dangerously wrong. In the context of nanosilver, knowledge 
by description can be a number of things. For instance, anyone who has read Babu et 
al. (2008) now knows that onions treated with nanosilver show genotoxic effects. 
What is more, anyone reading a different article that reports on the experiments 
conducted by Babu et al. (2008) now know about the genotoxicity of nanosilver. What 
the receiver or the holder of this descriptive knowledge does not know is under which 
conditions this genotoxicity may pose a problem in the real world; that is, outside the 
laboratory. For this to happen, any reader of the article in which Babu et al. (2008) 
describe their experiments must have sufficient scientific knowledge to, first and 
foremost, understand the research and then, secondly, to put the research in context. 
If this were the case, then the holder of this knowledge would not only possess 
knowledge by description, but also knowledge by acquaintance.  
The danger of only possessing knowledge by description, and that applies to the 
majority of people who are not experts, is when this particular type of knowledge is 
used to make recommendations, and, as mentioned before, when the descriptive 
knowledge is not being updated. Babu et al. (2008) investigated the effects of 
nanosilver on cell division in onions. And although Babu et al. (2008) have shown the 
potential genotoxicity of nanosilver in onions, this is not to say that this applies to all 
plant life, nor does it say anything about the impacts on animals or humans. Therefore, 
recommendations at this stage have to be limited until further evidence is produced.  
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6.2.4 Explicit knowledge 
Explicit knowledge is the most indirect form of knowledge, and often equates to 
attributes of pure information (which, in turn, is nothing else than data that has been 
enriched by meaning). To reiterate, M. Polanyi (2000) referred to explicit knowledge as 
being everything that has or can be clearly stated. In the case of nanotechnology, or 
the example of nanosilver, the limits of explicit knowledge become very apparent. 
When looking at clear statements that describe nanotechnology in the sense of what 
can explicitly be known by laypersons and experts alike, one is mostly limited to its 
definitions, the descriptions of areas involved and high-level descriptions of current 
and future research. Although the study of Babu et al. is ‘out there for everyone to 
find’, to use another definition of explicit knowledge (Bock 2000), it should be 
reiterated that knowledge is only what is also understood (Lyre, 2002). It cannot be 
expected that a layperson understands the “Effect of Nano-Silver on Cell Division and 
Mitotic Chromosomes” (Babu, Deepa, Shankar, & Rai, 2008). Therefore, and although 
Bock’s definition of explicit knowledge has been met, explicit knowledge in the sense 
of knowledge-intensive research remains expertise dependent for as long as parts of 
the audience to whom this type of knowledge is accessible has no means of evaluating 
or using it.  
Both knowledge by description and explicit knowledge have one main downside; and 
that is, even if they are available, they require a certain amount of prior knowledge to 
add value to the non-expert, unless pure information gathering is the main aim of the 
use of these types of knowledge. The implications of this are shown in the analysis of 
Moe’s approach and the use of external experts (see Chapter 6.4.)  
In other words, laypersons require the help of expert knowledge holders to 
understand things that go beyond mere factual knowledge or headline information. 
Laypersons are able to pick up on the fact that nanosilver ‘is not good’ when exposed 
to onions, but the reasons why will elude them without possessing prior in-depth 
scientific knowledge. Furthermore, Babu et al. (2008) have conducted their 
experiments only with ordinary garden onions. Can one now conclude that the same 
result will apply to red onions (Allium atrorubens), shallots (Allium oschaninii) or garlic 
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(Allium sativum)? Although normally science needs to provide the proof to confirm 
such a statement, who is to say that every layperson, or the media for that matter, will 
adhere to scientific principle? This, in summary, describes another danger of both 
knowledge by description and explicit knowledge; that is, they often become limited to 
headline only information, although actually based on acquired knowledge. The 
problem is that without context, mere headline information has the potential to do 
more harm than good.    
6.2.5 Policy Knowledge and Information 
P.M. Haas (2004) argues that policy information and knowledge must be usable 
knowledge, that is, knowledge that can be used directly by policy-makers and 
politicians. In the same vein, Straf (2001) points out that it must be objective and 
based on evidence. In the case of nanosilver, usable knowledge for policy-makers and 
politicians is only knowledge and information that they are able to understand and use 
directly. Therefore, policy information behaves is a similar way to the characteristics of 
descriptive knowledge (Chapter6.2.3). As Lyre (2002) described by his sender-receiver 
analysis, information not only requires a sender, but also a receiver, who in turn, needs 
to understand the information. By using Babu et al. (2008) as an example, any policy-
maker or politician who would read this research could know that onions treated with 
nanosilver show genotoxic effects. Similarly, any policy-maker or politician reading a 
different article that reports on the experiments conducted by Babu et al. (2008) 
would now know about the genotoxicity of nanosilver.  
Also, similarly to descriptive knowledge, what the reader does not know is under which 
conditions this genotoxicity may pose a problem in the real world; that is, outside the 
laboratory. For this to happen, any reader of the article in which Babu et al. (2008) 
describe their experiments must have sufficient scientific knowledge to, first and 
foremost, understand the research and then, secondly, to put the research in context. 
Furthermore, there is now also a danger of only possessing descriptive knowledge. The 
negative aspects have been described in the analysis of descriptive knowledge 
(Chapter 6.2.3), that is, if this type of knowledge is used in order to make 
recommendations, and when/if this type of knowledge is not being updated. Although 
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the potential genotoxicity of nanosilver in onions has been shown, nothing has been 
said whether that also applies to all plant life. Therefore, in order to make 
recommendations at this stage, further research evidence would have to be reviewed 
(in the case of nanosilver, it would have to be produced first, due to the novelty of the 
subject matter), and then accumulated and summarised in a wider body of knowledge.  
When looking back at both P.M. Haas’ and Straf’s definitions of policy information, it 
becomes clear that pure scientific data, such as the aforementioned research 
publications by Oberdörster et al. (2007) or Babu et al. (2008), is not policy 
information. In other words, any detailed knowledge of the properties of nanoscale 
silver particles, their behaviour and reactions with other elements etc. is not policy 
information. This, then, also means that policy information must differ from both 
knowledge by acquaintance and tacit knowledge. That is, however, not to say that 
holders of both acquired knowledge and tacit knowledge cannot be part of the policy 
process. Quite the contrary, as experts, for instance, they can provide expert 
testimony to a wider policy audience for as long as their expertise is accepted as a 
contributing form of authoritative knowledge that is accepted by all involved (see also 
Chapter 6.3.2.1 – Options 1 and 2).   
6.2.6 Comparing knowledge types 
After comparing the five different knowledge types and establishing what can be 
known by whom and what cannot, the knowledge framework will now be used to 
determine how this translates to nanotechnology knowledge and to knowledge of 
nanotechnology risks. As it has been established in chapter 3, a number of the 
interviewed researchers felt uncomfortable answering questions about the 
environmental, social and legal aspects of nanotechnology, although all of the 
interviewed researchers were actively involved in nanotechnology research. By being 
scientists or technologist working on nanotechnology, but not on associated risks, a 
very distinct line is drawn with regards to acquired knowledge. In the case provided by 
Nanologue, researchers were nanotechnology experts, but not experts on 
nanotechnology risk.  However, as the results presented in chapter 5 have also shown, 
the majority of researchers had an understanding of nanotechnology risk or ELSAs. In 
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these instances, researchers also had descriptive knowledge of nanotechnology risk. 
Similarly, the civil society representatives also had somewhat of an understanding on 
nanotechnology risk due to their prior exposure to the subject matter. They were, 
however, not experts and had, therefore, no acquired expertise. If they did have 
acquired nanotechnology expertise, they should have been disqualified from the group 
of members of the civil society and should have been part of the expert group. When 
comparing these findings to the studies undertaken by other researchers with respect 
to public understanding and perceptions of nanotechnology, such as Currall et al. 
(2007) Kahan et al. (2007,2008) and others, then one can conclude that the public may 
have descriptive knowledge, if they have been exposed to it, but will not have any 
acquired knowledge. The table below provides a summary overview: 
Knowledge type Expert Member of civil 
society 
Public 
NT NT risks NT NT risks NT NT risks 
Knowledge by 
acquaintance 
Must have Can have Cannot 
have 
Cannot 
have 
Cannot 
have 
Cannot 
have 
Knowledge by 
description 
Must have Can have Can have Can have Can have Can have 
Tacit knowledge Must have Can have Cannot 
have 
Cannot 
have 
Cannot 
have 
Cannot 
have 
Explicit 
knowledge 
Must have Can have Can have Can have Can have Can have 
Policy knowledge Can have Can have Can have Can have Can have Can have 
Table 17: Comparing knowledge types 
In this table, ‘must have’ refers to knowledge that is a given if the knowledge holder is 
to qualify for this particular group. For instance, in order to be an expert, a person 
must have acquired knowledge in at least one domain; for instance, nanotechnology. 
The risks of nanotechnology are, however, separate domains. ‘Can have’ refers to 
knowledge that a person is able to have or obtain, but is not a pre-requisite. For 
instance, a nanotechnology expert can have usable policy knowledge, but it is neither 
required nor is it outside the expert’s ability. All that is said here, is that it is possible. 
‘Cannot have’ refers to instances where holding this knowledge is outside the person’s 
ability. For instance, if a member of the public has acquired the appropriate expertise, 
they will be discounted from this group and will instead be associated with the expert 
group. 
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Alternatively, one could also look at this comparison in terms of extremes: the best 
possible scenario and the worst possible scenario. The table below provides an 
example for a best possible scenario, taking experts and public as well as three 
selected knowledge types into account. The selected subject matter is nanosilver. 
Knowledge type Researcher Public 
NT NT risks NT NT risks 
Knowledge by 
acquaintance 
Does have 
 
Example: 
Nanosilver 
Does have 
 
Example: 
Biomagnification 
of nanosilver 
Does not have Does not have 
Knowledge by 
description 
Does have 
 
Example: 
Nanosilver 
Does have 
 
Example: 
Biomagnification 
of nanosilver 
Does have 
 
Example: 
Nanosilver 
Does have 
 
Example: 
Biomagnification 
of nanosilver 
Policy knowledge Does have 
 
Example: 
Nanosilver 
properties and 
acceptable 
concentration 
levels 
Does have 
 
Example: reason 
why 
biomagnification 
requires action 
and what the 
results of inaction 
would be 
Does have 
 
Example:  
Nanosilver 
properties and 
acceptable 
concentration 
levels 
Does have 
 
Example: reason 
why 
biomagnification 
requires action 
and what the 
results of inaction 
would be 
Table 18: Best case scenario of available knowledge of nanosilver 
The above table differs from the previous one, as it does not intend to identify what 
can be known, without specifying whether a person actually does hold that knowledge. 
Instead, this table shows what a person does know while staying within the scope of 
the definitions of the respective knowledge types. In the example above, an expert of 
nanosilver is also an expert of the risks of nanosilver while also possessing sufficient 
usable policy knowledge. All that is being said here is that it is possible that an expert 
can be the holder of all three knowledge types while also being an expert in two 
domains: nanotechnology and the risks of nanotechnology. For the public, the 
situation is similar, with one exception. As the definition of an expert does not allow 
for it, a member of the public, who is by definition a non-expert, does not have 
knowledge by acquaintance of either nanotechnology or nanotechnology risks. 
However, this does not exclude the member of the public from having excellent 
descriptive knowledge and also usable knowledge for policy-making. Considering that 
the above example is an extremely unlikely scenario, questions need to be asked and 
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answered with regards to how expertise can be transferred, how usable information 
can be made available to the policy-maker and how the public can be included. The 
following chapter analyses the recommendations and recommended actions from the 
researchers and from the members of the civil society as well as those made by 
Nanologue. 
6.3 Applying the knowledge framework to policy recommendations 
Nanologue’s study of the ELSA of nanotechnology concluded with a number of 
significant findings. Two of them shall be reiterated here: First and foremost, it 
stresses that a distinction needs to be made between an expert in the area of 
nanotechnology and an expert in the field of the ELSA of nanotechnology. Secondly, 
both the attending researchers and the members of the civil society agreed that there 
is too much negative headline information out there. None of that, however, is 
surprising when applying the knowledge framework (see Chapter 3.6). 
This section aims to apply the knowledge framework introduced in Chapter 3.6 to a 
number of policy recommendations made in research and publications that have been 
used in previous chapters. The main aim is to investigate whether the policy 
recommendations, when tested against the knowledge framework, are as viable as the 
authors assume, and, if not, to introduce alternative recommendations that can be 
formed based on the research conducted.  Before going into detail, a quick discussion 
will highlight what the problems of policy recommendations are and what their 
purpose is.   
Majone argues that “policy problems are not textbook quizzes, they carry no guarantee 
that there always exist correct solutions against which analytic conclusions may be 
checked” (Majone, 1989, p. 65). The same needs to be said about policy 
recommendations. Haas and Springer (1998) suggest that although available 
information and outcomes of policy research carry weight within the realm of complex 
decision-making, the main aim remains to reduce uncertainty in public decisions, to 
increase clarity and consistency of decision makers’ understanding, to bring new 
perspectives and understanding of public problems and responses as well as to 
improve the quality of public debate (Haas & Springer, 1998). Moreover, this needs to 
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be put into context when then looking at what policy information is and how actors 
behave around it in different circumstances, that is, an actor’s dependency on the 
extent of their familiarity with a particular policy problem. 
In the case of nanotechnology, and for that matter, any other new and just emerging 
technically complex subject matter, the likelihood that policy-makers or politicians are 
familiar with it is very small. As Oh and Rich (1996) pointed out, policy-makers tend to 
behave differently when confronted with an unfamiliar policy problem. Instead of 
using their ‘normal’ and familiar information sources and agencies, policy-makers are 
forced to look beyond their familiar circles in order to get the information required. 
One of the direct results of this is that policy-makers, therefore, not only use much 
more information than normal in order to mitigate their unfamiliarity, but also 
potentially stray from their expected policy-decisions. Unlike with familiar policy-
problems, which in turn, often “reinforce decision-makers’ positions on the problems” 
(Oh & Rich, 1996, p. 12), unfamiliarity increases the information need.    
6.3.1 Recommended actions and recommendations - Nanologue 
The Nanologue group lists several actions as being recommended by the participating 
researcher and the members of civil society as well as generic and specific 
recommendations. In addition to Nanologue’s recommendations, two particular types 
of recommended actions shall be tested in more detail:  
 information and educational campaigns aimed at the public,  
 actions for governments. 
 
6.3.1.1 Recommended actions by researchers  
Information and educational campaigns aimed at the public are a growing concern 
amongst scientists, Nanologue reports. Although there was general agreement about 
the importance of these campaigns, there was concern about conflicting messages 
that, in the long term, may do more harm than help. Furthermore, the complexity 
inherent in knowledge-intensive technologies, such as nanotechnology, comes at a 
price. The researchers argued that “to be understood by the general public information 
campaigns require a simplification of content, which in itself may cause a problem 
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given the complexity of NT” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 62). Further issues mentioned in this 
regard were as follows: the public may not even realise which products have been 
enhanced through the use of nanotechnology; the choice of information channels is a 
challenge in itself, as “information is always considered not sufficient. The challenge is 
to choose the right communication channel to assure that important and balanced 
information is perceived” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 63). Another action point mentioned by 
several experts was that “the responsibility to inform the public lied with public science 
and industry that should more actively present their findings on conferences and work 
closely with media” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 63).   
Actions for three additional groups, namely journalists, workers, governments and 
policy-makers, were listed specifically. Journalists were perceived as information 
gatekeepers and, therefore, the education of journalists must play an important role: 
“If journalists don’t feel comfortable with the topic, how can we expect the media 
coverage about NT to be positive?” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 63) was a question asked by 
one particular researcher. The role of the workers needs to be highlighted in 
information campaigns, as workers may potentially be exposed to nano-particles. 
Finally, and similarly to the case of journalists, government and decision-makers 
require education and political advisory on nanotechnology.  
Actions to be taken by government are the second point to be discussed. Here, four 
main categories have been identified by the researchers: provision of funding, 
monitoring/governance of research, information and market-based instruments. Two 
of them will be discussed further: funding and information. 
In addition to providing funding for both basic and application-based research, it was 
suggested that the role of governments should extend to “better steer research 
activities towards the most important issues, e.g. risk assessment of nanoparticles, 
recycling option for materials containing nano-particles, and encourage the formation 
of multidisciplinary teams comprising of researchers, technologists, legal experts, 
experts for public perception and ELSA, business developers and “to a certain degree” 
politicians” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 65). Another issue that has been highlighted by the 
researchers is the tendency to declare research as nanotechnology related in order to 
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increase the chance for funding, even though much of that research does not fall into 
the category. Here, as the researchers suggested, government must improve on 
monitoring funding mechanisms.  
With regards to information, the recommended action is that “governments should 
take a lead on public outreach and information about ELSA and NT and participate 
(again through funding) to structure and balance the public debate” (Nanologue, 2006, 
p. 65).  One suggestion mentioned was that administrators and politicians should stay 
informed about nanotechnology developments. However, due to the lack of specificity 
of what was meant by ‘information’, this recommendation falls short of what is was 
supposed to deliver. Once can assume that, when governments are asked to deliver 
information to the public, it refers to descriptive information. This is problematic for 
two reasons. Firstly, it contradicts current trends of corporate vs. public funding of 
nanotechnology (see Chapter 4.3). Corporate funding has already surpassed public 
funding. Without explaining how governments can obtain corporate knowledge, this 
recommendation is therefore limited to what governments can control via the funding 
they provided. And even here, it is not guaranteed that governments can actually 
function in that capacity due to a lack of expert knowledge. The knowledge framework 
has established what can be known by whom. Governments do not have their own 
nanotechnology experts and, least of all, experts in the health and environmental 
related risks. Here, the overall available body of knowledge on the subject matter also 
plays a role. As it has been shown, there is a profound lack of available expertise of the 
health and environmental impacts of nanotechnology (see Chapter 4.6). Secondly, this 
recommendation fails to provide insight into what instruments are to be used by 
governments to ‘balance’ the public debate. When compared to the findings by Kahan 
et al. (2007, 2008) and Currall et al. (2007), who have provided compelling evidence as 
to how public perception on nanotechnology is formed and influenced by the provision 
of additional information, then it needs to be said that the subject of informing the 
public is too complex a topic that could simply be addressed by suggesting that 
governments should perform this function. For this recommendation to be fruitful, 
more basic research into the understandings of public perceptions of nanotechnology 
is required. In addition to obtaining qualitative and quantitative data of public opinion, 
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there is also need to include theoretical work that establishes models based on values, 
norms, attitudes and other pre-dispositions the public may have. Thus, Currall argues 
that a better and deeper “understanding of predictors of public perceptions, scientists, 
policymakers and businesses will therefore be better positioned to anticipate trends 
that will dictate how the public reacts to new scientific developments and commercial 
products based on nanotechnology” (Currall, 2009, p. 80) is required. Unfortunately, 
such predictors were not established by the Nanologue study; also because of 
Nanologue’s substitution of public opinion with that of their selected group of 
members of civil society, which, in itself, limits the usability of the obtained data. 
Furthermore, Currall (2009) suggests that social scientists should translate “technical 
research findings into language that is directly useful to others”  (Currall, 2009, p. 80). 
This view, however, is quite different from what Nanologue suggest. 
6.3.1.2 Recommended actions by members of civil society  
Nanologue argues that in general, the actions recommended by members of civil 
society mainly focus on mitigating risks than on maximising the benefits of 
nanotechnology. Thus, the structure of recommended actions is somewhat different 
when compared to that of the researchers. The recommended actions that will be 
discussed here further are:  
 Addressing risks 
 Engaging scientists in a dialogue 
 Taking the dialogue to the public and framing the Information and education 
campaigns 
Number one action was the recommendation to prevent a nanodivide; that is, 
preventing an “increasing technological gap between developing and industrialised 
countries” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 23). Other concerns covered by the term nanodivide 
are: concentration of powers and access to nanotechnologies (for instance, by means 
of high costs of potential medical treatments) and access within and between societies 
(Nanologue, 2006). The actions call for NGOs and governments to “take a lead in 
initiating education on the issue and starting a public debate about the role of 
technology in our society” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 67). The second recommended action 
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within the risk category is on toxicity of nanotechnology and nanoparticles. In 
particular, information sharing on toxicity and the transparent sharing of knowledge by 
the business are recommended actions. The third and final point is to prevent a ‘nano-
bubble’: “Stakeholders involved in the development of and communication on 
nanotechnologies should beware of fuelling the “nano-hype” to an extent that causes 
unrealistic expectations of the technology from consumers” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 67). 
Here, the idea is to publicly discuss what nanotechnology can deliver in order to 
prevent social disappointment as well as financial risk.  
Taking into account that there is a general hesitancy amongst scientist towards 
supporting public engagement due to lack of time and support, the members of civic 
society proposed the following actions: 
 Engagement on and communication of ELSA should be a condition of all 
grants and there has to be a move “beyond publishing” to get away from 
just publish or perish. Those in management positions should also provide 
encouragement to staff to work on ELSA; 
 Ensure that scientists have training in media, communication and ethics; 
 There should be independent funding for ELSA communication and funding 
for dialogue between Government, business and wider society; 
 The science education system needs to be updated to integrate discussions 
around science and society (Nanologue, 2006, p. 69). 
The final point of recommended actions that will be discussed here is the dialogue with 
the public and the framing of information and education campaigns. Recommended 
actions are to train the public in popular science and science literacy in order to 
encourage public involvement in the dialogue.  Furthermore, it was suggested that it 
might help if practical aspects of nanotechnology are used to explain benefits for 
society. A main issue in this area, however, remains the correct use of mass media. In 
this regard, Nanologue argues, the correct framing of the issues plays a vital role. 
Again, focussing on the benefits of nanotechnology, for instance on specific problems 
and applications that have societal benefit, has been recommended as well as 
preventing the focus on risks. A positive example mentioned here was that of 
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sustainable development. “It is essential that this framework be used as early as 
possible in the development process” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 71) is the final 
recommended action from the group of members of civil society.   
6.3.1.3 Nanologue’s recommendations 
Nanologue recommends that there should be an ongoing discussion about the risk and 
benefits of nanotechnology that runs in parallel with technological advancements. This 
discussion should focus not on risks, but on a vision of using nanotechnology for 
sustainable development in order to maximise benefits and minimise risks. This vision 
should also aim to attract media attention and focus on technological potential. Then, 
contextualisation is required, as some of the currently advocated technologies are 
actually not nanotechnologies in the narrower sense. Thus a differentiation between 
‘real’ nanotechnologies and those that exist only under the mantle of nanotechnology 
(for instance, in order to attract funding) is required. Another aspect of 
contextualisation is to focus on what would benefit society: “We might not need NT-
golf balls, but we might need NT based energy systems or medical applications…” 
(Nanologue, 2006, p. 73). Similarly, contextualisation is required when it comes to 
assessing risks. Risks should be discussed for particular nanotechnologies, instead of 
being “lumped together as “risks of Nanotechnology” in the public discussion, making a 
public backlash more likely” (Nanologue, 2006, p. 73). The same applies to non-expert 
decision-makers in politics, business and society.  
While drawing on previous experience (for instance, in the areas of biotechnology or 
GMO), Nanologue recommends that any public dialogue needs to be as transparent 
and open as possible. “The discussion on GM raised serious questions mainly but not 
exclusively about corporate transparency in particular, and this must be overcome” 
(Nanologue, 2006, p. 74). At the same time, however, a public information overload 
should be avoided, as too much information could lead to confusion and 
disengagement and thus achieve the exact opposite of an open dialogue. As a final 
point with regards to open dialogue, Nanologue argues that there must be a clear 
distinction between fact and fiction in the public debate. Hence, there is a need to 
stress the current state of R&D and also a need to illustrate potential future 
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developments, timeframes and technological advancements that are achievable and 
realistic.  
The final area of recommendations by Nanologue is that of access to information. The 
majority of the above recommendations are put into jeopardy when access to 
information is a serious issue. The lack of knowledge of nanotechnology and that of 
the ELSAs of nanotechnology (see also Chapter 4.5) cannot solely be attributed to the 
complexity of nanotechnology, as a lot of information is already ‘out there’. However, 
it was felt that the information is neither available in one central place nor is it always 
accessible. Thus the final recommendations are as follows: 
• A ‘clearing centre’, hosted by an institution with high social legitimacy, could be 
set up; 
• Activities could be initiated that involve the general public via museums or 
science centres for example; 
• Producers of products that contain NT-components should inform and engage 
with retailers; 
• Labelling of NT products has been suggested, while others were cautious about 
this. A public discourse on this issue might be needed; 
• Journalists and the media should be directly targeted with information both 
about benefits and risks (Nanologue, 2006, p. 76) 
6.3.2 Assessing the recommended actions and recommendations  
When reviewing the above recommendations, no matter whether they were formed 
by the researchers, by the members of civil society or by the Nanologue group 
themselves and no matter whether the recommendations focus on assessing 
nanotechnology related risks, funding or involving the public, what becomes obvious is 
that the key to each of those areas is information, or better still, data, information and 
knowledge. What matters is not only know-how, but also know-what and know-who. 
What matters is the data, the information and the knowledge available to experts and 
what is not available to the ‘have nots’. Possibly more than ever before, it matters 
what can be known by whom and what cannot. The table below (in no particular 
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order) summarises the main recommendations from Nanologue (see also Chapters 
6.3.1.1 -6.3.1.3), and also reiterates some of the commonly named problems.  
List of commonly named problems List of recommendations/actions 
• conflicting messages  
• complexity 
• public's ability to understand 
• simplification of content 
• contextualisation  
• relating risks to particular 
nanotechnologies 
• information sharing and 
transparency 
• media focussing on negative 
headlines 
• simplification of content 
• contextualisation  
• education and political advisory  
• administrations and politicians to stay informed about 
nanotechnology developments 
• governments should take a lead on public outreach and 
information 
• to use funding to structure and balance the public 
debate 
• information sharing on toxicity and the transparent 
sharing of knowledge by the business 
• communication of ELSA should be a condition of all 
grants 
• scientists have training in media, communication and 
ethics 
• science education system needs to be updated 
• train the public in popular science and science literacy  
• public dialogue needs to be as transparent and open as 
possible 
• avoid public information overload  
• focussing on the benefits of nanotechnology 
• a clearing centre or central place that hold information 
for all 
• correct use of mass media 
• targeting journalist and the media with information both 
about benefits and risks 
Table 19: Summary of Nanologue’s recommendations and actions 
The above table is the result of analysing Nanologue’s research and by grouping it 
according to items that have been identified as issues by the participants of 
Nanologue’s studies and by comparing it to recommendations made by both the 
participants of Nanologue’s survey and by Nanologue itself. A number of 
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contradictions can be seen. Although it shows that no matter whether the 
recommendations are aimed at governments, policy-makers, the industry or experts 
themselves, it all comes down to information and knowledge. What is does not show is 
what has been established in the knowledge framework, that different types of 
information and knowledge require different approaches, have different target 
audiences and are often dependent of specialists in order to interpret meaning.  For 
example, the table shows that some of the recommendations are, at the same time, 
also problems: simplification of content is one example, contextualisation another. 
Thus, the public’s limited ability to understand knowledge-intensive and complex 
technologies is a challenge for all involved. Neither the industry nor governments can 
lie back and simply wait. Therefore, a closer look at these issues is required. 
6.3.2.1 Assessing problems  
A number of the recommendations are, at the same time, problems in their own right. 
For instance, simplification of content; that is, making outcomes and findings of 
nanotechnology research and nanotechnology-related risk research available to the 
public in a manner that it can clearly be understood by the public without the need to 
have to have a science education background. On the one hand, simplification of 
content has been named as one of the major issues relating to knowledge-intensive 
technologies, yet on the other hand, it is part of the recommendations to overcome 
the exclusiveness of science research. How can one bridge that gap? Nanologue 
presented simplification of content as both part of the problem and part of the 
solution, yet Nanologue failed to illustrate how this can be achieved. By applying the 
knowledge framework (see Chapter 5.2, Table 13), one can classify the problem as 
knowledge by acquaintance (or tacit knowledge) specific and the solution as a matter 
of providing descriptive or explicit knowledge (or information). Both classifications of 
knowledge, however, as this thesis has shown, target different audiences. In other 
words, pure science and technology research targets other scientists; peer-reviewed 
publications are not only not aimed at the public, but are also often not accessible by 
the public, which in turn, poses another problem – accessibility. What are options of 
transforming expert knowledge into publicly understandable information? Edwards 
argues that “technical knowledge invariably declines into technocracy unless we also 
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invest in the knowledge-making and interpretive capacities of the broadest range 
possible of the population” (Edwards, 2010). Thus, two options shall be discussed, 
including their obstacles. 
Option 1 – Let the expert be the informer 
The first option would use an expert to overcome the problems of simplifying content. 
Here, an original participant of research would, in addition to his/her research 
publication, also write a popular scientific version of the research outcomes and, if 
applicable, their potential implications. The main advantage of this option is that first-
hand knowledge could be passed onto a larger audience. The obstacles to this 
approach are threefold:  
First, this approach would require the experts to have the relevant communication 
skills.  As shown by the use of expert testimony in court cases, not all experts have the 
ability to convey their research findings in ways that make them understandable, and 
henceforth, usable by the general public (Page & Lopatka, 2004).  
The second obstacle is that a number of experts work solely on individual components 
or aspects of a bigger problem, thus “*i]t is misleading to think of the expert as being 
perfectly clear-headed about all aspects of their domain” (Firlej & Hellens, 1991, p. 23). 
As shown with the case of the potential genotoxicity of nanosilver in onions (Babu, 
Deepa, Shankar, & Rai, 2008), researching individual components does not 
automatically lead to wider conclusions. Thus, even if this information were made 
available, it would not paint a complete picture for the public, and the result of public 
reactions may easily turn into a negative one.  
The third obstacle is that of making experts release descriptive versions of their 
research to the public. Nanologue, for instance, suggested that funding should be tied 
to public participation (Nanologue, 2006). Although the ideas sound compelling at first, 
in reality this is a larger issue in itself, as (1) this could be enforced for public funding 
only and (2) it immediately brings the first two of the above mentioned obstacles on 
the table. Furthermore, should public funding really discriminate against researchers 
who may not have the skills to communicate outside their domain? And what if the 
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release of partial information, that is, information that relates only to components or 
small areas of larger research issues, leads to premature panic or other kind of 
negative public reactions? Again, the research of Babu et al. (2008) can be used to 
illustrate an example: showing the potential genotoxicity of nanosilver in onions does 
not automatically mean that nanosilver has genotoxic properties that can negatively 
affect all root vegetables.  
In addition to the three obstacles above, one needs also to take the corporate sector 
into account. As shown in Chapter 4.3, corporate funding exceeded public funding for 
the first time in 2007, thus rendering Nanologue’s recommendation obsolete for the 
majority of research carried out when taking the use and enforcement of patents and 
intellectual property rights into account.  
Option 2 – Use knowledge elicitation  
As opposed to Option 1, knowledge elicitation does not rely on the original expert or 
author to issue/write a version of his/her research that would be understandable to 
the public. Knowledge elicitation, which is the process of retrieving knowledge from a 
human expert (Hoffman, Shadbolt, Burton, & Klein, 1995), uses knowledge elicitors to 
extract expert knowledge (Firlej & Hellens, 1991). Knowledge elicitors are experts in 
their own right, or, in other words, are knowledge elicitation experts. The purpose of 
knowledge elicitors is to understand an expert’s skill, to document domain-specific 
knowledge and to structure and prepare the elicited content for further use (Firlej & 
Hellens, 1991). The process is based on two main components or steps: creating views 
and layering the knowledge. Creating views is used to represent smaller areas of the 
knowledge domain (unless the experts’ domain is very small) and then layering comes 
into play in order to break elicited content into smaller components. Here, the aim is 
to “move downward from general high level characteristics, through successive levels 
of greater and greater detail until the required level of detail has been achieved…” 
(Firlej & Hellens, 1991, p. 156). Knowledge elicitation is normally carried out by using 
varying interview techniques, depending on subject matter and circumstances, 
followed by an analysis phase and a review phase. The latter two aim to prevent the 
knowledge elicitor either adding or misinterpreting domain-specific knowledge.  
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The main advantage of using knowledge elicitation is to obtain first-hand knowledge 
that often would not be available otherwise. In addition, and depending in the skill set 
of the knowledge elicitor, additional information may be revealed of which the domain 
knowledge holder may have not been aware (Gourlay, 2002, 2004; Polanyi M., 2000; 
Firlej & Hellens, 1991). Furthermore, obtaining domain-specific knowledge by means 
of knowledge elicitation can be targeted, thus allowing governments, institutions and 
organisations to obtain specific knowledge and information as per their needs.  
The main obstacles are cost, availability of knowledge elicitors and access. Firlej & 
Hellens provide some insights into the costs of knowledge elicitation. If, for instance, a 
total of ten hours (i.e 5 x 2 hours) of interview time is required, then the total amount 
of man hours, by taking preparation time, time for transcripts, and time for the 
analysis and review periods into account, will amount to 245 hours, which equals 
seven weeks (Firlej & Hellens, 1991). The second obstacle is availabilty of knowledge 
elicitors. In short, there are not many knowledge elicitors available, as this is an 
expertise in itself. In other words, there is a reason why the term knowledge elicitor is 
not a well known job title or description and why the field has not received much 
recognition within academia or in the corporate world. The majority of research was 
either carried out in the 1990s when Knowledge Management was a popular subset in 
Business Studies and Management Sciences (Hoffman, Shadbolt, Burton, & Klein, 
1995), or as part of research focussing on (computerised) expert systems (Firlej & 
Hellens, 1991). The final obstacle to knowledge elicitation is access. Similar to the 
observation mentioned for Option 1, when the majority of research is funded by 
corporations, then access becomes an issue due to the potential enforcment of 
intellectual property rights.  
Considering the above obstacles of Option 2, there remains the question as to whether 
knowledge elicitation is a viable alternative to Option 1, which, as has been shown, 
comes with its own issues. The lack of academic research and literature on the topic of 
knowledge elicitation notwithstanding, there is no easy answer to the question. Taking 
the current levels of public understanding of nanotechnology into account (Currall, 
King, Lane, Madera, & Turner, 2006; Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen, 2008; 
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Nanologue, 2006), the dire need for actions and options, however, becomes clear. 
Nanologue (2006) suggested to link public partcipation to the availability of funding. 
Although it has been shown that this is an issue when linking it to experts directly (see 
Option 1), linking knowledge elictitation to the availability of public funding could be a 
viable alternative, as it does not discriminate against experts that lack personal 
communication skills. Furthermore, public funding often involves focussing on specific 
target areas and topics (see EUs Framework Programmes), thus obtained information 
can be structured and distributed accordingly.  
6.3.2.2 Assessing recommendations  
The use of funding to structure and balance the public debate as one of Nanologue’s 
recommendations has been discussed above. Despite the discussed obstacles to this, 
Nanologue are not alone with their recommendation: “With respect to the future, 
government funding should be provided for interdisciplinary research centres that 
promote collaborative research among physical scientists, engineers and social 
scientists” (Currall, King, Lane, Madera, & Turner, 2006, p. 155). Currall et al., however, 
recognise the limits and explicitly refer to government funding. The next point raised 
by Nanologue is to provide training in media and communication to scientists. As 
Option 1 has shown, this may be perceived as discriminatory by some scientists and, 
bar regulatory changes and subsequent enforcement, it may only be applicable to 
publicly funded research. In other words, this recommendation relies on voluntary 
participation by scientists and despite its good intentions, the expected positive 
outcomes of this are, at this point in time, pure conjecture.  
The next two recommendations that need to be assessed here are the suggested 
correct use of mass media and the targeting of journalists and the media with 
information about benefits and risks. Again, Nanologue do not provide any specifics as 
to how this can be achieved. There is no doubt, that framing plays a vital role. 
However, what are the chances that positive framing with emphasis on the positive 
side of nanotechnology will dominate the public debate? Realistically, the chances are 
not good. Why? Nanotechnology, as well as a number of other new and emerging 
technologies, such as Genetic Engineering or Synthetic Biology, are simply too good an 
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example for negative, ‘doom and gloom’ headlines. When considering how the public 
informs itself by breaking down news coverage by quality and distribution, or 
circulation, then the likelihood of an all-positive debate becomes slim.  Nonetheless, a 
closer look into how the public informs itself should reveal some insight. Just to show 
an example, the UK and German newspaper markets shall be compared to illustrate a 
high-level view of how the public in both countries sources its main print-based 
information.37 For example, Table 15 below shows newspaper circulation in the UK by 
quality and numbers: 
Newspaper Year Circulation Type 
United Kingdom 
The Sun 2006 3,148,700 Tabloid 
The Daily Mail 2006 2,340,255 Tabloid 
Daily Mirror 2008 1,494,000 Tabloid 
Daily Telegraph 2008 874,000 Broadsheet 
Daily Express 2008 745,000 Tabloid 
Daily Star 2008 726,000 Tabloid 
The Times 2007 618,160 Broadsheet 
The Guardian 2007 355,750 Broadsheet 
The Independent 2008 240,503 Broadsheet 
Financial Times (UK) 2007 133,665 Broadsheet 
Germany 
Die Bild 2008 3,345,468 Tabloid 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 2008 457,353 Broadsheet 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2008 387,064 Broadsheet 
Die Welt 2008 279,004 Broadsheet 
Frankfurter Rundschau  2008 161,867 Broadsheet 
Financial Times Deutschland 2008 104,101 Broadsheet 
Table 20: Tabloid and broadsheet circulation in the United Kingdom and Germany (Tryhorn, 2008; WAN, 2008) 
This simplified view of the print market in both countries shows that in the UK, tabloids 
outsell broadsheets by a roughly 4:1 and in Germany by roughly 2.5: 1. Considering 
that the reach of each newspaper is three times as high as the number of sold copies, 
at any given day, approximately 25 million people in the UK obtain their print-based 
information from tabloids, and slightly more than 10 million people in Germany. Thus, 
recommending the ‘correct use’ of mass media as well as targeting journalists and the 
                                                     
37 It shall be by no means suggested here that this study is representative for the entire media market. 
In order to achieve such a view, radio, TV and the full spectrum of the Internet as news resource needed 
to be investigated. The purpose of investigating the print and online newspaper market is solely to get a 
better understanding of some of the potential issues involved.  
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media with information about benefits and risks of nanotechnology is a moot point. 
The University of Plymouth conducted a survey of British newspapers and their 
coverage of nanotechnology between April 2003 and June 2004. The press coverage of 
nanotechnologies at that time was limited to a small number of ‘elite newspapers’  
(Petersen, 2006), which, as Table 15 shows, have a fairly limited circulation in 
comparison to tabloids. The number or appearances of news coverage on 
nanotechnologies was as follows:  The Guardian (24%), The Times (19%), The Financial 
Times (14%), The Independent (10%), and The Daily Telegraph (7%). Tabloids, or mass-
market newspapers, reported relatively scarcely on nanotechnology during the survey 
period. The News of the World was the only paper not to feature any articles 
containing the keywords nano or nanotechnologies (Petersen, 2006). The study also 
showed that a “significant amount of the coverage was not authored by a health, 
science or environmental correspondent or editor - writers who are likely to have at 
least some knowledge of the area. Indeed, 57% of items in the sample were by 
"general" or "other" correspondents” (Petersen, 2006). When considering Petersen’s 
findings about who authored these articles, then Nanologue’s recommendation to 
target the media with information about benefits and risks of nanotechnology seems a 
good idea at first sight. However, it also begs the question whether such endeavour 
would rather further these trends, as one might argue that the journalistic work 
involved in writing science-based news and articles can now be left to general 
correspondents, since detailed information has already been provided. In addition, the 
above figures show that the reach of news coverage of nanotechnology is very limited, 
which in turn questions whether the media are the right vehicle in the first place? This 
view is confirmed by Scheufele et al. (2007) who argue that the levels of attention that 
nanotechnology and its risk have received in mass media have been low. A quick 
search for the term nanotechnology on the most popular tabloids’ websites revealed 
the following: 
The Sun listed 8 stories in total between 2004 and 2008; The Daily Mail listed 46 stories 
between 2000 and 2008 and the Daily Mirror listed 11 stories between 2003 and 2008. 
To make things worse, the results of the websites’ search engines listed everything 
that contained the word nanotechnology, from film news to celebrity news. Similar to 
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Petersen’s observations made when reviewing the results of the UK broadsheets (see 
Figure below); the news coverage can be classified as either neutral (balanced), 
positive (accurate, beneficial) or negative (inaccurate, sensationalised, detrimental). 
 
Figure 17: Broadsheet coverage of nanotechnology (Petersen, 2006) 
The Sun’s coverage contained four sensational and one neutral headline (the other 
three stories were actually not related to nanotechnology). The Daily Mail contained 
nine outright negative headlines38 and 17 sensationalised headlines39. The few positive 
and accurate messages that were reported by The Daily Mail had been sensationalised.  
The results of the Daily Mirror were comparable to that of The Sun.40  All in all, this 
paints a dire picture, not only on the coverage of nanotechnology in general, thus 
confirming the observations made by research carried out on the public’s 
understanding of nanotechnologies (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, & Cohen, 2007; 
Currall, King, Lane, Madera, & Turner, 2006), but also on the ‘correct use’ of the mass 
media as suggested by Nanologue. The main problem with this recommendation is not 
that it does conflict with current trends, as shown above, but that it lacks applicability 
when taking the news market into account. The scarcity of news coverage as reported 
                                                     
38 Outright negative headlines are viewed as ones that mainly play on the negative and speculative risk 
side of nanotechnology. For example: “Alert over the march of the 'grey goo' in nanotechnology 
Frankenfoods” or “The beauty creams with nanoparticles that could poison your body”.  
39 For example: “Revolutionary device 'can detect bird flu in 30 minutes” or “Could tiny golden bullets 
kill cancer?”. 
40 Personal search carried out by entering the word ‘nanotechnology’ in the provided search function of 
the website of The Sun (www.thesun.co.uk), The Daily Mail (www.dailymail.co.uk) and the Daily Mirror 
(www.mirror.co.uk). Search carried out on January 20, 2008. 
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by Peterson (2006), and results found by searching the websites of the tabloids need 
to ask the validity of this recommendation in question. Without judging the quality of 
nanotechnology coverage in tabloids, one fact remains: the news corporations that 
own these newspapers run a business, and the realm in which they operate is a free 
market. Simply put, both in Germany and in the UK, tabloids outsell quality 
newspapers by far and this is simply due to public demand. Nanotechnology, and 
especially positive news about nanotechnology do not sell newspapers.  
By applying the knowledge framework and the findings above to the recommendations 
made by Nanologue, then a number of issues become apparent (see Table 16 below). 
Six of the recommendations are dependent on the transformation of tacit knowledge 
into explicit knowledge (or knowledge by acquaintance into descriptive knowledge). 
The obstacles to this have been shown in the discussion of Options 1 and 2 (see 
Chapter 6.3.2.1). Four recommendations are dependent on research being publicly 
funded (also see the discussion of Options 1 and 2 in Chapter 6.3.2.1), thus rendering 
the recommendation for the majority of current research obsolete. The final four 
recommendations are being made moot due to the realities of the media market, as 
discussed in this chapter. What remains is the question as to whether such a harsh 
view on the quality of the recommendations made by Nanologue diminishes the 
quality of the research carried out, and subsequent questions about the value of 
Nanologue’s study?  
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List of recommendations/actions Dependency or issue 
simplification of content transformation of explicit into tacit knowledge 
education and political advisory  transformation of explicit into tacit knowledge 
administrations and politicians to stay informed 
about nanotechnology developments transformation of explicit into tacit knowledge 
governments should take a lead on public 
outreach and information transformation of explicit into tacit knowledge 
to use funding to structure and balance the public 
debate only applicable to publicly funded research 
communication of ELSA should be a condition of 
all grants only applicable to publicly funded research 
scientists have training in media, communication 
and ethics if at all, only applicable to publicly funded research 
science education system needs to be updated transformation of explicit into tacit knowledge 
train the public in popular science and science 
literacy  
transformation of explicit into tacit knowledge and 
news market based on free market values 
focussing on the benefits of nanotechnology news market based on free market values 
a clearing centre or central place that hold 
information for all only applicable to publicly funded research 
correct use of mass media news market based on free market values 
targeting journalist and the media with 
information both about benefits and risks news market based on free market values 
 Table 21: Applying the knowledge framework to selected recommendations 
First of all, the importance of Nanologue’s research cannot be stressed enough. 
Nanologue’s research has purposefully been chosen to serve as a case study for this 
thesis, as it combined expert opinion with non-expert opinion and because it was the 
first study carried out on such a major scale. Also, it linked researchers from four 
different institutes across Europe, within four different countries (Germany, 
Switzerland, the UK and Italy). Furthermore, Nanologue’s approach focussed on both 
nanotechnology and the ELSAs of nanotechnology, thus providing a unique 
opportunity to gain expert and public insight into the current debate (see Chapter 4.5).  
Where did things go wrong then? Actually, they didn’t. Nanologue’s recommendations 
are on a par with the majority of (policy) recommendations given by social scientists. In 
fact, they are fairly representative of what so far has been the ‘standard mode’ of 
providing recommendations. This ‘standard mode’ can be defined by the commonly-
used wide spectrum that is applied to recommendations without actually being 
specific. In other words, currently, recommendations such as ‘scientist and society 
should work together’ or ‘the public should be more involved’ are very much standard 
recommendations made to governments or policy-makers. The point that shall be 
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made here is that the use of scientific knowledge and expert opinion needs to change, 
going forward. As part of a panel discussion organised by the Royal Society, Ian Gibson 
put it as follows: “in terms of science and how we use the knowledge of science in 
decision-making and policy-making has a long, long way to go yet” (RSA, 2004, p. 10).  
The ESRC (2007) summarised explicit as well as implicit social and economic 
implications of nanotechnology after having carried out an extensive literature review. 
Based on these findings, a number of recommendations can be identified. Although a 
number of researchers have identified ethical concerns with regards to 
nanotechnology, not many have specifically identified the need to involve the public. 
Although, MacDonald (2004) stresses the need for “greater synergy between scientists, 
society and corporations” (ESRC, 2007, p. 38), Williams-Jones (2004) implies that 
meaningful public engagement is essential, Sweeney et al. (2003) ask for the 
involvement of the public, Wolkow (2004) highlights substantial societal implications, 
Sheremeta & Daar (2004) ask for the investigations of public perception and 
engagement, Schummer (2005) suggest that “nano-scientists and social scientists are 
best placed to comment on social and ethical implications” (ESRC, 2007, p. 45), and The 
Royal Netherlands Academy (2004) suggests that there “are lessons to be learned from 
the GM controversy, and the introduction of new technologies should be carefully 
managed” (ESRC, 2007, p. 43). There was no mention of the potential difficulties the 
public or policy-makers might have to understand nanotechnology. The suggestions 
made in this thesis with regards to both the knowledge-intensity and complexity of 
nanotechnology have not been mentioned once as being an issue.     
Similar to the findings of the ESRC (2007), and again without providing the ‘how’, 
Maynard (2006) suggests developing “communication activities that enable technical 
information to be summarized, critiqued and ultimately synthesized for various 
interested parties, including decision-makers and consumers. The advent of the 
Internet provides an ideal venue for such activities and we encourage its use in 
communicating with the end-users of risk-based science” (Maynard, 2006, p. 269). The 
first suggestion is echoed by Currall et al. (2006) as well as Bainbridge and Rocco 
(2005) (see below), who, however, are more specific in terms of who should take on 
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such a task. The latter recommendation is similar to that of both Nanologue (2006) and 
Currall et al. (2006), who suggested using clearing-houses as a means of distributing 
information on nanotechnology to the public. Currall et al. (2006) as well as Bainbridge 
and Rocco (2005) suggest making use of respected institutions, such as the Royal 
Society and Royal Academy of Engineering in the UK and the National Academies in the 
United States. The Royal Society agrees with these recommendations: 
We recommend that the research councils build on the research into public 
attitudes undertaken as part of our study by funding a more sustained and 
extensive programme of research into public attitudes to nanotechnologies. 
This should involve more comprehensive qualitative work involving members of 
the general public as well as members of interested sections of society… We 
recommend that the Government initiates adequately funded public dialogue 
around the development of nanotechnologies. We recognise that a number of 
bodies could be appropriate in taking this dialogue forward (Royal Society, 
2004, p. 87). 
These institutions could be used a bridge between researchers working on 
nanotechnology and the risks of nanotechnology, and the public as well as policy-
makers. The need for such a clearing-house seems to confirm what has been noted 
earlier. Krohn suggested that instead of leaving actors alone with infinite amounts of 
information, it would be better if there were “an agency promising to be specialised in 
knowing how to read and use information” (Krohn, 2001, p. 8140). This insight has to 
be seen as very much opposed to generalised statements, such as ‘educate the public’ 
(Nanologue, 2006). However, the point must be to provide information that is based 
on a person’s ability to comprehend, be it members of the public or a policy-maker, in 
order to “minimize the likelihood that the public develops polarized perceptions of 
nanotechnology based on rumour and supposition and hence avoid potential 
overreactions such as those that occurred with GMO” (Currall, King, Lane, Madera, & 
Turner, 2006, p. 155). In this regard, and considering that there is not much public 
interest in nanotechnology at the moment, appropriate recommendations still need to 
be defined. This does not come as a surprise when considering that even the EU’s 
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nanotechnology strategy remains vague with regards to ‘involving the public’ and only 
stresses the needs for: “an ongoing dialogue with the media and public opinion, based 
on dissemination of scientific knowledge, to provide the public with an assurance that 
the potential dangers for health or the environment are being monitored, and also to 
forestall misunderstandings concerning nanotechnological developments” 
(Commission, 2004, p. 83).  
To summarise, the majority of recommendations provided in current research on 
nanotechnology, the ELSA of nanotechnology, and on either integrating the public in a 
debate or on informing the public about nanotechnology remain vague at best. The 
most explicit ones available to date are the ones, from and about, the Royal Society. 
Many of the other recommendations highlighted above are, albeit good-willed, too 
broad, too normative, and not very hands-on, and thus, not specific. Bar the example 
of the Royal Society, the majority of recommendations do not take ‘know-who’, ‘know-
what’, ‘know when’ or ‘know how’ into account. In other words, the majority of 
recommendations lack specificity with regards to who needs to do what, how and by 
when should it be done?  
As for Nanologue and their study, an additional criticism of their recommended actions 
and recommendation is that Nanologue failed to make a distinction between 
recommendations for public research and the private sector, corporate research. 
Nanologue did not distinguish between who needs to do what. For instance, the 
majority of the 1741 recommendations summarised in Table 14 are not applicable to 
the corporate world, as many of them are simply of no concern to corporate funding. 
In addition, Nanologue did not distinguish between what can be known by, for 
instance, members of the public, or, simply put laypersons. As mentioned before, 
Nanologue’s study has been one of the most comprehensive to date and the areas that 
have been criticised throughout this thesis are only symptomatic for what has been 
standard practice when studies and research that have been carried out provide 
recommendations. 
                                                     
41 Nanologue’s recommendation extends beyond the ones mentioned here. For the purpose of this 
thesis, the 17 most relevant have been extracted and summarised in Table 14. 
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6.4 Applying the findings to theories of the policy process  
Following the research findings of the aforementioned studies by Kahan et al. (2007, 
2008), Nanologue (2005, 2006) and Currall et al. (2007), three things have become 
clear: 
 there is not enough knowledge about nanotechnology,  
 there is not much interest by the public 
 there is not much known about the ELSA’s of nanotechnology. 
Although this does not seem to be a problem when approached from Ostrom’s point 
of view, it somewhat feeds into Moe’s general statement about the expertise problem, 
that is, the general lack of expertise when it comes to scientifically unknowns. This 
premise, however, is an issue when it comes to Sabatier’s AC point of view. In 
advocacy coalitions, information plays a key role. The situation gets worse, when 
expertise is limited. As noted by Nanologue (2006), a number of nanotechnology 
experts felt uncomfortable answering questions about the ELSA of nanotechnology, as 
they saw nanotechnology itself as the area of expertise, but not the ELSA’s. In a more 
practical example, once could argue that researchers such as Babu et al. (2006), 
Oberdörster et al. (2007) and Guo et al. (2008) are all experts in nanotechnology, and 
as such may either not be able or willing to acts as experts for nanotechnology risks. 
Furthermore, questions remains to what extent such a pure research scientist would fit 
with the use of information at the advocacy building stage, that is, to build coalitions of 
like-minded actors. The likelihood that existing advocacy coalition members are trying 
to extend their coalition by ELSA experts is much higher. This seems also supported by 
the Nanologue findings, which suggests that the interest of the pure scientist in 
regulatory affairs is somewhat limited. What is more, the participating researches in 
Nanologue’s study actually demanded additional information on nanotechnology for 
non-experts, for instance, if these non-experts were involved in creating regulation 
(Nanologue, 2006).  
The previously stated lack of general information on nanotechnology is also a problem. 
Although the approaches of Ostrom and Moe do not directly emphasise the use of 
information, when it comes to making policy choices, at least at some point, the use of 
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information is required. Ostrom’s approach of search and trial-and error learning in 
order to reduce uncertainty seems somewhat problematic in the light of a complex 
subject matter, such as nanotechnology. The most obvious reason is the generally 
acknowledged (Nanologue, 2006; Currall, King, Lane, Madera, & Turner, 2006) lack of 
available material for non-scientists. The material that is already available is mostly of 
a pure research nature; and if it is corporate research, then it is even less likely to be 
available. Even if participants in Ostrom’s model were able to work with pure science 
publications and also able to extract relevant information for policy purposes, time 
would always be the issue. P. M. Haas (2004) already pointed out that the time 
necessary for developing credible knowledge is too long, and as such, time tends to 
interfere with the short-term needs of using knowledge in making policy. The same 
principle applies to Ostrom’s approach.  
Nonetheless, information plays a role here. It is used as a measure, for instance, when 
it comes to past performances. The decision to trust an actor is based on available 
information with regards to whether this particular actor has been trustworthy in the 
past. When considering the novelty of nanotechnology, two assumptions can be made: 
either the actors involved in nanotechnology policy-making are new, as the subject 
matter is new or the actors are the same, only the subject matter is new. In the first 
instance, information about the trustworthiness of actors would not exist. In the other 
example, information about the trustworthiness of actors would play a major role, but 
these ‘known’ actors would not have any particular knowledge about the subject 
matter, which may either be perceived externally as a problem or by the actors 
themselves, as they potentially would not want to jeopardise the trust gained and 
built-up over time. Both scenarios have a profound impact on the dynamics of the 
institutions. As actors assume that their goals can be best achieved through 
institutions, actors will attempt to maximise their efforts in order to do so. Thus, 
specific choices over institutional arrangements will differ not only in both of the 
above scenarios, but also between actors. The uncertainty that is currently inherent in 
nanotechnology could lead to a multitude of actors trying to advance their interests 
according to their own preferences; there is no guarantee that they would work 
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together and could form a somewhat collective opinion of the issue at hand. In the 
case of nanotechnology, this, however, is exactly what is currently required.  
Although information plays a key role in the AC framework, the lack of information 
also has an impact. This has to do with the fact that advocacy coalitions tend to use 
information during the coalition building stage. Here, the awareness about the lack of 
information, as documented by Nanologue, is in itself information, and, as such, could 
be used by a coalition to their advantage. For instance, any new and emerging 
technology, such as nanotechnology, needs time to reach a larger audience. If, in an 
advocacy collation stage, existing members have already some awareness of potential 
issues of nanotechnology, then exactly this information could be used as perception 
filter in order to strengthen the coalition’s core belief well in advance before opposing 
views become known. Also, knowing that the provision of some knowledge to 
individuals without prior knowledge of nanotechnology tends to exacerbate existing 
opinions (Kahan et al., 2007; Peter D. Hart Research Associates, 2008) can be used 
actively to the advantage of a coalition.  
In Moe’s structural choice framework, the lack of available information is less of a 
problem. Here, political uncertainty is a primary force between competing actors often 
resulting in political compromise at the expense of technical expertise. Thus, technical 
information, such as about the risks of nanotechnology, play a lesser role. However, as 
interest competition impacts outcomes with regards to the achieved compromises, the 
lack of available information could be used by one of the participating groups to their 
advantage. By withholding information, for instance, dominant groups could shape 
structural decision to their advantage. The question that remains is whether this would 
have long-lasting impact? Moe sees structural choice as a perpetual process that never 
ends; choices can be modified or reversed later: “Battles lost today can be won 
tomorrow, and vice versa” (Moe, 1995, p. 146). However, Moe make one additional 
and crucial point: in the context of political parties in government, structural decisions 
are taken at the start of the reign of a political party and “*m+ost of the pushing and 
hauling in subsequent years is likely to produce only incremental change” (Moe, 1995, 
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p. 146).  Here, the lack of information, be it due to its unavailability or because it has 
been withheld does impact structural choices.  
An associated aim of the knowledge framework was to use the different knowledge 
types in an attempt to identify which, if at all, could be used or explain the terms 
information, knowledge and expertise used by the aforementioned theorists. To 
reiterate, Ostrom uses the term information with regards to the information-
processing capabilities of actors; either in model-building by assuming that actors can 
have complete information and infallible information processing capabilities, or by 
applying what Ostrom calls ‘bounded rationality’, which is assuming that actors have 
much weaker information processing capabilities. In both cases, nonetheless, Ostrom 
is not specific about what type of information this could be. However, she does specify 
what she considers what this information is to encompass: “information available to a 
participant … about actions, outcomes, and their linkages…“ (Ostrom, Gardner, & 
Walker, 1994, p. 31). Unfortunately, this is very vague, when compared to the 
knowledge framework. From a decision-making perspective, this could include policy 
information and other descriptive and explicit knowledge used for policy making. It 
also could include technical expertise or acquired direct knowledge by any of the 
participating researchers at any of the stages in Ostrom’s model. It also may not. Thus, 
it might be more useful to limit this assessment to the ‘bounded rationality’ stage, 
where actors, simply put, cannot process all available information, and therefore, 
where information may remain unused. “Under bounded rationality, the information 
needed for many of the rigorous selection criteria is not assumed to be present” 
(Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994, p. 35). In many cases, it is assumed that the 
amount of available information is larger than the information processing capacities. 
Thus, a rather large amount of available information will not be utilised and, as a 
result, actors are going to make mistakes. Here also, no further insight is provided 
about the type of information missed by participating actors.  Again, this could include 
any or some of the types used in the knowledge framework, but it may also not. This is 
unfortunate, as by using specific information types within Ostrom’s model, the 
outcomes could be fine-tuned and the results could potentially become more 
accurate. Furthermore, and although this cannot be said with any degree of certainty 
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do to the lack of details, the opposite could become true. Due to lack of specificity of 
the type of information used on Ostrom’s model, some result may potentially lose 
their validity, when specific information types are assumed. For instance, instead of 
using ‘general information’, that is, descriptive and explicit information about 
nanotechnology in Ostrom’s model, one could use hands-on, personally acquired 
information. In such a case, the assumption that perfect information exists among all 
participating actors would be immediately wrong as soon as one of the participating 
actors were not a hands-on nanotechnology researcher. Even when using the bounded 
rationality, and even when assuming that not all available information is used, the 
approach would still struggle when there were obvious differences not only due to the 
amount of information that can be processed, but due to the lack of one or more 
actors’ capabilities, or better said, knowledge.   
For Moe, the emphasis is on expertise. As it has been established in the knowledge 
framework, expertise is always direct, and thus, acquired knowledge. Furthermore, 
expertise can also include descriptive, and therefore, indirect knowledge. However, 
descriptive knowledge does not include acquired knowledge and explicit knowledge 
does not include tacit knowledge. Therefore, Moe’s use of expertise is an ideal 
candidate to analyse with the knowledge framework. Moe’s point is that in order to 
exercise power in complex situations, for instance in the case of nanotechnology, the 
dominant groups simply lacks the knowledge and expertise.  
Seen from a very simplistic perspective, one could argue that this is exactly the case as 
described by the Nanologue group. The lack of knowledge, and the dependency on 
expertise, which, in the case of nanotechnology is also lacking due to its novelty, leaves 
only one choice in decision-making situations: the reliance on external expertise. If one 
were to follow Moe’s assumptions, this, however, would weaken any dominant group. 
In addition, it would also pose a legitimacy problem, if, for instance, a government 
were to follow Moe’s example and create legislation only to the extent that it 
practically can do, based on available knowledge, while leaving technical aspects to 
external expertise providers. In this scenario, any dominant group following this 
example would not be able to explain the contents of the taken policy-choices, and 
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their rationale to the public. However, in reality and based on current knowledge, the 
situation is actually much worse. This is due to the fact the dominant or challenging 
groups do not own or have access to nanotechnology expertise. As such, this 
possession of knowledge or access to it is still extremely rare, especially outside the 
corporate world. What is more, as established before, expertise in nanotechnology is 
not the same as expertise in health or environmental risks and impacts of 
nanotechnology. This type of expertise is even rarer. Under normal circumstances, 
Moe’s model predicts that technical expertise normally suffers due to political 
compromise between dominant and challenging groups. In the case of a just emerging 
technology, such as nanotechnology, this does not hold true because of the lack of 
relevant expertise required in these choice-situations. In fact, when following the 
example as described here, then one could argue that the central dynamic of Moe’s 
framework is not triggered until a sufficiently large enough body of knowledge on the 
subject matter in question has been established. For this in-between period, that is, 
the time between the emergence of a new highly complex, and expertise-dependent 
technology and the establishment of a large enough body of knowledge, Moe’s 
structural choice framework has been cancelled out. When following this model 
further and when considering the current levels of corporate funding (see Chapter 4.3) 
and corporations’ ability and speed to bring products to market (see Chapter 4.4), one 
could argue that the public interest would be left vulnerable during this ‘in-between’ 
phase, as those who steer public interest are forced to rely on the body of knowledge 
available to all. Corporations would be at an advantage, as they have access to the 
same body of knowledge available to all plus their own knowledge held in patents and 
accumulated by their own experts.   
Sabatier uses the term information in a fashion that often represents technical 
information or quantitative data. For instance, by providing the example of air 
pollution, Sabatier’s view of information is that of technical information used in policy 
change (Sabatier, 1988). As such, this type of information is policy information, when 
compared to the knowledge framework. It is policy information; because it is usable 
information in the sense P.M Haas (2004) defined policy information: it is usable by 
actors involved in making policy choices. But, it is more than just policy information. An 
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important aspect of the AC framework is the use of information very early on in the 
process, for instance, when choosing new, but like-minded participants of a coalition. 
Here, this type of information has a strategic attribute, much more in an economic 
sense than that of policy knowledge. It is strategic in nature, as its intended use is of 
long-term vision. Such information comes very close to the type of information 
described in corporate or business contexts; it is mean to  “change the way the 
receiver perceives something, …” (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 3). This strategic 
information becomes even more important when viewed from Keohane and Nye’s 
political perspective, where strategic information becomes even more important when 
the competitors do no possess it (Keohane & Nye, 1998). This is, however, not to say 
that this is the goal of information use in Sabatier’s framework. Yet, such knowledge 
does provide an added advantage for advocacy coalitions.  
In addition to policy and strategic knowledge, advocacy coalitions make use of one 
added type of knowledge. As the knowledge framework showed, both explicit and 
descriptive knowledge are the types of knowledge most likely understood by the 
public. Thus, the nature of advocacy coalition to use various means to support their 
views, engaging and convincing the public can only be done by providing information 
that is understood. To reiterate, this is also one of the basic principles that 
distinguishes information from pure data; only what is understood can be regarded as 
information. Here, the issue with nanotechnology is that much of the information that 
can be understood by the public needs to be created first, before it could be 
distributed. This, in turn, could also hinder or, at least, slow down the advancements of 
an advocacy coalition. Thus, the current lack of available and usable information can 
also pose a temporary problem to the AC framework. When coupling this with the 
aforementioned current dominance of corporate funding and investing, the question 
that needs to be asked is could an advocacy coalition be dominated by corporate 
players? In principle, the answer is yes. Competing advocacy coalition competing in 
political sub-systems is one of the defining functions of policy-change as seen by 
Sabatier. These policy-subsystems are not limited to areas of government; instead they 
include “actors from a variety of public and private organizations who are actively 
concerned with a policy problem” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 131). Sabatier goes even further 
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and argues that it should “include actors at various levels of government active in 
policy formulation and implementation, as well as journalists, researchers, and policy 
analysts” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 131). Therefore, by definition, an advocacy coalition could 
include corporate representation, or even corporate bias. However, as competing 
views are often mediated by policy brokers, a complete corporate dominance seems 
unlikely. What needs to be kept in mind that the goal of an advocacy collation is policy 
change, which does not happen in a vacuum.  Boundaries, such as cultural and social 
values and existing legal structures apply to all competing advocacy coalitions.  
6.5 Summary 
The main finding of this chapter can be summarised as follows: First, the previously 
established fact that the public does not know much about nanotechnology becomes 
even more an issue when taking the results from the applications of the knowledge 
framework into account. By distinguishing between different types of knowledge, in 
this case, knowledge of and/or about nanotechnology, the knowledge that should be 
made available to the public is descriptive and therefore explicit knowledge or 
information. When considering the complexities of nanotechnology, as it has been 
shown by the example of studies carried out by Babu et al. (2008) and Oberdörster et 
al. (2007), it becomes apparent that this is an issue. It is an issue because the public 
lacks the capacity to comprehend these, as these studies are mere matters-of-
acquaintance (James, 2002) and are therefore realities that can be known only directly. 
A number of recommendations made by researchers (Nanologue, 2006; Currall et al., 
2006; Maynard, 2006, Scheufele et al., 2007, Kahan et al. 2007) and other 
organisations (ESRC, 2007; Royal Society, 2004) involved in nanotechnology have 
acknowledged the need for public engagement, be it due to the acknowledged 
complexities or due to lessons learned from the past (i.e. GMO). However, without 
looking at the different types of knowledge involved and thus without defining the 
required knowledge needed to reach a target audience, in this case the public, nearly 
all recommendations fail short on how exactly a positive dialogue with the public can 
be initiated.  
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The second main issue identified is that of education and (political) advisory. Although 
a number of studies highlighted the areas directly (Nanologue, 2006) or indirectly 
(Royal Society, 2004), so far, no-one has been specific as to how to implement this. 
When it comes to education of the media, a popular example, studies have shown that 
the media currently has no appetite for nanotechnology stories (Petersen, 2006). Even 
tabloids, who after all reach the majority of readers in the UK or Germany, for 
example, shun the topic. The sames goes for quality newspapers; nanotechnology is 
not a popular topic. What is worse, even if it is reported upon, the majority of articles 
are not authored by educated science and technology correspondents (Petersen, 
2006).  A recommendation that has been proposed by the Nanologue Group suggests 
that public administrations and politicians ‘should stay informed’ about 
nanotechnology developments and that the public ‘should be trained in popular 
sciences’ (Nanologue, 2006). Both, however, are problematic when viewed through 
the knowledge framework. By looking at source and at the target audience, it becomes 
obvious that a knowledge transformation needs to happen. To overcome this obstacle, 
two different options were discussed. 
Option 1 focussed on letting nanotechnology researchers being the informers, be it to 
the public or to policy-makers, and Option 2 introduced knowledge elicitors aimed at 
converting directly acquired knowledge into explicit and thus descriptive information. 
Some researchers (Nanologue, 2006) suggested that funding should be used to 
mandate a dialogue with the public; others suggested that that only in the spheres of 
public research funding should be used to encourage public engagement (Currall, King, 
Lane, Madera, & Turner, 2006). This limitation to the sphere of public research stems 
from the insight that as of 2007, the majority of nanotechnology related research is 
now being funded by corporations (see Chapter 4.3). Another limitation that has been 
identified for Option 1 is that not all (public) researchers have the ability to engage the 
public. Experts excel by both a great amount of knowledge and advantageous 
knowledge organisation in order to make functional and efficient use of their 
knowledge (Gruber, 2001). This, however, does not mean that experts are 
automatically experts in knowledge organisation or that an experts’ personal approach 
to knowledge organisation is of such generic nature that it is open and accessible to 
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everyone. According to research on expertise, it is being suggested that experts, no 
matter their domain, are often not good communicators on their own subjects. This is 
due to the fact that they often use their own language/technical jargon, have their 
own styles and are often not explicitly aware of the amount of knowledge they have 
(Firlej & Hellens, 1991).  
Thus, using funding as an instrument to mandate pubic engagement might not only 
being seen as discriminatory by some, but also might ‘drive’ some public researchers 
towards the industry, where such a mandate could not be enforced. In this regard, 
Option 2 offers to be a better alternative, as it could make use of elicitors who have 
the skill to drive out information from experts, no matter whether they are aware of 
their own domain-specific knowledge or not. However, this option has some 
downsides as well: costs, the limited number of people available with knowledge 
elicitation skills, and similarly to Option 1, it would have to be based on voluntary 
agreements and therefore focus mainly on publicly funded research. Although neither 
Option 1 nor 2 are perfect solutions to minimise the current gap in public knowledge 
about nanotechnology, nor are they a perfect solution to the identified issues with 
regards to recommendations to involve the public. What they are, however, are a step 
in the right direction by taking care of the knowledge issue with regards to the target 
audiences, in this case, the public and policy-makers.  
A number of authors (ESRC, 2007; Currall et al., 2006; Nanologue, 2006) have stressed 
that lessons need to be learned from the GMO case when it comes to openness and 
transparency. Yet, transparency in itself will not change the public debate on its own, 
nor will it provide ultimate answers for policy-makers. If the public cannot be involved 
because they are either not aware of what is happening or because they cannot get 
access to the information an intended dialogue itself will not achieve much. Moreover, 
if the public cannot participate because of the lack of skills and knowledge then this 
puts new, and probably unexpected, challenges to all actors involved that have an 
interest in setting up a public dialogue.  
The application of the knowledge framework to the three selected theories of the 
policy process also yielded a number of interesting results. Firstly, Sabatier’s advocacy 
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coalition framework makes most use of different the types of knowledge, depending 
on the goals of such a coalition. Information is used as policy information, when 
appropriate. It is also used as strategic information in order to shape the composition 
of a coalition. And finally, it is used as a form of indirect knowledge when an advocacy 
coalition aims to convince wider audiences, such as the public, of their intentions. 
Although the use of the knowledge framework allowed for the identification of these 
different types on knowledge and information, it is not to say that Sabatier had this in 
mind when developing his approach.   
An unexpected consequence of the use of the knowledge framework was shown when 
applying it to Moe’s structural choice approach.  Instead of using the term information, 
Moe described expertise dependency that exist as a result of lacking knowledge by 
dominant groups. However, in the case of nanotechnology, or any other just emerging 
knowledge-intensive and complex technology, Moe’s approach cannot account for a 
scenario where the expertise requirements cannot be fulfilled due to a lack of such 
expertise, or the lacking access to it. Here, it has been suggested that during this ‘in-
between period’, that is the time between the emergence of such technology and the 
growths of a sufficiently large enough body of knowledge, Moe’s approach cannot be 
used.  
The analysis of Ostrom’s institutional rational choice approach yielded the least useful 
results due to the unspecific nature in which Ostrom uses the term information. 
Without making further assumptions and thus adding to the uncertainty about 
Ostrom’s use of the term information, what can be said for sure is that if Ostrom had 
specified different knowledge types, a number of outcomes IRC scenarios could 
potentially be fine-tuned in order to potentially achieve more accurate results.   
Finally, the lack of specificity when using terms information or knowledge in policy 
context has been highlighted throughout this chapter. The same can be said for policy 
recommendations or recommendations to the public. Information always requires 
understanding by the receiver. Using the wrong type of information simply results in 
information not being received. This can have dire consequences, for instance, when 
the public either does not have information at all or when the public’s needs have 
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been addressed by using the wrong type of information. As studies by Nanologue and 
others have shown, currently the public has neither sufficient information nor the 
desire to learn about nanotechnology. The latter makes the overall situation worse, 
and more complicated for policy making.   
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7. Conclusions 
The thesis set out to investigate whether increasing complexity and knowledge-
intensity will challenge policy-making and also hinder the public’s ability to participate 
in the public debate? This was based on the proposition that due to the increasing 
knowledge-intensity and complexity of new and emerging technologies, a distinction 
between various types of information and knowledge is beneficial, if not 
required/necessary, in order to benefit both the public discourse and policy-making. 
Furthermore, it was proposed that by distinguishing between various types of 
information and knowledge, theories of the policy process can be assessed for their 
applicability to complex, knowledge-intensive and expertise dependent subject 
matters, such as nanotechnology. The overall assumption was that the public has no 
first-hand and thus direct knowledge of this, and that even second-hand knowledge is 
only partially understood. The latter also applies to the majority of policy-makers, who 
are not experts in the fields of nanotechnology.  
After briefly summarising the main findings of nanotechnology, this conclusion will 
summarise the answers to the above questions. First, an assessment of the application 
of the knowledge framework to the policy recommendations and recommended 
actions by Nanologue and other researchers will be provided. This is followed by the 
assessment of the application of the knowledge framework to the three theories of the 
policy process. Finally, an outlook will be provided for the further study of policy-
making and nanotechnology. 
Nanotechnology 
Investigating one knowledge-intensive area in detail was one of the additional aims of 
the thesis. Nanotechnology was chosen as an example of a technology that potentially 
will lead to increasing complexity and knowledge intensity with long-term 
consequences. An increase in worldwide funding of previously unseen proportions 
highlights nanotechnology’s rising importance effectively. Despite the complexities of 
nanotechnologies, a number of products that are either based on nanotechnology or 
that contain nanoparticles are already available; approximately a quarter of them 
contained one particular product: nanosilver. This is problematic, as nanosilver has 
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potential negative impacts on aquatic life, but also in food-production, as recently 
confirmed. Moreover, there is a general lack of existing knowledge in areas such as 
detection and characterisation of nanoparticles, their environmental fate and 
transport, and their toxicology and in particular their ecotoxicology. This knowledge, 
however, is not only important in order to better determine health and environment-
related impacts, but it is absolutely vital when it comes to formulating appropriate 
policy or when it comes to encourage public debate. An additional current issue is that 
the public does not know much about nanotechnology, nor does it seem to be 
interested in it.  
Another objective of this thesis was to establish a framework that focuses on different 
knowledge types that can be used to make distinctions vital in practical contexts. This 
knowledge framework is a matrix for comparing different types of knowledge and 
information. In particular, the framework covered the five different types of 
knowledge: knowledge by acquaintance and tacit knowledge as forms of direct 
knowledge, and knowledge by description and explicit knowledge as forms of indirect 
knowledge as well as policy knowledge. The aim was to apply the different knowledge 
types against technical data about nanotechnology, and nanosilver in particular, and 
against the results of intensive qualitative surveys undertaken by Nanologue and other 
studies: By identifying ‘knowable content’ by groups of ‘knowers’, the applicability and 
usefulness of policy recommendations and recommended actions were assessed.    
The Nanologue group made a number of recommendations. A selection of them has 
been assessed for their dependency on the transformation of tacit knowledge into 
explicit knowledge. Six of the recommendations were dependent on the occurrence of 
this knowledge transformation. In addition, four of the listed recommendations were 
found to be dependent on research being publicly funded and another four other were 
dependent on the good-will of the media. When comparing Nanologue’s 
recommendations with that of other research, it put Nanologue’s findings in 
perspective, and it was shown that they were fairly representative of what is common 
practice when providing recommendations. This common practice is characterised by 
its focus on a rather wide spectrum of recommendations with regards to target 
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audience and suggested actions while at the same time, lacking specificity. The 
majority of recommendations remain vague at best, as they remain good-willed, yet 
far too broad, too normative, and not very specific. Out of all recommendations 
reviewed for this thesis, only the Royal Society was specific; the majority of 
recommendations do not take ‘know-who’, ‘know-what’, ‘know when’ or ‘know how’ 
into account, and, as shown when compared to the knowledge framework, do not 
distinguish between different types of knowledge. By employing a best case scenario, 
the importance of doing so has been illustrated effectively, as in reality, overly positive 
scenarios as such do not exist; at least not with regards to nanotechnology or 
nanosilver. 
A number of recommended actions of the Nanologue group suggest training the public 
in popular science and science literacy and explaining the benefits of nanotechnology 
to society. Although this suggestion is good-willed, and factually not incorrect, it only 
describes ways of reaching the public, but not the means to ensure that the public 
accepts the offered training. Unless the public sees a personalised benefit in gaining 
knowledge, informing the public may not yield the expected outcomes; such a 
personalised payoff seems unlikely given the absence of any targeted instruments for 
inducing this. The problem with nanotechnology is that the public has no interest in it. 
As this has been established by Nanologue and by other studies, it came as a surprise 
to see Nanologue suggesting the ‘correct use of mass media’. In this regard, Nanologue 
highlighted that correct framing of issues is vital and suggested to focus on the 
benefits of nanotechnology. However, the question that needs to be asked here is 
whether this might not achieve the opposite? If the dialogue with the public should be 
transparent and open, as suggested by the participants of Nanologue’s study, would 
intentionally positive framing not bear the risk of coming across as being dishonest, if 
found out? Nanologue argues that the reason is to avoid a public information 
overload.  Again, the problem is the lack of specificity with regard to ‘what can be 
known by whom’. Without making an assessment about what information can be 
provided to whom, and what the likely uptake is, these recommendation and 
recommended actions fail to acknowledge the complexity of nanotechnology. This is 
somewhat surprising, as Nanologue learned from the attending researchers, that many 
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that were experts in the field of nanotechnology were not comfortable with the ELSAs 
of nanotechnology and indicated that they lacked an overview of the subject matter 
that is ELSA (Nanologue, 2006). It was this particular statement that made it clear that 
a distinction between nanotechnology experts and experts of ELSA of nanotechnology 
needs to be made; an expert in nanotechnology is not automatically also an expert in 
the impacts of nanotechnology, for instance, environmental or human health impacts. 
If a researcher is an expert in working with nanoscale silver particles, it does not make 
him/her an expert in the impacts of nanosilver exposure.   
The difficulties of accessing and harnessing expertise have been highlighted 
throughout this thesis. One of the additional objectives of this thesis was to identify 
tools that could help overcome potential stumbling blocks for policy-makers and the 
public. Two of these tools have been identified as alternative means of accessing 
expertise. The first option refers to using experts directly as the group that informs the 
public and advises policy-making. Here, two problems have been identified:  
1. It requires the experts having the relevant communication skills, which is not 
always a given.    
2. A number of experts work solely on individual components and could therefore 
only report on parts of what potentially be bigger issues.  
Thus, this option has its limitations. However, in instances where these two issues do 
not occur, it must be regarded as the preferred option. To put it in the context of the 
knowledge framework, this means that if the holder of acquired expertise can utilise 
personal skills that enable him/her to transfer this knowledge without a loss of 
information into publicly understandable, descriptive knowledge, then the resulting 
descriptive knowledge holds the potential to be (nearly) epistemically equal to that of 
acquired knowledge. 
The second option suggests utilising knowledge elicitation. The advantage is that 
knowledge elicitation does not rely on the original expert to be the informer, thus 
circumventing the two issues highlighted above. Retrieving knowledge from an expert 
is done by knowledge elicitors whose task is to document an expert’s skill. The 
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advantage of using knowledge elicitation is that acquired first-hand knowledge can be 
obtained that otherwise would not be available. Furthermore, additional information 
may be revealed of which the domain knowledge holder may have not been aware. 
The main obstacles are cost, availability of knowledge elicitors and access. The latter 
becomes an issue when research is funded by corporations, as the majority of 
nanotechnology research already is today. Another advantage is that knowledge 
elicitation can be used to target specific areas, thus allowing governments, institutions 
and organisations to obtain specific knowledge and information as per their needs. 
Again, the preferred option must be option 1, but this is limited to the instances 
described above. Hence, option 2 should be utilised as well for as long as cost, access 
and availability of knowledge elicitors are not an issue. 
When trying to apply the problems that come with complex, knowledge-intensive and 
expertise depended new technologies to society, be it to evaluate risks vs. benefits or 
to carry out a prognosis on the long lasting impacts, it becomes clear that technology 
itself is not the problem. The problem is one of culture, cultural acceptance and 
change. As has been shown in this thesis, nanotechnology is complex, difficult to 
understand by a layperson and yet it is not nanotechnology itself that poses 
difficulties. Recent studies into public perception of nanotechnology show that it is 
wrong to assume that ‘all that needs to be done’ is to inform the public with 
scientifically sound information. This is not only due to ordinary citizens lacking both 
time and expertise to assess information properly, but also because people tend to 
evaluate information based on their own cultural disposition and preference, that is, 
existing values often play a greater role than available scientific knowledge. Public 
perception of nanotechnology is imperative for shaping the future of its development. 
Past experiences have shown that negative public perception can shape the direction 
and pace of scientific activity. Nuclear power, GMO, embryonic stem-cell research and 
biotechnology are some of the best known examples.  
Theories of the policy process 
Another core objective of the thesis was to assess selected criteria of a number of 
theories of the policy process with regards to the usefulness of identifying different 
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types of knowledge and information. The use of the knowledge framework, for 
instance, helped to establish that knowledge by description and explicit knowledge 
have one major downside; laypersons still require the help of expert knowledge 
holders to understand things that go beyond mere factual knowledge or headline 
information. In a policy context, the main aim of information is actually to reduce 
uncertainty and to increase clarity and consistency of decision-making as well as to 
improve the quality of public debate. This pertains to the public and to policy-makers 
alike. From an expert-knowledge point of view, there are doubts as to whether policy-
makers are able to properly manage and respond to these challenges. It has been 
suggested that the use of scientific knowledge in decision-making and policy-making is 
still insufficient. The reliance on experts and, therefore, on their authority is 
problematic at best. Due to the nature of expert knowledge, a clear distinction must 
be made between producing knowledge, offering an expert opinion and decision-
making. This has been confirmed by the application of the knowledge framework; 
data, information and knowledge available to policy-makers differ from that available 
to experts.  
It has been argued throughout the thesis that the correct use of terms, such as data, 
information, knowledge and expertise is increasingly important for policy-making and 
for the policy sciences. With regards to policy making and the importance of 
information and knowledge, this view can also be found in the literature. A similar 
view, however, cannot be found when it comes to the theories of the policy process. 
Thus, the knowledge framework has also been used to assess three theories of the 
policy process in order to investigate the usage of information, knowledge and 
expertise. To reiterate, Ostrom uses the term information to describe information-
processing capacities of actors, Moe uses knowledge and expertise dependency as key 
component, while for Sabatier information also plays a key role in in advocacy 
coalitions.  
Ostrom (1991) uses the term information in her IRC approach in a rather unspecific 
and generic fashion. Information is used with regards to the information processing 
capacities of actors. The application of the different knowledge types of the knowledge 
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framework, from which different information types can be derived, showed the least 
useful results. This was due the lacking specificity given to information in Ostrom’s 
approach, which, in turn, makes a proper analysis of potential impacts of specifying 
different knowledge types very difficult, without adding further assumptions. This 
should be avoided, as this could lead to adding even more uncertainty about Ostrom’s 
use of the term information. Therefore, what can be said is that if Ostrom had 
specified different types of information, a number of outcomes of the ICR scenarios 
could potentially be fine-tuned in order to achieve more accurate results.   
Moe (1995) did not use the term ‘information’; instead he used the term ‘expertise’ 
and argued that expertise dependency is a result of the lack of knowledge of dominant 
groups. When using nanotechnology as an example, the application of the knowledge 
framework showed that Moe’s approach failed to account for a scenario where 
required expertise cannot be provided, simply due to its unavailability. However, it has 
also been established that this period is limited to the time when a new complex and 
knowledge intensive technology, such as nanotechnology, emerges and the time 
required until a sufficiently large enough body of knowledge has been established. 
During this ‘in-between’ period, however, the central dynamic of Moe’s approach is 
not being triggered. As a result, Moe’s assumption that technical expertise is being 
sacrificed for the sake of political compromise, due to constant use of arguments and 
counter arguments of opposing groups may not hold true, as, simply put, there is not 
enough data, information and knowledge available that could support opposing 
arguments.  
When applying the knowledge framework to Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework, 
it showed that information has various uses. It is used as policy information, it is used 
strategically, for instance, when it comes to shaping the composition of an advocacy 
coalition and it is used as a form of indirect knowledge, when advocacy coalitions aim 
to reach wider audiences, such as the public. The latter could also be described as an 
authoritative form of knowledge. Most commonly, however, information used in 
Sabatier’s framework is policy information, that is, technical information or 
quantitative data used by actors involved in policy change. Policy information has to be 
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adequate for its purpose; it has to be useful information. A lack of this information, as 
in the case of nanotechnology impacts Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework more 
than any other of the aforementioned theories. Although under certain circumstances 
it could also be useful (for instance, when information is generally scarce but some 
members of a coalition have some awareness), they could potentially use it to 
influence the composition of a coalition. In most cases, however, it is disadvantageous 
due to the fact that information impacts a coalition’s core belief, and thus, determines 
the stance on a particular subject matter. One the one hand, the formation of this core 
belief could be delayed and give the opposing coalition sufficient time to form their 
counter-belief. On the other hand, if a general lack of information and knowledge is 
widely accepted, opposing views will take even longer to form, thus potentially 
delaying any action.  
As this thesis has shown, much can be learned by acknowledging the differences that 
exist between the varying types of information and knowledge. The research has been 
approached as prototypical case study, that is, the assumption was made that findings 
from this research will play a greater role in the future, as the number of increasingly 
complex and expertise dependent technologies will only rise. Thus, one of the main 
findings of this research is that terms such as data, information, knowledge and 
expertise should only be used in a context-specific way, and most importantly, should 
never be used as a substitute for one another. This is the more important as the rising 
complexity of technology will also lead to a rise in complexity of policy-making. Making 
deliberate distinctions between various knowledge types can help to distinguish how 
information can flow from the expertise holder to the non-expert. It also helps to 
distinguish different types of knowledge holders, thus opening up options to better 
address information deficits. Based on what has been established in this thesis, further 
study should concentrate on investigating the impacts of knowledge on policy-making 
and vice versa.  
Using Sabatier’s framework to study knowledge in a policy context will be more fruitful 
than the study of knowledge using either Ostrom’s or Moe’s approaches. In both 
Ostrom’s and Moe’s cases, this is due to the already assumed limited information 
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processing capability of actors and the expertise dependency. Sabatier’s framework, 
however, offers more to the study of knowledge. One option would be to particularly 
assess the role core beliefs play on acquired knowledge. For instance, if there were 
already an existing belief on the environmental, social and legal aspects of 
nanotechnology, how, if at all, would that impact the acquisition of knowledge in that 
area?  Similarly, and perhaps easier to accomplish, one could assess the impact of an 
existing belief on the availability of explicit knowledge. Would an existing core belief 
impact the amount of information available, and would competing core beliefs lead to 
an acceleration of the provision of explicit knowledge? 
However, Moe’s approach could also be further studied by applying different types of 
knowledge to different actors, such as the bureaucracy or political appointees, or to 
specific parts of government, such as the legislature or judiciary. Here, one could 
compare acquired expertise of professionals who function as independent experts to 
the descriptive knowledge of careerists who must concern themselves with political 
uncertainty. This could be studied under the assumption that both groups are 
constantly concerned with the pressures of reputational information, that is, how 
opposing interest groups and actors see them and how this impacts the utilisation of 
their respective knowledge types. Furthermore, by carrying out a comparative analysis, 
one could attempt to identify which of these is potentially more useful to either break 
the stalemate of political compromise or which of the two has the potential to ensure 
that technical information is not being sacrificed for the sake of short-term political 
victory.  
Outlook 
Further studies need to be carried out with regards to the impacts of nanotechnology. 
Although lessons can be learned from other areas, such as the climate change or GMO, 
the complexity of nanotechnology itself suggest that this may not suffice. If current 
trends of the number of already available and expected nanotechnology-related 
products are accurate, than the number and the variety of different types of products 
will go beyond what GMO production has delivered to date. Considering that the 
current focus, especially the corporate focus, is on mainly new nanotechnology based 
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products, then both the simultaneous development of new nanoparticle detection 
technologies and health and environmental impact analyses of new nanoparticles are 
required. The main challenge here is to create incentives for corporations to combine 
product based R&D with research on detection technologies and the impact of 
nanoparticles on health and the environment. In turn, a number of current findings on 
nanotechnology should be applied to other highly topical issues, such as Climate 
Change or GMO. In particular, the findings with regards to the general of lack of public 
interest and about the influence of available information on the perceptions of 
technology risk have the potential to provide useful insights for policy-makers. 
Then, the transfer of expertise requires both further study and further specialisations. 
In particular, studies will be required that detail the free access and transfer of 
expertise held by corporations, as it is assumed that this will differ from the 
accessibility and transferability of expertise held by public organisations. This should 
include further studies of instruments that would compel corporation to cooperate 
with such expertise transfer. Also, in addition to the two options already discussed in 
this thesis, new methods and tools that can be employed in expertise transfer require 
further study. This could be combined, for instance, with the continued study of 
knowledge distinctions, as introduced in this thesis. In particular, the study of 
knowledge by acquisition vs. knowledge by description yielded useful results and 
merits further research. Yet, this has not been studied much further since Russell.  A 
promising candidate for further study is Sabatier’s AC framework. Both the success and 
the dynamics of opposing coalitions could be studied by applying this concept against 
coalition members in order to measure and identify success criteria of advocacy 
coalitions.     
Furthermore, policy studies would benefit from the existence of a classification of 
areas of technology by their inherent complexity. This is the more important as 
nanotechnology is only a forerunner; it is only one example of new sets/types of 
technologies of growing significance. Other emerging technologies are genetic and 
biomedical engineering and Synthetic Biology. Such a classification would benefit both 
corporate and governmental actors during the policy process. In particular, areas such 
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as policy alternatives, conflict resolution and the evaluation of impacts would benefit 
from such as clarification. Especially the latter is of importance, as policy-makers need 
to fully understand what the consequences of their policy-choice are. In order to get 
that insight, the expertise dependency problem needs to be solved. Therefore, already 
existing technologies and highly complex issues, such as GMO or Climate Change, 
could also benefit from such classification. Considering the already dominant 
corporate funding of, and subsequent advances in nanotechnology, the relations 
between the state and corporations in terms of steering policy developments with 
regards to the new complex and knowledge-intensive technology also requires further 
attention.  
  
P a g e  | 232 
Bibliography 
 
Alberts, D. S., & Papp, D. S. (Eds.). (2000). Information Age Anthology: National Security 
 Implications of the Information Age - Volume 2. Wahsington D.C.: CCRP 
 Publication Series. 
Alberts, D. S., & Papp, D. S. (Eds.). (2001). Information Age Anthology: The Information 
 Age Military - Volume 3. Washington D.C.: CCRP Publication Series. 
Alberts, D. S., & Papp, D. S. (Eds.). (1997). The Information Age: An Anthology on Its 
 Impact and Consequences - Volume 1. Washington D.C.: CCRP Publication 
 Series. 
Amidon, D. M. (1998). Blueprint for 21st Century Innovation Management. Journal of 
 Knowledge Management , 2 (1), 23-31. 
Amin, A., & Thrift, N. (Eds.). (1999). Globalization, Institutions, and Regional 
 Development in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Atherton, J. S. (n.d.). Learning and Teaching: Tacit knowledge and implicit learning. 
 Retrieved Feburary Accessed: 12., 2003, from 
 http://www.dmu.ac.uk/~jamesa/learning/tacit.htm 
Babu, K., Deepa, M. K., Shankar, G. S., & Rai, S. (2008). Effect of Nano-Silver on Cell 
 Division and Mitotic Chromosomes: A Prefatory Sire. The Internet Journal of 
 Nanotechnology , 2 (2). 
Bainbridge, W. S., & Rocco, M. C. (Eds.). (2005). Managing Nano-Bio-Info-Congo 
 Innovations: Concerging technologies in society. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Barbiero, D. (2004). Tacit knowledge. (C. Eliasmith, Ed.) Retrieved May 12, 2005, from 
 http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/tacitknowledge.html 
Bechmann, G., & Stehr, N. (2000). Risikokommunikation und die Risiken der 
 kommunikation wissentschaftlichen Wissens. GAIA , 9 (2), 113-121. 
P a g e  | 233 
Beck, U. (2000). The Post-National Society and its Enemies. Prometheus (04), 6-19. 
Beck, U. (2000). What is Globalisation? In D. Held, & A. McGrew (Eds.), The Global 
 Transformation Reader. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Behra, R., & Krug, H. (2008). Nanoparticles at large. Nature Nanotechnology , 3 (May), 
 pp. 253-254. 
Bell, D. (1976). The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society. Harmondsworth: Penguin 
 Books. 
Bell, W. (1997). Foundations of Future Studies Vol.1. New Brusnwick: Transaction 
 Publishers. 
Bell, W. (1998). Foundations of Future Studies Vol.2. New Brusnwick: Transaction 
 Publishers. 
Benton, T., & Craib, I. (2001). Philosophy of Social Science. Houndsmills: Palgrave. 
Bernstein, D. E. (1998). Non-Scientific' Experts: What Degree of Judicial Scrutiny Should 
 They Face? Critical Legal Issues Working Paper No. 89. Retrieved September 14, 
 2006, from SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=141115 
Bhagwati, J. (2004). In Defense of Globalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bittlingmayer, U. H. (n.d.). "Spaetkapitalismus" oder "Wissensgesellschaft"? Retrieved 
 July 07, 2002, from http://www.bundestag.de/cgi-bin/druck.pl?N=parlament 
Bloom, D. E. (2000). Social Capitalism and Human Diversity. In OECD, The Creative 
 Society of the 21st Century (pp. 24-78). Paris: OECD. 
BMBF. (2006). Nano-Initiative - Aktionsplan 2010. Berlin: Bundesministerium fuer 
 Bildung and Forschung. 
Bonny, S. (2003). Why are most Europeans opposed to GMOs? Factors explaining 
 rejection in France and Europe. Electronic Journal of Biotechnology , 6 (1), 50-
 71. 
P a g e  | 234 
Bosso, C. J. (1994). The Contextual Bases of Problem Definition. In D. A. Rochefort, & R. 
 W. Cobb (Eds.), The Politics of Problem Definition (pp. 182-203). Lawrence: 
 University Press of Kansas. 
Boswell, C. (2008). The political functions of expert knowledge: knowledge and 
 legitimation in European Union immigration policy. Journal of European Public 
 Policy , 15 (4), 471-488. 
Bowman, D. M., & Hodge, G. A. (2008, August). ‘Governing’ nanotechnology without 
 government? Science and Public Policy , 35 (7), pp. 475-487. 
Boynton, P. M. (2007). Expert Knowledge: what we can and can’t expect from ‘experts’ 
 in the media. Retrieved Febuary 22, 2007, from 
 http://www.mediawise.org.uk/display_page.php?id=485 
Boynton, P. M. (2003). How to spot PR-based research. Retrieved February 22, 2007, 
 from www.mediawise.org.uk/files/uploaded/How%20to%20spot%20PR.doc 
Brewer, G. D. (1999). The challenges of interdisciplinarity. Policy Sciences , 32, 327-337. 
Busch, P., & Richards, D. (n.d.). Graphically defining articulable tacit knowledge. 
 Sydney: Department of Computing, Macquarie University. 
Cairncross, F. (1997). The Death of Distance. London: Orion. 
Castells, M. (1998). End of Millenium. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Castells, M. (1997). The Power of Identity. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Castells, M. (1996). The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Chen, H., Rocco, M. C., Li, X., & Lin, Y. (2008). Trends in nanotechnology patents. 
 Nature Nanotechnology , 3, pp. 123-125. 
Cinquegrani, R. (2002). Futurist networks: cases of epistemic community? Futures , 34, 
 779-783. 
Colebatch, H. B. (2006). What work makes policy? Policy Sciences , 39, 309-321. 
P a g e  | 235 
Commission. (2004). EU Policy for Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies. Towards a 
 European strategy for nanotechnology. COM(2004)338. 
Commission. (2005). Nanosciences and nanotechnologies: An action plan for Europe 
 2005-2009. COM(2005)243. 
Cortada, J. W. (1998b). Introducing the Knowledge Worker. In J. W. Cortada, Rise of the 
Knowledge Worker (pp. xiii-xix). Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Cortada, J. W. (Ed.). (1998a). Rise of the Knowledge Worker. Boston: Butterworth - 
 Heinemann. 
Cortada, J. W. (1998c). Where did knowledge workers come from? In J. W. Cortada, 
 Rise of the Knowledge Worker (pp. 3-22). Boston: Butterworth - Heinemann. 
Crick, M. R. (1982). Anthropology of Knowledge. Annual Review of Anthroplogy , 11, 
 287-313. 
CRN. (n.d.). What is Nanotechnology? Retrieved February 5, 2008, from Centre for 
 Responsible nanotechnology: http://www.crnano.org/whatis.htm 
CSP. (2008). Presidential Leadership to Ensure Science and Technology in the Service of 
 National Needs. Washington D.C. 
Cummings, T. G., & Worley, C. G. (1997). Organization Development & Change (6th 
 ed.). Cincinnati: South-Western. 
Currall, S. C. (2007). Consumer Myths about Nanotechnology. Retrieved July 26, 2010, 
 from BusinessWeek.com via www.stevecurrall.com: 
 http://www.stevecurrall.com/pdf/Currall_BW_DebunkingNanoMyths.pdf 
Currall, S. C. (2009). Nanotechnology and Society: New Insights into Public Perceptions. 
 Nature Nanotechnology , 4, pp. 79-80. 
Currall, S. C., King, E. B., Lane, N., Madera, J., & Turner, S. (2006). What drives public 
 acceptance of nanotechnology? Nature Nanotechnology , 1, pp. 153-155. 
P a g e  | 236 
Dabek, B. (2006). Top 10 Least Expected Products to use Nano-Technology . Retrieved 
 February 5, 2008, from http://www.aboutmyplanet.com/science-
 technology/top-10-least-expected-products-to-use-nano-technology/ 
Dancy, J., & Sosa, E. (2001). A Companion to Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Davenport, T. H., & Prusak, L. (2000). Working Knowledge. Boston: Havard Business 
 School Press. 
Davies, M. (2001). Knowledge (Explicit and Implicit): Philosophical Aspects. In N. J. 
 Smelser, & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), International Encyclopaedia of the Social & 
 Behavioral Sciences (pp. 8126-32). Elsevier Science Ltd. 
de Haan, G., & Poltermann, A. (2002). Funktion und Aufgaben von Bildung und 
 Erziehung in der Wissensgesellschaft. Freie Universitaet Berlin. 
 Forschungsgruppe Umweltbildung. 
de la Mothe, J. (Ed.). (2001). Science, Technology and Governance. London: Continuum. 
Deloitte. (2008). Technology Predictions. TMT Trends . Deloitte. 
Demortain, D. (2008). Standardising through concepts: the power of scientific experts 
 in international standard-setting. Science and Public Policy , 35 (6), 391-402. 
Desai, P. N. (2007). Traditional knowledge and intellectual property protection: past 
 and future. Science and Public Policy , 34 (3), 185-197. 
Die Zeit. (2005, March 17). Die Billig-Unternehmer. Retrieved November 11, 2006, from 
 Zeit Online: http://www.zeit.de/2005/12/Handwerk 
Drexler, K. E. (1986). Engines of Creation. The Coming Era of Nanotechnology. New 
 York: Anchor Books. 
Drucker, P. F. (1995). Managing in a Great Time of Change. London: BCA. 
Drucker, P. F. (n.d.). The 1994 Edwin L. Godkin Lecture: Knowledge Work and 
 Knowledge Society. The Social Transformations of this Century. Retrieved July 
 30, 2002, from 
P a g e  | 237 
 http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ifactory/ksgpress/www/ksg_news/transcripts/dru
 cklec.htm 
Dudley, G., Parsons, W., Radaelli, C. M., & Sabatier, P. A. (2000). New theories and 
 policy process discontinuities. Journal of European Public Policy , 7 (1), 122-140. 
Edquist, C. (Ed.). (1997). Systems of innovation. London: Pinter. 
Edwards, M. (2010). “Know-How”, “Know-What” and the politics of knowledge for 
 social change. Retrieved October 2, 2010, from Open Democracy: 
 http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/mike-edwards/%E2%80%9Cknow-
 how%E2%80%9D-%E2%80%9Cknow-what%E2%80%9D-and-politics-of-
 knowledge-for-social-change 
Ehdaie, B. (2007). Application of Nanotechnology in Cancer Research: Review of 
 Progress in the National Cancer Institute’s Alliance for Nanotechnology. 
 International Journal of Biological Sciences , 3 (2), 108-110. 
Engels, A., & Ruschenburg, T. (2008). The uneven spread of global science: patterns of 
 international collaboration in global environmental change research. Science 
 and Public Policy , 35 (5), 347-360. 
Ernst, D., & O'Connor, D. (1989). Technology and Global Competition. Paris: OECD. 
ESRC. (2007). Nanotechnology: A Report for the ESRC 2007. Swindon: ESRC. 
ESRC. (2003). The social and economic challenges of nanotechnology. Swindon: ESRC. 
FDA. (2006). Nanoscale Materials. Nomination and Review of Toxicological Literature. 
 Chemical Selection Working Group. Food and Drug Administration. 
Firlej, M., & Hellens, D. (1991). Knowledge Elicitation. London: Prentice Hall. 
Flaherty, J. E. (1999). Peter Drucker: Shaping the managerial mind. San Fransciso: 
 Jossey-Bass. 
Frankfort-Nachmias, C., & Nachmias, D. (2002). Research Methods in Social Sciences. 
 London: Arnold. 
P a g e  | 238 
Franz, H., Kogge, W., Möller, T., & Wilholt, T. (2000). Wissensgesellschaft: 
 Transformationen im Verhaeltnis von Wissenschaft und Alltag. IWT- Paper Nr. 
 25, Institut fuer Wissenschafts- und Technikforschung, Universitaet Bielefeld. 
FST. (2003). Opportunities and threats from nanotechnology. Foundation for Science 
 and Technology. 
Fukuyama, F., & Wagner, C. S. (2000). Information and Biological Revolutions: Global 
 Governance Challenges. Washington D.C.: Science and Technology Institute. 
 RAND. 
Fuller, S. (1991). Social Epistemology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Gatti, A. M., & Montanari, S. (2008). Nanopollution: The Invisible Fog of Future Wars. 
 The Futurist (May-June), 32-34. 
Geißel, B., & Penrose, V. (2003). Lokale Vernetzung und Wissensintegration von Laien(-
 wissen) und Experten(-wissen) durch neue Partizipationsformen. Retrieved 
 November 2, 2007, from Science Policy Studies: 
 http://www.sciencepolicystudies.de/expertise/download.htm 
Goodman, A. H., Heath, D., & Lindee, S. M. (Eds.). (2003). Genetic Nature/Culture. 
 Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Gourlay, S. B. (2004). ‘Tacit knowledge’: the variety of meanings in empirical research. 
 5th European Organizational Knowledge, Learning and Capabilities Conference 
 (2-3 April). Innsbruck. 
Gourlay, S. B. (2002). Tacit knowledge, tacit knowing, or behaving? 3rd European 
 Organizational Knowledge, Learning, and Capabilities Conference (5-6 April). 
 Athens. 
Gross, S. R., & Mnookin, J. L. (2003). Expert Information and Expert Evidence: A 
 Preliminary Taxonomy. Seton Hall Law Review , 34, pp. 134-185. 
Gruber, H. (2001). Expertise, Acquisition of. In International Encyclopedia of the Social 
 & Behavioral Sciences. (pp. 5145-5150). Elsevier. 
P a g e  | 239 
Guo, L., Singh, R. N., & Kleebe, H. J. (2006). Growth of Boron-Rich Nanowires by 
 Chemical Vapor Deposition (CVD). Journal of Nanomaterials . 
Haas, E. B. (1990). When Knowledge is Power. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Haas, P. J., & Springer, F. J. (1998). Applied Policy Research. Concepts and cases. New 
 York: Garland. 
Haas, P. M. (2004). Addressing the Global Governance Deficit. Global Environmental 
 Politics , 4 (4), 1-15. 
Haas, P. M. (1992). Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy 
 coordination. International Organization , 46 (1), 1-35. 
Haas, P. M. (2001). Policy Knowledge: Epistemic Communities. In N. J. Smelser, & P. B. 
 Baltes (Eds.), International Encyclopaedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences 
 (pp. 11578-86). Elsevier Science Ltd. 
Haas, P. M. (2004). When does power listen to truth? A constructivist approach to the 
 policy process. Journal of European Public Policy , 11 (4), pp. 569-592. 
Hagedoorn, J. (1995). Technical Change and the World Economy. Aldershot: Edward 
 Elgar. 
Hager, P. (2000). Know-How and Workplace Practical Judgement. Journal of Philosophy 
 of Education , 34 (2), 281-296. 
Hagget, P. (2001). Geography. A Global Synthesis. London: Prentice Hall. 
Hague, R., Harrop, M., & Breslin, S. (1998). Comprative government and politics (4th 
 ed.). Houndmills: Macmillan Press. 
Hall, P., & Preston, P. (1988). The Carrier Wave. London: Unwin Hyman. 
Hamelink, C. (1986). Is there a life after the information revolution? In M. Traber (Ed.), 
 The Myth of the Information Revolution (pp. 7-20). London: Sage. 
P a g e  | 240 
Hatano, G., & Inagaki, K. (1986). Two courses of expertise. In H. W. Stevenson, H. 
 Azuma, & K. Hakuta (Eds.), Child Development and Education in Japan (pp. 27-
 36). New York: Freeman. 
Hayek, F. (n.d.). The Use of Knowledge in Society. Retrieved July Accessed: 30., 2002, 
 from 
 http://www.virtualschool.edu/mom/Economics/hayekUseOfKnowledge.html 
Heidenreich, M. (n.d.). Die Debatte um die Wissensgesellschaft. Retrieved September 
 Accessed: 07., 2002, from htpp://www.uni-
 bamberg.de/sowi/europastudien/erlangen 
Held, D. (1996). Models of democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Held, D., & McGrew, A. (Eds.). (2000). The Global Transformation Reader. Cambridge: 
 Polity Press. 
Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., & Perraton, J. (2000). Rethinking globalization. In 
 D. Held, & A. McGrew (Eds.), The Global Transformations Reader (pp. 54-60). 
 Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Henderson, J. (1989). The Globalisation of High Technology Production. London: 
 Routledge. 
Hepworth, M. E. (1989). Geography of the Information Economy. London: Belhaven 
 Press. 
Héretier, A. (1999). Policy-Making and Diversity in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press. 
Hillner, J. (2000). Venture Capitals. Wired (8.07). 
Hodgson, G. M. (2000). Socio-economic Consequences of the Advance of Complexity 
 and Knowledge. In OECD, The Creative Society of the 21st Century (pp. 89- 112). 
 Paris: OECD. 
P a g e  | 241 
Hoffman, R. R., Shadbolt, N. R., Burton, A. M., & Klein, G. (1995). Eliciting Knowledge 
 from Experts: A Methological Analysis. Organizational Behavior and Decision 
 Processes , 62 (2), pp. 129-158. 
Hogwood, B. W., & Peters, G. B. (1982). The dynamics of policy change: Policy 
 Succession. policy Sciences , 14, 225-245. 
Hollis, M. (2002). The Philosophy of Social Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press. 
Holzner, B. (1991). Knowledge and action in the emerging world: Social science, the 
 shocks of global structural change, and policy. Knowlegde & Policy , 4 (1/2), 18-
 37. 
Hoogvelt, A. (2000). Globalization and the Postcolonial World. In D. Held, & A. McGrew 
 (Eds.), The Global Transformation Reader (pp. 355-360). Cambridge: Polity 
 Press. 
Hutter, M. (2002). Die Entwicklung der Maerkte für Wissensgüter. Retrieved June 30, 
 2004, from Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung: http://www.wz-
 berlin.de/wissenswert/Praesentationen/Wissensgütermaerkte.doc 
INNI. (2006). Israel Broadens Matching Funds Program for University-Based Nanotech 
 Research Centers. Retrieved February 5, 2008, from Israel Naitional 
 Nanotechnology Initiative: 
 http://www.nanoisrael.org/download/triangle/Triangle%20Donation%20Match
 ing%20Program%20PR%2018SEP06.pdf 
IST 1999 Helsinki. (22-24 November 1999). Exploring the Information Society. Final 
 Report. Information Society Technologies Conference. Helsinki. 
James, W. (2000). Principles of Psychology. Blackmask Online Publishing. 
James, W. (2002). The Meaning of Truth. Blackmask Online Publishing. 
JR Nanotech Plc. (n.d.). What is nanotechnology and nano-silver? Retrieved October 
 17, 2008, from http://www.jrnanotech.com/acatalog/More_Info.html 
P a g e  | 242 
Jussawalla, M., Okuma, T., & Araki, T. (Eds.). (1989). Information technology and Global 
 Interdependence. New York: Greenwood Press. 
Kahan, D. M., Braman, D., Slovic, P., Gastil, J., & Cohen, G. L. (2008). The Future of 
 Nanotechnology Risk Perceptions: An Experimental Investigation of Two 
 Hypotheses. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1089230. 
Kahan, D. M., Slovic, P., Braman, D., Gastil, J., & Cohen, G. L. (2007). Affect, Values, and 
 Nanotechnology Risk Perceptions: An Experimental Investigation. 2nd Annual 
 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies. GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
 261: Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=968652. 
Kahan, D. M., Slovic, P., Braman, D., Gastil, J., Cohen, G. L., & Kysar, D. A. (2008). Biased 
 Assimilation, Polarization, and Cultural Credibility: An Experimental Study of 
 Nanotechnology Risk Perceptions. Available at SSRN: 
 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090044. 
Kaul, H. (2004). Information Resource Sharing Through DLL: The Issues. . DRTC - INDEST 
 (IIT-Dehli), (pp. 2-3). Bangalore. 
Keohane, J. (2010). How facts backfire. Retrieved 10 01, 2010, from boston.com: 
 http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/07/11/how_facts_b
 ackfire/ 
Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. F. (1998). Power and Interdependence in the Information 
 Age. Foreign Affairs , 77 (5), 81-94, online version. 
King, R. (1986). The state in modern society. New Jersey: Chatham House. 
Kling, R. (n.d.). Learning about Information Technologies and Social Change: The 
 Contribution of Social Informatics. Retrieved May Accessed: 14., 2001, from 
 http://www.slis.indiana.edu/kling 
Knoblauch, H. (2005). Wissenssoziologie. Konstanz: UKV. 
P a g e  | 243 
Kommersant. (2007). Nanotechnology Program Approved. Retrieved February 05, 
 2008, from Kommersant : http://www.kommersant.com/p-
 11216/state_corporations/ 
Kondratieff, N. D. (1926). Die langen Wellen der Konjunktur. Archiv für 
 Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik (56), pp. 573–609. 
Krohn, W. (2001). Knowledge Societies. In N. J. Smelser, & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), 
 International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (pp. 8139-43). 
 Elsevier Science Ltd. 
Krug, H. F., & Fleischer, T. (2001). Nanotechnologie - eine Bestandsaufnahme. umwelt - 
 medizin - gesellschaft , 20 (1), 44-50. 
Landes, D. S. (1999a). The Unbound Prometheus. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press. 
Landes, D. S. (1999b). The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. London: Abacus. 
Landman, T. (2000). Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics. London: Routledge. 
Langenscheidt. (2000). Bilingual Dictionary: German - English. Berlin: Langenscheidt 
 KG. 
Lindbloom, C. E. (1977). Politics and markets. New York: Basic Books. 
Lindner, S. H., & Peters, G. B. (1987). A design perspective on policy implementation: 
 The fallacies of misplaced prescription. Policy Studies Review , 6 (3), 459-475. 
Luoma, S. N. (2008). Silver Nanotechnologies and the environment. Old problems or 
 new challenges? Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 
Lustick, I. (1980). Explaining the Variable Utility of Disjointed Incrementalism: Four 
 Propositions. The American Political Science Review , 74, 342-353. 
Lux Research. (2007). State of the Market Report. Retrieved October 18, 2008, from 
 Lux Research: http://www.luxresearchinc.com/info/smr?nano_smr 
P a g e  | 244 
Lyre, H. (2002). Informationstheorie. München: Wilhelm Fink. 
MacDonald, J. (1999). Understanding Knowledge Management. London: Hodder & 
 Stoughton. 
Machlup, F. (1962). The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States 
 (1962). Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Macnaghten, P., Kearnes, M. B., & Wynne, B. (2005). Nanotechnology, Governance, 
 and Public Deliberation: What Role for the Social Sciences? Science 
 Communication , 27 (2), 268-291. 
Maeseele, P. A. (2007). Science and technology in a mediatized and democratized 
 society. Journal of Science Communication , 6 (1), 1-10. 
Majone, G. (1989). Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process. New 
 Haven: Yale University Press. 
Mandel, D. R. (2005). Threats to Democracy: A Judgment and Decision-Making 
 Perspective. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy , 5 (1), 209-222. 
Marris, C. (2001). Public views on GMOs: deconstructing the myths. EMBO Reports , 2 
 (7), 545-548. 
Marsden, C. T. (2000). Regulating the Global Information Society. London: Routledge. 
Martin, B. R., & Nightingal, P. (Eds.). (2000). The Political Economy of Science, 
 Technology and Innovation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Martin, G. (2006). Managing people and organizations in changing contexts. Oxford: 
 Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Martin, W. J. (1995). The Global Information Society. Aldershot: Aslib Gower. 
Martins, D. B. (2001). Knowledge by acquaintance/knowledge by description. In J. 
 Dancy, & E. Sosa (Eds.), A Companion to Epistemology (pp. 237-240). Oxford: 
 Blackwell. 
P a g e  | 245 
Maynard, A. D. (2006). Safe handling of nanotechnology. Nature , 444, pp. 267-269. 
Meehan, E. J. (1993). The Outlook for Policy-making: An Epistemological Perspective. 
 Knowledge & Policy , 6 (2), 54-70. 
Mehta, M. D. (2002). Nanoscience and Nanotechnology: Assessing the Nature of 
 Innovation in These Fields. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society , 22 (4), 
 269-273. 
Moe, T. M. (1995). The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public 
 Bureaucracy. In O. E. Williamson (Ed.), Organisation Theory (pp. 116-153). 
 Oxford: Oxford Univesity Press. 
Mokyr, J. (1992). The Lever of Riches. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Molyneux, S. (1999). Broadband Internet: Future Applications and Challenges. In J. 
 Vince, & R. Earnshaw (Eds.), Digital Convergence - The Information Revolution 
 (pp. 3-12). London: Springer. 
Nano Care Technology. (2007). Retrieved October 17, 2008, from 
 http://www.nanocaretech.com/enyeNewsInfo.asp?id=17 
Nanologue. (2005). Nanologue Mapping Study. Summary of key findings from a 
 literature study on ethical, legal and social aspects of nanotechnologies. 
 Wuppertal Institute (WI),EMPA, Forum for the Future (FFF) and triple innova 
 (TI). 
Nanologue. (2006). Opinions on the Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects of 
 Nanotechnologies - Results from a Consultation with Representatives from 
 Research, Business and Civil Society. Joint publication of the Wuppertal Institute 
 (WI),EMPA, Forum for the Future (FFF) and triple innova (TI). 
Nanotechwire. (2008). Overhyped Technology Starts to Reach Potential: Nanotech to 
 Impact $3.1 Trillion in Manufactured Goods in 2015. Retrieved October 18, 
 2008, from Nanotechwire: http://nanotechwire.com/news.asp?nid=6340 
P a g e  | 246 
Nanovip. (2008). Buzzword: Nanotechnology. Retrieved October 20, 2008, from 
 http://www.nanovip.com/node/53740 
Nanowerk. (2007). The wacky world of nanotechnology consumer products . Retrieved 
 February 5, 2008, from Nanowerk: 
 http://www.nanowerk.com/news/newsid=1711.php 
New Scientist Magazine. (2008, September 10). McCain vs Obama: Who will end the 
 war on science? . Retrieved November 27, 2008, from 
 http://www.newscientist.com/channel/opinion/mg19926733.900-mccain-vs-
 obama-who-will-end-the-war-on-science.html 
Nonaka, I., & Takeuchi, H. (1995). The Knowledge-Creating Company. Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press. 
Oberdörster, G., Stone, V., & Donaldson, K. (2007). Toxicology of nanoparticles: A 
 historical perspective. Nanotoxicology , 1 (1), 2-25. 
OECD. (2001). Knowledge Management in the Learning Society. Paris: OECD. 
OECD. (2000). The Creative Society of the 21st Century. Paris: OECD. 
O'Flynn, T. (2007). Review article: Divided societies and deliberative democracy. British 
 Journal of Political Science , 37 (4), 731-751. 
Oh, C. H. (1997). Issues for the new thinking of knowledge utilization: Introductory 
 remarks. Knowledge & Policy , 10 (3), 3-10. 
Oh, C. H., & Rich, R. F. (1996). Explaining the use of information in public policmaking. 
 Knowledge & Policy , 9 (1), 3-36. 
Open Source Initiative. (2007, March 13). Home. Retrieved October 5, 2009, from 
 http://2opensource.openmirrors.org/ 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (1991). Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward 
 Complementarity. American Political Science Review , 85 (1), pp. 237-243. 
P a g e  | 247 
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., & Walker, J. (1994). Rules, games, and common-pool 
 resources. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
Overman, S. E. (1988). Theory development in policy science. Policy Sciences , 21 (1), 
 109-115. 
Page, W. H., & Lopatka, J. E. (2004). Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise in 
 Antitrust Cases. Retrieved September 14, 2006, from SSRN: 
 http://ssrn.com/abstract=507542 
PEN. (2007). Nanotechnology Surges Into Health And Fitness Products. Retrieved 
 October 21, 2008, from ScienceDaily: http://www.sciencedaily.com 
 /releases/2007/10/071002163854.htm  
PEN. (2008). New Nanotechnology Products Hitting The Market At The Rate Of 3-4 Per 
 Week. Retrieved July 26, 2008, from ScienceDaily: 
 http://www.sciencedaily.com /releases/2008/04/080424102505.htm 
Peter D. Hart Research Associates. (2008). Awareness of and Attitudes toward 
 Nanotechnology and Synthetic Biology. Washington D.C.: Peter D. Hart 
 Research Associates. 
Peters, G. B., & Pierre, J. (Eds.). (2006). Handbook of Public Policy. London: Sage. 
Peters, G. B., & Pierre, J. (1998). Institutions and Time: Problems of Conceptualization 
 and Explanation. Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory , 8 (4), 
 565-584. 
Petersen, A. (2006). Nanotechnology in the news. Retrieved December 16, 2008, from 
 http://nanotechweb.org/cws/article/indepth/23900 
Pickles, J., & Smith, A. (Eds.). (1998). Theorising Transition. London: Routledge. 
Pielke, R. A. (2004). What future for the policy sciences? Policy Sciences , 37, 209-225. 
Pierre, J. (Ed.). (2000). Debating Governance. Authority, Steering and Democracy. 
 Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
P a g e  | 248 
Pierre, J. (2000). Introduction. In J. Pierre (Ed.), Debating Governance. Authority, 
 Steering and Democracy (pp. 1-12). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Polanyi, K. (2001). The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Polanyi, M. (2000). Personal Knowledge. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Polanyi, M. (1969). The Logic of Tacit Inference. In M. Grene (Ed.), Knowing and Being. 
 Essays (pp. 138-158). London: Routledge. 
Polanyi, M. (1966). The tacit dimension. London: Routledge. 
Poole, C. P., & Ownes, F. J. (2003). Introduction to Nanotechnology. Hoboken, New 
 Jersey: Wiley - Interscience. 
Porat, M. U. (1998). The Information Economy: Definition and Measurement. In J. W. 
 Cortada, Rise of the Knowledge Worker (pp. 101-132). Boston: Butterworth - 
 Heinemann. 
Prusak, L. (1998). Introduction to the Series: Why Knowledge, Why Now? In J. Cortada, 
 Rise of the Knowledge Worker (pp. vii-viii). Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Radaelli, C. M. (1999). Technocracy in the European Union. London: Longman. 
Radaelli, C. M. (1997). The Politics of Corporate Taxation in the European Union. 
 London: Routledge. 
Richardson, J. (Ed.). (2006). European Union: Power and Policy-making. London: 
 Routledge. 
Ringland, G. (2002). Scenarios in public policy. New York: John Wiley. 
Rocco, M. C. (2003). Government Nanotechnology Funding: An International Outlook. 
 Retrieved October 2, 2008, from 
 http://www.nano.gov/html/res/IntlFundingRoco.htm 
P a g e  | 249 
Rochefort, D. A., & Cobb, R. W. (1994). Problem Definition: An emerging perspective. 
 In D. A. Rochefort, & R. W. Cobb (Eds.), The Politics of Problem Definition (pp. 1-
 31). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 
Rochefort, D. A., & Cobb, R. W. (Eds.). (1994). The Politics of Problem Definition. 
 Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 
Rosenberg, N., Landau, R., & Mowery, D. C. (Eds.). (1992). Technology and the Wealth 
 of Nations. Standford: Stanford University Press. 
Rowley, J. (1998). What is information? Information Services & Use , 18, 243-254. 
Royal Society. (2004). Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: opportunities and 
 uncertainties. London: The Royal Society & The Royal Academy of Engineering. 
RSA. (2004). Nanotechnology: who benefits from technology like this – and who is 
 accountable? London: RSA. 
Russel, B. (2001). The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sabatier, P. A. (1988). An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role 
 of policy-oriented learning therein. Policy Sciences (21), 129-168. 
Sabatier, P. A. (1991a). Political Science and Public Policy. PS: Political Science and 
 Politics , 24 (2), 144-147. 
Sabatier, P. A. (1991b). Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process. PS: Political 
 Science and Politics , 24 (2), 147-156. 
Sabatier, P. A., & Mazmanian, D. (1980). The Implementation of Public Policy: A 
 Framework of Analysis. Policy Studies Journal , 8 (4), 538-560. 
Salomon, J.-J. (2001). Science, Democracy and Technological Risks. In J. de la Mothe 
 (Ed.), Science, Technology and Governance (pp. 210-222). London: Continuum. 
Scarbrough, E., & Tannenbaum, E. (1998). Introduction. In E. Scarbrough, & E. 
 Tannenbaum (Eds.), Research Strategies in the Social Sciences (pp. 1-26). 
 Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
P a g e  | 250 
Scheringer, M. (2008). Environmental risks of nanomaterials. Nature Nanotech (3), 
 322-323. 
Scheufele, D. A., Corley, E. A., Dunwoody, S., Shih, T.-J., Hillback, E., & Guston, D. H. 
 (2007). Scientists worry about some risks more than the public. Nature 
 Nanotech (2), 732-734. 
Schlager, E., & Blomquist, W. (1996). A Comparison of Three Emerging Theories of the 
 Policy Process. Political Research Quarterly , 49 (3), pp. 651-672. 
ScienceDaily. (2008). University of Wisconsin-Madison. Religion Colors Americans' 
 Views Of Nanotechnology. Retrieved April 27, 2008, from ScienceDaily: 
 http://www.sciencedaily.com /releases/2008/02/080215151215.htm 
Sennet, R. (1999). Der flexible Mensch. Die Kultur des neuen Kapitakismus. Frankfurt an 
 Main: Buechergilde Gutenberg. 
Shipman, A., & Shipman, M. (2006). Knowledge Monopolies. Exeter: Societas. 
Slaughter, R. A. (1997). Reinventing the Future: Foresight and the Rise of 
 Nanotechnology. Retrieved September Accessed: 20., 2004, from 
 www.wfsf.org/pub/publications/Brisbane_97/SLAUGHTER.pdf 
Smith, A. (2000). The Wealth of Nations. New York: The Modern Library. 
Sosa, E., & Kim, J. (2001). Epistemology: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Spinner, H. F. (1998). Informationsgesellschaft. In W. Zapf, & B. Schäfers, 
 Handwörterbuch zur Gesellschaft Deutschlands (pp. 313-325). Opladen: Leske & 
 Buderich. 
Stehr, N. (2002). A world made of knowledge. Lecture at the Conference “New 
 Knowledge and New Consciousness in the Era of the Knowledge Society". 
 Budapest. 
P a g e  | 251 
Stevens, B., Miller, R., & Michalski, W. (2000). Social Diversity and the Creative Society 
 of the 21st Century. In OECD, The Creative Society of the 21st Century (pp. 7-
 24). Paris: OECD. 
Straf, M. (2001). Policy information. In N. J. Smelser, & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), International 
 Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavrioural Sciences (pp. 11560-63). Elsevier 
 Science Ltd. 
Sveiby, K. (n.d.). Tacit Knowledge. Retrieved March 10, 2005, from 
 http://www.sveiby.com/articles/Polanyi.html 
Technology Transfer Centre. (2007). Government funding, companies and applications 
 in nanotechnology worldwide. Retrieved February 4, 2008, from 
 www.nano.org.uk 
The Club of Rome. (2002). No Limits to Knowledge, but Limits to Poverty: Towards a 
 Sustainable Knowledge Society. Hamburg: Club of Rome. 
The Economist. (2006, October 14). The brain business. The Economist . 
The White House. (2008). Budget FY 2008. Retrieved October 2, 2008, from 
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/budget/BudgetFY2008.pdf 
The White House. (2006). State of the Union 2006. Washington D.C.: The White House. 
The World Bank. (1999). World Development Report 1998/99: Knowledge for 
 Development. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Tiessen, R., Andriessen, D., & Deprez, F. L. (2000). Knowledge Dividend. London: 
 Pearson. 
Traber, M. (Ed.). (1986). The Myth of the Information Revolution. London: Sage. 
Tryhorn, C. (2008). Financial Times dips for second month. Retrieved December 17, 
 2008, from The Guardian: 
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/may/09/abcs.pressandpublishing1 
P a g e  | 252 
Tsourikov, V. (2001). Semantic Causal Reasoning: Applications in Patent Intelligence 
 and Concept Extraction. International Chemical Information Conference, (pp. 2-
 3). Nimes. 
Türk, V. (2005). Small talk. Parliament Magazine , pp. 55-56. 
UNESCO. (2005). Towards Knowledge Societies. Paris: UNESCO Publishing. 
United Nations Development Programme. (2003). The Arab Human Development 
 Report 2003. Building a knowledge society. New York: UNDP. 
Van Duijn, J. J. (1983). The long wave in economic life. London: George Allan & Unwin. 
Varwick, J. (1998). Globalisierung. In W. Woyke (Ed.), Handwörterbuch Internationale 
 Politik. Opladen: Leske & Buderich. 
Verhoest, K., Peters, G. B., Bouckaert, G., & Verschuere, B. (2004). The study of 
 organisational autonomy: A conceptual review. Public Administration and 
 Development , 24, 101-118. 
Vince, J., & Earnshaw, R. (Eds.). (1999). Digital Convergence - The Information 
 Revolution. London: Springer. 
Walker, P. M. (1999). Dictionary of Science and Technology . New York: Chambers. 
Wallace, H., & Wallace, W. (2000). Policy-Making in the European Union. Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press. 
WAN. (2008). World Press Trends 2008. Paris: World Association of Newspapers. 
WBGU. (2000). New Structures for Global Environmental Policy. World in Transition. 
 Vol. 2. London: Earthscsan. 
Webster, F. (2001). Information Society. In N. J. Smelser, & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), 
 International Encyclopaedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (pp. 7464-68). 
 Elsevier Science Ltd. 
P a g e  | 253 
Weible, C. M., & Sabatier, P. A. (2009). Coalitions, Science, and Belief Change: 
 Comparing Adversarial and Collaborative Policy Subsystems. The Policy Studies 
 Journal , 37 (2), 195-222. 
Weible, C. M., Sabatier, P. A., & Lubell, M. (2004). A Comparison of a Collaborative and 
 Top-Down Approach to the Use of Science in Policy: Establishing Marine 
 Protected Areas in California. The Policy Studies Journal , 32 (2), 187-207. 
Weible, C. M., Sabatier, P. A., & McQueen, K. (2009). Themes and Variations: Taking 
 Stock of the Advocacy Coalition Framework. The Policy Studies Journal , 37 (1), 
 121-140. 
Wheeler, B. (2006). 1,425,000 migrants in two years? Retrieved September 3, 2006, 
 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/5274476.stm 
Whitman, J. (2007). The governance of nanotechnology. Science and Public Policy , 34 
 (4), 273-283. 
Wielage, M., & Woodcock, R. (2003). Rise and Fall of Beta. Retrieved October 5, 2009, 
 from http://www.geocities.com/videoholic2000/RiseandFall.htm 
Williams, M. (2001). Problems of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Willke, H. (n.d.). Organsierte Wissensarbeit. Retrieved July Accessed: 07., 2002, from 
 http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/pet/zfs.html 
Wilson III, E. J. (1998). Inventing the global inormation future. Futures , 30 (1), 23-42. 
WIPO. (2007). WIPO Patent Report. Statistics on Worldwide Patent Activities. World 
 Intellectual Property Organisation. 
Wolf, E. L. (2004). Nanophysics and Nanotechnology. Weinsheim: Wiley - VCH. 
Yin, R. (1994). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. London: Sage. 
Zapf, W., & Schäfers, B. (1998). Handwörterbuch zur Gesellschaft Deutschlands. 
 Opladen: Leske & Buderich. 
P a g e  | 254 
Ziman, J. (1984). An Introduction to Science Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press. 
Ziman, J. (1991). Reliable Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Zito, A. R. (2001). Epistemic communities, European Union governance and the public 
 voice. Science and Public Policy , 28 (6), 465-476. 
 
 
